The Batavian Navy () was the navy of the Batavian Republic which existed from 1795 to 1806. Founded in May 1795 after the Dutch Republic was overrun by France during the French Revolutionary Wars and transformed into the Batavian Republic, it assumed control over the ships and administrative infrastructure of the Dutch States Navy. The Batavian navy underwent a thorough reorganisation and embarked on several construction programmes in an attempt to match the strength of its main rival, the Royal Navy. Despite this, the British navy inflicted several crushing defeats on the Batavian Navy at the capitulation of Saldanha Bay, Battle of Camperdown and Vlieter incident.
The British also occupied much of the Dutch colonial empire during the French Revolutionary Wars, which the Batavian Navy was powerless to prevent. Despite losing much of its fleet by 1802, the Batavian navy's reorganisations proved to be durable, and it played a role in Napoleon's planned invasion of the United Kingdom and efforts to restore Batavian rule in the Dutch colonies returned by Britain under the Treaty of Amiens. However, the Batavian Navy was again unable to prevent Britain from occupying its colonies after the Napoleonic Wars began in 1803. The Batavian Republic became the Kingdom of Holland in June 1806, with the Batavian navy being transformed into the navy of the Kingdom of Holland.
Background
In 1777, the Dutch Republic embarked on a program of expanding the States Navy, which had suffered from decades of neglect. From 1777 to 1789, 92 warships were built, of which 45 were ships of the line.de Jonge, p. 2 However, from 1789 to 1795, only six ships (including two ships of the line) were built, with the States Navy once again suffering from neglect. While the new ships were built with poor-quality materials, they incorporated recent technological developments such as copper sheathing and carronades. Naval establishments, like the port at Den Helder and the dry dock at Vlissingen were repaired and improved.de Jonge, pp. 2-19
In 1792, the decision was made to reserve a fixed sum on the war budget for maintenance of the States Navy, which had up to that point been the responsibility of the Dutch admiralties. William V, Prince of Orange proposed in 1792 to form a permanent formation of marines, though this was rejected. A few years later, he was more successful with the establishment of a corps of gunners. Plans for establishing a corps of midshipmen, to revise the articles of war for the Dutch navy and to have the government pay for the meals of the crews (instead of charging them for) went nowhere.de Jonge, pp. 24-36
The officers and crews of the Dutch navy were experienced and professional, though the former's knowledge of sailing ship tactics were poor. Officers like Jan Hendrik van Kinsbergen published naval instructions to remedy this situation in the 1780s. Van Kinsbergen also improved the General Seinbook (General signal book) which was used to communicate at sea between ships, along with introducing reforms to improve military discipline in the navy.de Jonge, pp. 38-57 Several improvements were made after the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, but the incompetence of the admiralties was a big drag on progress. Grand Pensionary Laurens Pieter van de Spiegel attempted to reorganize them into a modern navy department, but was thwarted by vested interests. The state of the Dutch, therefore, was dire when war with the French First Republic broke out in 1793, and the Dutch Republic was eventually overrun by the French army in January 1795.de Jonge, pp. 57-64
Establishment of the Batavian navy Abolition of the admiralties and other institutions of the States Navy
Most of the Dutch States Navy was captured by French forces in early 1795. On 23 January 1795, a Dutch fleet of five ships of the line, three frigates, six corvettes and four cutters, immobilized by ice in the Texel roadstead, surrendered to French hussars after the Gecommitteerde Raden of the States of Holland had ordered the fleet's commander Captain Hermanus Reintjes to surrender on 21 January. Other States Navy warships had already surrendered earlier on the orders of the Dutch supreme command; de Jonge, pp. 178-193At the same time seven States Navy warships and a number of Dutch East India Company (VOC) and non-VOC Dutch merchantmen were impounded in British ports. These ships were declared prizes in March 1796 by British authorities and pressed into the Royal Navy or used as merchantmen; de Jonge, pp.199-201 The officers and crews were paid off, and French crews took over the Dutch warships. However, after the Treaty of The Hague had been concluded, the warships were returned to the Batavian Republic. Meanwhile, the old organisational structure of the Dutch navy had been overturned. The office of Stadtholder, who also had been Captain-General of the Dutch States Army, and Admiral-General of the fleet, was abolished right away in the first days of the Batavian Revolution. Soon the admiralty boards were abolished and replaced by a standing Committee on Naval Affairs of the Provisional Representatives of the People of Holland.de Jonge, pp. 203-208This was done on the initiative of Pieter Paulus, a former advocaat fiscaal (military prosecutor) of the Admiralty of Rotterdam, who was chairman of the Provisional Representatives. He also assumed the chair of the new Committee, in which capacity he managed to push through a large number of reforms, even though he soon died in office. To avoid misunderstandings: the Provisional Representatives were an organ of the province of Holland, whereas most of the reforms were formally instituted by the States General of the Batavian Republic. However, this may be explained by the fact that (as under the old Republic) Holland had the most influential delegation in the States General, and often took the initiative that then was rubber stamped by the other provincial delegations. After April 1796 the Committee for Naval Affairs was replaced by a similarly named body of the new National Assembly of the Batavian Republic; de Jonge, pp. 207-208 A measure that would have a long-lasting deleterious influence was the wholesale cashiering of the corps of naval officers.de Jonge, pp. 208-210
