Operation Prone was a proposed military operation by the South African Defence Force (SADF) and South West African Territorial Force (SWATF) during the South African Border War and Angolan Civil War between May and September 1988. With the advance of the 50th Cuban Division towards Calueque and the South-West Africa border, the SADF formed the 10 SA Division to counter this threat. The plan for Operation Prone had two phases. Operation Linger was to be a counterinsurgency phase and Operation Pact a conventional phase.
Background and threat assessment Caught off guard by the rapid movement southwards by the Cuban 10th Division, whose appearance was first noticed during April/May 1988 when SADF units in south-western Angola started to come into contact with advancing Cuban/FAPLA units, serious planning began. Initially, the plans were developed as a proposed attack on the Cuban/FAPLA forces in south-western Angola but as events played out and peace talks developed, the plan evolved to one of defence of north-western South-West Africa.
The South Africans anticipated attacks from two or three fronts possibly from Cahama, Xangongo or Ondjiva towards Ruacana and Calueque. They believed that the Cubans response to any South African counterattack, could be attacks by Cuban forces on SADF bases at Rundu, Ruacana, Oshakati, Ondangwa and Grootfontein and could also involve SWAPO insurgents in the SADF rear during the attacks. The SADF's main conventional unit in SWA, 61 Mechanised Battalion was in a state of reorganisation and training after Operation Hooper. 32 Battalion and 101 Battalion were engaged in south-western Angola against SWAPO while the other main conventional unit, 4 SAI, was also reorganising in South Africa and would be combat ready in SWA by 25 July. The South Africans did not believe that Cuban/FAPLA forces in south-eastern Angola at Cuito Cuanavale would try to attack the UNITA's bases at Mavinga and Jamba. This meant Cuban/FAPLA forces would concentrate their efforts in south-western Angola.
Order of battle South African and South West Africa Territorial forces 10 SA Division (Operation Hilti/Prone) - Brigadier Chris Serfontein Source: HQ 10 SA Division - Oshakati 61 Mechanised Battalion incl. one tank squadron 4 SAI Battalion - no tank squadron 32 Battalion 101 Battalion 81 Armoured Brigade (South Africa) Brigade HQ one G-2 battery - 17 Field Regiment one tank regiment - 3 squadrons Pretoria Regiment one mechanized battalion - 1 Regiment Northern Transvaal one armoured car regiment - 2 Light Horse Regiment one field engineer regiment - 15 Field Regiment one anti-aircraft battery - Regiment Oos Transvaal one engineer support squadron one signal unit - 81 Signal Regiment one maintenance unit - 20 Maintenance Unit one field workshop - 32 Field Regiment one medical battalion group - 6 Medical Battalion Group one provost platoon - 8 Provost Unit 71 Motorised Brigade HQ Cape Town Highlanders two mechanized infantry companies - Cape Town Highlanders Regiment one support weapons company - Cape Town Highlanders one armoured car regiment - Regiment Orange River one field engineer troop - 6 Field Engineer Regiment one signal troop - 7 Signal Group one maintenance platoon - 4 Maintenance Unit one medical battalion - 3 Medical Battalion one light workshop troop - 71 Field Regiment one provost platoon - 7 Provost Unit Parachute Battalion Group three parachute companies one parachute support company one anti aircraft troop one engineer troop one signal troop one maintenance platoon one reconnaissance section one light workshop troop one provost platoon one medical team two mobile air operations teams 10 Artillery Brigade HQ 10 Artillery Brigade one G-5 battery - 4 SAI one G-5 battery - 61 Mechanised Battalion one G-2 battery - Transvaal State Artillery one G-2 battery - 51 Battalion one MRL battery - 32 Battalion one MRL battery - 4 Artillery Regiment one 120 mm mortar battery - 4 Artillery Regiment one 120 mm mortar battery - 18 Light Artillery Regiment Parachute Brigade two meteorological sections Reserves HQ elements from 71 Motorised Brigade HQ elements from 8th Armoured Division (South Africa) HQ elements from 44 Parachute Brigade one G-5 battery - based in SE Angola one G-2 battery - 71 Motorised Brigade 8 Maintenance Unit 30 Corps Maintenance Unit two 32mm anti aircraft batteries one provost platoon
10 SA Division (Operation Prone) - Brigadier Chris Serfontein Source: Task Force X-ray - Colonel Leon Marais 53 Battalion 54 Battalion 4 SAI Battalion one combat wing - 101 Battalion 17 Field Regiment HQ one G5 battery - 4 SAI one G2 battery - 17 Field Regiment one MRL battery - 17 Field Regiment one AA battery - Regiment Vaalriver Task Force Zulu - Colonel Mucho Delport 51 Battalion 52 Battalion 102 Battalion 32 Battalion 61 Mechanised Battalion incl. one tank squadron one combat wing - 101 Battalion 14 Artillery Regiment HQ one G2 battery - Transvaal State Artillery Regiment one 35mm AA troop - Regiment Orange Free State two 20mm AA troops - Regiment Eastern Transvaal Task Force Yankee - Colonel Jan Lusse HQ 81 Armour Brigade HQ 10 Artillery Brigade one tank regiment (less one tank squadron) - 81 Armour Brigade one mechanized infantry company - 81 Armour Brigade one armoured car squadron - Light Horse Regiment|2 Light Horse Regiment two armoured car squadrons - 1 & 2 Special Service Battalion one 120 mm mortar battery - 4 Artillery Regiment Task Force Whiskey all counter-insurgency units from Tsumeb/Grootfontein/Otavi 10 Artillery Regiment - Colonel Jean Lausberg
Cuban forces 50th Division - Brigadier General Patricio de la Guardia Font three special forces battalions - Cuban SPETSNAZ three tank battalions - Cuban tank regiment (105-110 tanks) one artillery regiment - Cuban regiment six infantry regiments - Cuban and Angolan soldiers (1500-2000 men each plus tanks) three raiding battalions - Cuban and SWAPO soldiers (200 Cuban + 250 SWAPO each) Missile air defence batteries, air force helicopters and aircraft
Initial clashes With the Cuban movements southwards and continuing SADF/South West African Territorial Force operations against SWAPO in the same area, both forces would soon come into contact with each other. On 18 April 1988, a SWATF unit, 101 Battalion, chasing a SWAPO unit was ambushed by Cuban elements from Xangongo near Chipeque. The battle ended with the South Africans losing two men and eleven wounded. Thereafter the Cubans continued patrolling southwards from Xangongo towards the SADF garrison at Calueque.
