Use–mention distinction

In analytic philosophy,Wheeler (2005) p. 568. a fundamental distinction is made between the ordinary use of a term (a word, name, phrase, etc.) and the mention of it.Devitt and Sterelny (1999) pp. 40–1. The distinction between using and mentioning a term can be illustrated with the English word cheese below: Cheese is derived from milk. Cheese is derived from the Old English word .

The first sentence is a statement about an edible product of milk-producing animals. It the term; the writer is using the English word in its standard way to refer to the common dairy product. The second is a statement about the very word itself. This second sentence instantiates a ; the writer is mentioning the word but not using it to refer to anything other than itself.

Invoking the use–mention distinction can sometimes seem pedantic, especially in simple cases where it is obvious what is being referred to. However, scholars argue that many philosophical works have been misguided, or misinterpreted by others, based on a failure to understand or recognize this basic distinction.

Overview

Referring to a word or phrase itself, rather than what the word or phrase normally refers to, is accomplished in written language by invoking single or double quotation marks or by using italics. In philosophy, single quotation marks are typically used, while in other fields (such as linguistics) italics are more common.For example, Butcher's Copy-Editing: The Cambridge Handbook for Editors, Copy-editors and Proofreaders, 4th edition, by Judith Butcher, Caroline Drake, and Maureen Leach. Cambridge University Press, 2006. Butcher's recommends against the practice, but The Chicago Manual of Style, section 7.58 (15th edition, 2003), indicates that philosophers use single quotes for a similar distinction, though it is not explained in these terms. Some style authorities, such as Strunk and White, recommend that mentioned words or phrases should be visually distinct. On the other hand, used words or phrases do not carry typographic markings.

The phenomenon of a term's having different references in different contexts was referred to as suppositio (supposition) by medieval logicians.See Read, Stephen (2006). Medieval Theories: Properties of Terms. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Supposition describes how a term is substituted in a sentence based on its referent. For nouns, a term can be used in different ways: With a : "That is my pig." (personal supposition) With a : "Santa Claus's pig is very big." (personal supposition) With a : "Any pig breathes air." (simple supposition) Metaphorically: "Your grandfather is a pig." (improper supposition) As a : "Pig has only three letters." (material supposition)

The use–mention distinction is particularly significant in analytic philosophy. Confusing use with mention can lead to problems, such as category errors.

Self-referential statements also engage the use–mention distinction and are often central to logical paradoxes, such as Quine's paradox. In mathematics, this concept appears in Gödel's incompleteness theorem, where the diagonal lemma plays a crucial role.

Commentary Stanisław Leśniewski extensively employed this distinction, noting the fallacies that can result from confusing it in Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica.

Donald Davidson argued that quotation cannot always be treated as mere mention, giving examples where quotations carry both use and mention functions.

Douglas Hofstadter explains the distinction between use and mention as follows:

Issues arise when a mention itself is mentioned. Notating this with italics or repeated quotation marks can lead to ambiguity.

In Limited Inc, a 1977 response to analytic philosopher John Searle, Jacques Derrida mentioned the distinction as "rather laborious and problematical".

Use–mention distinction

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