The Central Bureau was one of two Allied signals intelligence (SIGINT) organisations in the South West Pacific area (SWPA) during World War II. Central Bureau was attached to the headquarters of the Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, General Douglas MacArthur. The role of the Bureau was to research and decrypt intercepted Imperial Japanese Army (land and air) traffic and work in close co-operation with other SIGINT centers in the United States, United Kingdom and India. Air activities included both army and navy air forces, as there was no independent Japanese air force.
The other unit was the joint Royal Australian Navy/United States Navy Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne (FRUMEL), which reported directly to CINCPAC (Admiral Chester Nimitz) in Hawaii and the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Ernest King) in Washington, D.C.
Central Bureau is the precursor to the Defense Signals Bureau, which after a number of name changes is (from 2013) called the Australian Signals Directorate.
Structure Central Bureau comprised: administrative personnel supply personnel cryptographic personnel cryptanalytic personnel interpreters translators a field section which included the intercept and communications personnel
History Origins Beginning in January 1942, U.S. Navy stations in Hawaii (Station HYPO), Cavite/Corregidor (Station CAST) and OP-20-G (Station NEGAT, at Washington) began issuing formal intelligence decrypts far in advance of the U.S. Army or Central Bureau.
General MacArthur had his own signals intelligence unit, Station 6, while he was in command in the Philippines before the start of the war, and was not fully dependent on the U.S. Navy for that type of information. However, most of the signals intelligence he received was from the U.S. Navy's Station CAST, originally at Cavite in the Manila Navy Yard, and evacuated to Corregidor Island after Japanese successes. Prior to the war, it had to be sent by courier, which caused some delay and annoyance.
General MacArthur escaped from Corregidor in the Philippines in a PT boat to Mindanao and flew to Australia from Del Monte on a Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress. He made his way to Melbourne, arriving there on 22 March 1942.
The Signals Intelligence units operating in Australia at the time of MacArthur's arrival in Melbourne were as follows: No. 4 Australian Special Wireless Section at Park Orchards near Ringwood in Melbourne A small Diplomatic and Press intercept section at Park Orchards A Diplomatic cryptographic and intelligence section at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne Some British Army Signals personnel from the Far East Combined Bureau who had escaped from Java A small RAAF Intercept section in Darwin A small RAN intercept and Direction Finding (D/F) organisation A small RAN cryptographic and intelligence section at the Navy Office in Melbourne
and, eventually, after evacuation from Corredigor by submarine, the personnel of Station CAST, the US Navy SIGNIT group in the Far East. They were responsible for channeling all SIGINT information to OP-20-G in Washington. It became known as FRUMEL and obtained IBM equipment in 1942 to replace that which had been left behind in Manila Bay on leaving Corregidor and employed it throughout their tenure in Melbourne.
Establishment of Central Bureau One of Macarthur's first decisions when he arrived in Melbourne was to expand the SIGINT operations already existing in Australia.
Brigadier General Spencer B. Akin, MacArthur's Chief Signals Officer held discussions with Major General Colin Simpson. They agreed that a Research and Control Centre to handle Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) was needed. MacArthur subsequently issued orders for the formation of two complementary groups: An intercept organisation known initially as No. 5 Wireless Section A research and control centre known as the Central Bureau. Initially Central Bureau was made up of 50% American, 25% Australian Army and 25% RAAF personnel.
Central Bureau was a joint US-Australian signal intelligence organisation, established on 15 April 1942 under the command of US Army Major General Spencer B. Akin, with headquarters in Melbourne.Its role was to research and decrypt army and air intercept traffic and work in close co-operation with other SIGINT centres in the USA, United Kingdom and India.
A small Naval cryptographic group also became part of the secret new unit. It was led by Commander Eric Nave, who with Professor Dale Trendall had been working on Japanese diplomatic and naval codes at Victoria Barracks.
Central Bureau was established in a gabled, ivy-clad mansion called "Cranleigh" in Domain Road, at South Yarra, Melbourne.
Major General Akin's Executive Officer, Major (later Colonel) Joe R. Sherr had been evacuated from the Philippines (Station 6). He was responsible for arranging for the first group of US "SIGINT" personnel to come to Australia, and as Akin's control was indirect he was responsible for day-to-day running of the bureau. He was killed when returning from a liaison visit to the wireless Experimental Centre in India, when his aircraft crashed 3 km from Calcutta airfield on 21 September 1943. Sandford had wanted to send "Pappy" Clark to the conference but Akin said that MacArthur would not agree to send Clark (only a major) and so sent Colonel Sherr instead.
He was succeeded by Major Abraham "Abe" Sinkov, a mathematician, who was appointed assistant director of Central Bureau. Sinkov had previously been a senior cryptographer in the US Army Signals Intelligence Service under William F. Friedman. Sinkov had previously been in charge of an intercept station in Panama. He had visited Britain in 1941 to facilitate the exchange of cryptographic information.