On 2 May 1988, SAAF Mirages attacked FAPLA positions south of Techipa. The Cubans, fearing a South African advance, retaliated and planned another ambush.
During the first round tripartite talks in London on the 3 May 1988, behind the scene talks between the military contingents of Cuba and South Africa was tense. The Cubans threatened to invade SWA/Namibia if the South Africans did not agree to the Cuban proposals while the South African indicated if they tried, it would be Cuba's darkest day. The talks ended the following day.
The Cuban ambush site was in position by 4 May 1988 less than 2 km south of Donguena. A SADF unit, the 101 Battalion, with twenty Casspirs and two trucks had been sent forward to occupy Donguena. They ran into the ambush with Cubans destroying or damaging four Casspirs. The South Africans withdrew at dusk having lost seven men and one captured, Sergeant Johan Papenfus and failed to retrieve the fourth Casspir and its equipment. The Cubans were said to have lost forty-five soldiers. Later that evening, a further three companies from 201 and 101 Battalions were sent forward to capture Donguena, but with Cuban tank positions south of the town, withdrew. The Cuban later withdrew the same evening.
On 12 May 1988, the 32 Battalion commander was called to a meeting in Oshakati to discuss a plan for the unit to attack SWAPO units at Techipa. The commander persuaded the planners to reconnoitre the area first before attacking. On 16 May, two reconnaissance units were airlifted to an area south of Techipa and while the second landed close to Xangongo but on the western side of the Cunene River. The first team was unable to get close to Techipa while the second team found tank tracks on all roads showing extensive patrolling of the area. The first team was sent back in from the north of Techipa by vehicle, finding extensive trench systems around the town reminiscent of the same layered system around Cuito Cuanavale with vehicles, generators and radar systems and outposts at further distances south of the town. A decision was then made to establish a new task force but it would only be in operation by early June, with a specific aim of protecting the water scheme at Calueque. In the meantime, three companies of 32 Battalion would hold the line until the task force was operational and would continue to patrol and reconnoitre the area south of Techipa.
An ambush by 32 Battalion was planned for 22 May 1988. The plan called for a mortar attack on an outpost south of Techipa which would draw out the Cubans who would be then ambushed. Members of 32 Battalion company ambushed a Cuban de-mining team before the mortaring began and then found themselves being attacked by four BRDM-2 armoured personnel carriers and from two other hidden outposts. Fleeing back to the mortar position under covering mortar fire, the Cubans finally caught up and attacked with the BRDM's resulting in the abandonment of three damaged Unimogs. The 32 Battalion company retreated again as BM-21s started shelling. The Cubans eventually gave up the chase and the company was able to return to the mortar position in search of the missing vehicles but these had been removed by the Cubans. The remaining missing 32 Battalion members turned up at Ruacana and Calueque the following day.
Following the bungled ambush of the 22 May, the Cubans analysed the intelligence gathered from the captured SADF vehicles. Cuban intelligence concluded that the South African were planning a major attack on Techipa which was not the case.
June 1988 was spent reinforcing the defences around Techipa with consisted of minefields, bunkers and anti-tank barriers which had been employed successfully to slow down the SADF and UNITA forces around Cuito Cuanavale during Operation Packer. There was also a build-up of Cuban forces around the town and aggressive patrolling by SWAPO and FAPLA forces to establish the positions of the South African forces.
Cuban attack planning At the same time, Castro planned an operation consisting of two parts. The first, a two-pronged attack, one from Xangongo to capture Cuamato, then a three column advance from Techipa to capture Calueque joined later by the forces that had captured Cuamato. The second part of the plan was an air attack on Ruacana if Techipa was attacked by the SAAF. Castro also notified the Angolan and Soviets of his plan.
10 SA Division formed By the 27 May 1988, Brigadier Chris Serfontein was appointed 10 SA Division commander while Colonel Roland de Vries was appointed his chief of staff.
On the 30 May/1 June, operational instructions for Operation Hilti (to be renamed Operation Prone later) was released to the planners by SADF HQ. The instructions required the development of a conventional and counterinsurgency plan for north-west South-West Africa and south-western Angola.
The instructions called for a sub-phase called Operation Excite to gain military control of south-west Angola by August 1988.
Following Operation Excite, Operation Faction, restoration of SADF influence over 21 days in the area of dispute. And finally Operation Florentine, the installation of UNITA in the area of dispute and to support them against a FAPLA and Cuban attempts to retake the area.