Jordanian General Intelligence Department, (GID) or Mukhabarat (Arabic: ) is the primary civilian foreign and domestic intelligence agency of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. It functions as both a foreign and domestic intelligence agency as well as a law enforcement force within the country. The GID is reportedly one of the most important and professional intelligence agencies in the Middle East and the world; the agency has been instrumental in foiling several terrorist attacks around the world.
Before the establishment of the General Intelligence Directorate, intelligence and security work in Jordan was handled by the General Investigation Department from 1952 to 1964. The transition was formalized under Act No. 24 of 1964. Since its establishment, the GID has remained the principal institution in Jordan's intelligence and security system.
The Director of the General Intelligence Directorate is appointed by royal decree on the basis of a decision by the Council of Ministers. The agency forms part of Jordan's state security structure. Its officers are recruited according to specified educational and security requirements, including university-level qualifications and vetting procedures.
Under its legal framework, the GID is responsible for matters related to Jordan's internal and external security. Its work includes intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and other security functions assigned through the executive authorities. The agency also maintains cooperation with foreign intelligence services, including the CIA and MI6, and is active beyond Jordan in regional intelligence matters.
Law and establishment Before the establishment of the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), Jordanian intelligence functions were carried out by the General Investigation Department () from 1952 to 1964. The establishment of the GID was formalized by Act No. 24 of 1964, which underwent all necessary constitutional procedures. This legislation created a centralized intelligence agency directly linked to the Prime Minister's office.
The Director of the GID is appointed by a royal decree based on a decision from the Council of Ministers. Officers within the agency are also appointed through royal decree upon the recommendation of the Director-General, subject to extensive security vetting and educational qualifications.
Mission As quoted from the official GID Site, their mission is
In practice, the agency is notoriously known for its extensive activity in Jordan and throughout the Middle East, as well as its cooperation with American and British intelligence. Through a complex spying system, it plays a central role in preserving stability in Jordan and monitoring seditious activity. The GID is believed to be the CIA's closest partner after MI6.
History Establishment In the 1950s, security and intelligence functions in Jordan were handled by more than one agency, including the General Investigations Department of the Public Security Directorate and the Political Investigations Office. These bodies were responsible for political monitoring and intelligence work.
The General Intelligence Directorate was established in 1964 under Law No. 24 of 1964. The new agency assumed functions previously carried out by the General Investigations Department and the Political Investigations Office, and it operated under the prime ministerial framework.
After the GID was established, it assumed control of the files of the former General Investigation Department. These records included thousands of reports, many of which had been compiled from informant material. Mudar Badran and his team later conducted a review of the archive, during which about 70,000 files described as inaccurate or no longer needed were destroyed in the presence of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal.
Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kailani was one of the figures involved in the developments that led to the establishment of the General Intelligence Directorate (GID). He was among those associated with the early planning for a centralized intelligence body. During that period, Jordan was facing regional and internal political tensions, including disputes with neighboring regimes, domestic party activity, and tension along the armistice line with Israel.
Before the Six-Day War, Mudar Badran and three other senior officers attended an advanced intelligence training course in London as part of the early development of the GID. The delegation included Hani Tabbarah, Rajai Dajani, and Tariq Aladdin. The trip was part of broader efforts to build the agency's institutional capacity.
In Al-Qarar ("The Decision"), Mudar Badran writes about night meetings held at the GID headquarters with King Hussein. He states that the meetings were attended by several officers, including Adeeb Tahboub, Ahmad Obeidat, Tariq Aladdin, Adnan Abu Odeh, and GID Director Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kailani. According to Badran, the king encouraged those present to speak openly and share their views and analyses.
Historical contributions and operations Following the events of Black September, the GID became one of the main agencies responsible for internal security in Jordan. It later developed close cooperation with foreign intelligence services in counterterrorism work. According to published accounts, Jordanian intelligence shared information with the United States on a number of security threats before the September 11 attacks. One of these accounts states that in 1999 Jordanian intelligence warned the CIA of a plot against American interests in Europe originating in Bosnia. intercepted an encrypted message referring to a planned large-scale attack inside the United States using aircraft, with the message calling it "The Big Wedding," which later turned out to be the code name for the September 11 attacks. The GID passed this information to U.S. authorities, although the warning did not include enough detail to prevent the attacks. Nevertheless, Jordanian intelligence is credited with forewarning the possibility of aircraft being used as human missiles in a major attack within America—a scenario previously uncommon before 2001. Notably, Jordan was not the only country to warn Washington (other countries such as Egypt also provided alerts), but the Jordanian warning was distinctive in explicitly mentioning "the use of aircraft".