Personnel reforms In 1787, after the repression of the Patriot revolution through Prussian military intervention, the Dutch navy was purged of suspected members of the Patriot faction. Many were forced to go into exile (among them Jan Willem de Winter, the future commander-in-chief of the Batavian navy, who was a lieutenant at the time). Many of these people returned with the Dutch troops in the army of the French Republic (de Winter as a général de brigade). They felt not only hatred for the defeated Stadtholderate, but also for its adherents under the naval officers, who had conducted the purge in 1787. The purge that the Naval Affairs Committee now instituted probably was therefore motivated by this rancor, and also by the fear that the "old guard" officers would constitute a "Fifth column". But the immediate effect of the rash measure was that the navy lost a large number of experienced and competent officers, like Admiral Van Kinsbergen, who later refused to return to the service, when they were asked. The Batavian navy, therefore, started out with a new officer corps that was qualitatively substandard, many flag officers having been promoted from subaltern ranks, without having acquired the necessary experience, especially in combat. The new officer corps also became divided between the "new" and "old" officers (after some of those returned) who mutually mistrusted each other, leading to frequent suspicions of disloyalty, even treason.de Jonge, pp. 208-210
The new navy needed a new commander-in-chief immediately and in this post, the former navy lieutenant (but now general) de Winter was appointed (12 March 1795).This decision was also hastened by the fact that a French rear-admiral, Pierre Jean Van Stabel, had come to Flushing, apparently to take command of the Batavian fleet. This was something the leaders of the Republic wanted to avoid at any price; de Jonge, p, 211 This was followed by the appointment of six vice-admirals (one of whom was de Winter) and three rear-admirals on 26 July 1795. The quick elevation of de Winter above his older, and more experienced, colleagues could only cause jealousy, and this later proved a dangerous flaw for the leadership of the navy. Another source of discontent was that the pay scales for the officers were not established for another two yearsAt the same time the establishment of the officer corps was then set at 1 lt-admiral, 4 vice-admirals, 6 rear-admirals, 12 captains first class, 12 captains second class, 36 commanders, 36 first lieutenants, and several hundred subaltern officers; this for a fleet of 20 to 25 ships of the line, and 50 to 60 frigates and smaller vessels; de Jonge, p.214, note 1 (which caused much uncertainty among them, and was seen as a sign of low esteemde Jonge, pp. 211-212).
To assure the quality of the education of naval officers Jan Hendrik van Swinden was appointed "examinator-general." To manage the naval shipyards (each admiralty previously had had one, autonomous, shipyard to build warships) one "constructor-general" was appointed (Pieter Glavimans, the superintendent of the Rotterdam shipyard). The criminal justice system in the navy was put in the hands of a Provost marshal for the navy. A commission for Pilotage was formed under direct control of the Naval Affairs Committee, and an officer charged with surveying the harbors and coastal waters and publishing naval charts.de Jonge, pp. 214-216
Finally, the 1702 Articles of War for the navy were modernized (punishments like keelhauling, inconsistent with the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, adopted by the Provisional Representatives on 31 January 1795, were abolished, and replaced with more humane forms). The General Order for the Service at Sea was also modernized.de Jonge, p. 216
Commission on the state of the fleet The fleet had been severely neglected in the years before the revolution by the old regime (for which the Stadtholder was held responsible by the new regime). To get a view of what the real state of the fleet was, the Naval Affairs Committee appointed a commission, consisting of its member, the distinguished scientist Henricus Aeneae, the future rear-admirals Samuel Story and Engelbertus Lucas, and Constructor-General Glavimans to inspect the ships then in service (26 February 1795). The commission already reported on 26 May 1795.Rapport wegens den staat van 's Lands schepen van oorlog en kleinere vaartuigen tot den zeedienst betreklyk: midsgaders den staat der havens, scheeps- timmerwerven, magazynen, arsenaalen, enz. : zoo als zich die, by inspectie van de Ondergeteekende Leden eener door Hun Hoog Mogenden daar toe aangestelde Commissie bevonden, in het voorjaar, of in de maanden van Maart en April, des Jaars 1795, Volume 1 ('sLands drukkerij 1796) It reported that the navy had available 40 ships of the line of different ratings, 35 frigates, and 104 smaller vessels. However, many of these ships were in bad repair, and could only be made operational after expensive repairs would be made. The commission judged that only four ships of the line of 74 guns, fourteen of 60 to 68 guns, and six of 50 to 56 guns, would be worth the trouble to be made operational; likewise, five frigates of 40 to 46 guns, eight of 36, and eleven of 20 to 24 guns (24 ships of the line and 24 frigates in total). The remainder should be scrapped (at a cost of 3.3 million guilders, while the cost of the repairs would be 4.7 million guilders). Fortunately, the state of the shipyards was satisfactory, though the stocks of materials were below par. The state of the naval installations, like ports and docks, varied, with some needing appreciable investments.de Jonge, p. 221