With Sinkov (US Army), the three assistant directors were Australians Alistair "Mic" Sandford (Major then Lt-Col, Second AIF) and Roy Booth (Squadron Leader then Wing Commander, RAAF). They acted as head of their respective service organisations; with Sandford the bureau executive officer under Sherr, then Booth from 1944. The bureau functioned well and harmoniously, with job demarcation as Australian experience was from wireless interception and traffic analysis in the Middle East and the Americans in breaking codes and cyphers, although this "broke down" as the war went on. Signals organisations tend to be "meritocratic" rather than on rank.
Experienced intercept Kana operators from a Royal Australian Air Force unit at Townsville were assigned to the new Central Bureau. The RAAF at the time had a number of Kana operators being trained and were about to train a further 13 WAAAF personnel. (Katakana is one of the syllabic forms of written Japanese).
The cryptanalysts who had operated from the Malinta Tunnel during the Battle of Corregidor got out to Australia by submarine in two groups. Their equipment was pushed into Manila Bay. They were used to assist the Australian Wireless Group units. A group of cryptographic, cryptanalytic and translator personnel from the Japanese section of the Washington Signal Intelligence Service were also moved to Australia. More Australians were also recruited to Central Bureau after it was established.
Central Bureau-FRUMEL relations MacArthur was not happy to depend on the Navy's discretion in handling his SIGINT requirements. He felt he had experienced problems with such an arrangement when he was in Manila. MacArthur's Intelligence Officer (G-2) was Major General Charles A. Willoughby.
In Australia the rules laid down by Cmdr Rudy Fabian the head of FRUMEL (through Admiral Leary) for receiving FRUMEL briefings said that Fabian or his representative were to brief MacArthur and his chief of staff Richard K. Sutherland at 1400 each day, but could not copy or distribute the material. The representative was not to be kept waiting. Only MacArthur and Sutherland were to be present; Willoughby, his G2 was excluded. Once Fabian burnt a document in front of Willoughby on his way out and dropped the ashes in his bin to demonstrate that he was not allowed to see it!
Commander Nave moved to Central Bureau in mid-1942 from the combined Australian Navy/U.S. Navy operation in Melbourne known as FRUMEL, which came under U.S. Navy control (Lt Rudy Fabian) in mid-1942. Fabian thought Nave had breached security, and got rid of Nave and the civilians (including Professor Thomas Room, who also went to Central Bureau); the Holden Agreement specifically stated that Eric Nave was not to work at FRUMEL, indicating that Fabian had "friends in high places".
Although Nave headed up the "Solutions" division there, most records indicate he personally dealt with minor Japanese naval codes and simple substitution ciphers in spite of his Japanese language capability and long history with Japanese codes. However Duffy wrote that Nave was actively working on JN-25 until the day he was expelled from Monterrey. Colonel Sinkov and his American staff worked on the high-level Japanese Army codes.
Central Bureau was an unusual cryptographic organisation, coming under the direct command of an area commander (MacArthur) rather than reporting to a central cryptographic organisation; as confirmed by Marshall's reply. This decision led to periodic ructions in the American military establishment about MacArthur's command having its own cryptographic service under his command; a privilege that he jealously guarded.
No.1. Wireless Unit On 25 April 1942 the small RAAF Intercept Station operating in two back-to-back houses at 21 Sycamore Street and 24 French Street in the suburb of Pimlico in Townsville was given its new name of No. 1 Wireless Unit and became part of Central Bureau. The newly named Unit included 7 RAAF, 1 AMF and 4 United States Army personnel in No. 1 Wireless Unit at Townsville. This RAAF Unit had started earlier in March 1942 as a small intercept station located in the initial two houses at Pimlico under Wing Commander Booth. By 6 July 1942 the intercept operator numbers at Central Bureau had increased from six to twenty nine.
Coral Sea and Kokoda A message on 9 April 1942 indicated that the "RZP Campaign" against Port Moresby was to be an invasion not an air raid and which would isolate Australia from America. Fabian at FRUMEL briefed MacArthur who was "incredulous" as he expected the target would be New Caledonia, so Fabian explained the (JN-25) code-breaking process and showed him the Japanese commander’s intercepted message with the objectives to restrict enemy fleet movements and attack the north coast of Australia. So a transport due to leave the next day for New Caledonia was sent to Port Moresby. On 23 April Fabian showed MacArthur that the IJN was amassing a large force at Truk, and planned to occupy Tulagi also. MacArthur got an Australian reconnaissance plane to "discover" the Port Moresby invasion force on 5 May, leading to the Battle of the Coral Sea.
On 19 and 23 May messages indicated that the Japanese were proposing to land at Buna and go overland over the Owen Stanley Range via the Kokoda Track to Port Moresby; though MacArthur, Willoughby and Blamey were unconvinced saying "Nobody in their right senses would land there". Blamey took "minimal precautions" to defend the track, resulting in heavy losses for the 39th Battalion sent there.
Move from Melbourne to Brisbane On 20 July 1942, General MacArthur moved his headquarters to Brisbane. A separate American intelligence operation was located nearby in a building called "Palma Rosa" at 9 Queens Road, Hamilton. "Palma Rosa" was commandeered by the Counter Intelligence Corps, G-2 Section, Headquarters U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (U.S.A.F.F.E.).