The agency has also been described as active in regional counterterrorism operations beyond Jordan. Reports by U.S. and other sources state that Jordanian intelligence helped track Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi,TheNational.ae, "US and Jordan intelligence services pay the price of secrecy" the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, leading to his assassination in a U.S. airstrike in 2006. Other reports state that a number of al-Qaeda detainees were held in Jordan, including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Persian Gulf chief Abd al-Rahim al Nashiri. The reliance of US intelligence on its Jordanian counterpart was forged in part by both countries' aversion to Islamic radicalism. Foreign Policy magazine described Jordanian intelligence as achieving "significant victories" in the war on terror, such as overthrowing Zarqawi and helping suppress the Sunni insurgency in Iraq in 2006.
Foiling intervention in a civil conflict – 1970
In September 1970, during the Black September civil war, (fedayeen) had become a "state within a state" in Jordan, and a force of 20,000 Iraqi troops stationed in eastern Jordan seemed poised to back the insurgents. To neutralize this threat without direct foreign intervention, Jordanian intelligence chief Natheer Rshaid orchestrated an elaborate deception. GID agents obtained real military planning documents through a European officer in Amman and used them to forge a fake U.S. battle plan for the Middle East. These forged plans suggested that the United States and Jordan were preparing a lightning airstrike to annihilate any Iraqi forces that intervened in the conflict. The disinformation was slipped to the Iraqi high command via a double agent, causing Baghdad to believe any move against Hussein would trigger American military retaliation. The ruse worked brilliantly: Iraqi units stood down and never came to the fedayeen's aid, allowing Jordan's army to defeat the PLO fighters on its own. This intelligence coup was strategically vital – it averted an Iraqi intervention and thus ensured Hussein's survival during the kingdom's worst internal crisis. Notably, the operation blended domestic and international tactics: a local counter-insurgency was won using espionage and psychological warfare on a foreign army.
Thwarting Syrian subversion – 1981
In the early 1980s, Jordan's GID faced a serious security challenge from neighboring Syria, amid bitter regional rivalries. Tensions peaked in 1981 when Jordanian intelligence uncovered a Syrian-backed plot to assassinate Prime Minister Mudar Badran in Amman. Around the same time, a top Jordanian diplomat was kidnapped in Beirut, and Syria was blamed for that as well. King Hussein's government accused Syrian President Hafez al-Assad of waging "sabotage and subversion" to destabilize Jordan from within. In response, the GID intensified internal security measures – increasing surveillance and foiling infiltrators – to protect Jordan's leadership and vital installations. Crucially, Jordan also struck back on the intelligence front: Hussein's mukhabarat covertly harbored Syrian Muslim Brotherhood dissidents who opposed Assad. By giving refuge and support to Assad's underground opponents, the GID was effectively engaging Syria in a shadow war of espionage and proxy forces. The foiling of the assassination attempt on Badran was a major success for the GID, denying Damascus a chance to decapitate Jordan's government. It demonstrated that even as Syria tried "terrorist drive" tactics to weaken King Hussein, Jordan's intelligence could thwart foreign plots on its soil. This episode highlighted how domestic security operations in Jordan were deeply intertwined with regional politics – the GID had to counter external aggression (Assad's covert campaign) while maintaining internal stability, underlining its dual domestic-and-international mandate in protecting the kingdom.
Foiling assassination attempt on King Hussein – 1984 and 1993
There were ongoing threats faced by King Hussein. He was subjected to 18 assassination attempts. Most of them were rescued by members of the intelligence service. In 1984, Jordan witnessed one of the most serious assassination attempts targeting King Hussein bin Talal, amid rising regional tensions and increased activity from groups opposed to the regime, both within and outside the kingdom. The Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (GID), led at the time by Mustafa al-Qaisi, uncovered the details of a dangerous plot that aimed to assassinate the king during one of his domestic tours. Intelligence service was able to accurately identify the conspirators and their locations. A series of preemptive arrests was carried out, successfully thwarting the attack very shortly before it could be executed. Following this incident, Mustafa Al-Qaisi gained increasing royal trust and was later appointed as the Director of the General Intelligence Directorate from 1991 to 1996. Also, a notable incident occurred in 1993 when Jordanian security forces uncovered a plot to assassinate King Hussein during a June graduation ceremony at a military academy. The plan involved six military cadets and four senior members of an Islamic fundamentalist group. The government announced that the plot was thwarted in April of that year.
Bay'at al-Imam – Mid-1990s