The capability approach (also referred to as the capabilities approach) is a normative approach to human welfare that concentrates on the actual capability of persons to achieve lives they value rather than solely having a right or freedom to do so. It was conceived in the 1980s as an alternative approach to welfare economics.
In this approach, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum combine a range of ideas that were previously excluded from (or inadequately formulated in) traditional approaches to welfare economics. The core focus of the capability approach is improving access to the tools people use to live a fulfilling life. Hence, the approach has a strong connection to intragenerational sustainability and sustainability strategies.
Assessing capability
Sen initially argued for five components to assess capability: The importance of real freedoms in the assessment of a person's advantage Individual differences in the ability to transform resources into valuable activities The multi-variate nature of activities giving rise to wellbeing A balance of materialistic and nonmaterialistic factors in evaluating human welfare Concern for the distribution of opportunities within society
Subsequently, in collaboration with political philosopher Martha Nussbaum, development economist Sudhir Anand and economic theorist James Foster, Sen has helped propel the capabilities approach to appear as a policy paradigm in debates concerning human development; his research inspired the creation of the UN's Human Development Index (a popular measure of human development that captures capabilities in health, education, and income). Additionally, the approach has been operationalized to have a high income country focus by Paul Anand and colleagues. Sen also founded the Human Development and Capability Association in 2004 in order to further promote discussion, education, and research on the human development and capability approach. Since then, the approach has been much discussed by political theorists, philosophers, and a range of social scientists, including those with a particular interest in human health.
The approach emphasizes functional capabilities ("substantive freedoms", such as the ability to live to old age, engage in economic transactions, or participate in political activities); these are construed in terms of the substantive freedoms people have reason to value, instead of utility (happiness, desire-fulfillment or choice) or access to resources (income, commodities, assets). An approach to wellbeing using utility can be found in utilitarianism, while access to resources is advocated by the Rawlsian approach.
Poverty is understood as capability-deprivation. It is noteworthy that proponents emphasize not only how humans function, but their access to capabilities "to achieve outcomes that they value and have reason to value". Everyone could be deprived of capabilities in many ways, e.g. by ignorance, government oppression, lack of financial resources, or false consciousness.
This approach to human well-being emphasizes the importance of freedom of choice, individual heterogeneity and the multi-dimensional nature of welfare. In significant respects, the approach is consistent with the handling of choice within conventional microeconomics consumer theory, although its conceptual foundations enable it to acknowledge the existence of claims, like rights, which normatively dominate utility-based claims (see ).
Key terms
Functionings In the most basic sense, functionings consist of "beings and doings". As a result, living may be seen as a set of interrelated functions. Essentially, functionings are the states and activities constitutive of a person's being. Examples of functionings can vary from elementary things, such as being healthy, having a good job, and being safe, to more complex states, such as being happy, having self-respect, and being calm. Moreover, Amartya Sen contends that functionings are crucial to an adequate understanding of the capability approach; capability is conceptualized as a reflection of the freedom to achieve valuable functionings.
In other words, functionings are the subjects of the capabilities referred to in the approach: what we are capable of, want to be capable of, or should be capable of being and/or do. Therefore, a person's chosen combination of functionings, what they are and do, is part of their overall capability set — the functionings they were able to do. Yet, functionings can also be conceptualized in a way that signifies an individual's capabilities. Eating, starving, and fasting would all be considered functionings, but the functioning of fasting differs significantly from that of starving because fasting, unlike starving, involves a choice and is understood as choosing to fast despite the presence of other options.Hudson, John (2018). "Social Justice and Social Welfare." In Gary Craig (ed.), *Handbook on Global Social Justice*, pp. 46–63. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 9781786431417. https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781786431417/9781786431417.00011.xml
Capabilities Capabilities are the alternative combinations of functionings that are feasible for a person to achieve. Formulations of capability have two parts: functionings and opportunity freedom — the substantive freedom to pursue different functioning combinations. Ultimately, capabilities denote a person's opportunity and ability to generate valuable outcomes, taking into account relevant personal characteristics and external factors. The important part of this definition is the "freedom to achieve", because if freedom had only instrumental value (valuable as a means to achieve an end) and no intrinsic value (valuable in and of itself) to a person's well-being, then the value of the capability set as a whole would simply be defined by the value of a person's actual combination of functionings. Such a definition would not acknowledge the entirety of what a person is capable of doing and their resulting current state due to the nature of the options available to them. Consequently, the capability set outlined by this approach is not merely concerned with achievements; rather, freedom of choice, in and of itself, is of direct importance to a person's quality of life.
For example, the difference between fasting and starving, on person's well-being, is whether the person is choosing not to eat. In this example, the functioning is starving but the capability to obtain an adequate amount of food is the key element in evaluating well-being between individuals in the two states. In sum, having a lifestyle is not the same as choosing it; well-being depends on how that lifestyle came to be. More formally, while the combination of a person's functionings represents their actual achievements, their capability set represents their opportunity freedom — their freedom to choose between alternative combinations of functionings.
In addition to being the result of capabilities, some functionings are also a prerequisite for capabilities, i.e., there is a dual role of some functionings as both ends and instruments. Examples of functionings that are a direct requirement for capabilities are good nourishment, mental and physical health, and education.
Nussbaum further distinguishes between internal capabilities that are personal abilities, and combined capabilities that are "defined as internal capabilities together with the social/political/economic conditions in which functioning can actually be chosen". She points out that the notion of (combined) capability "combines internal preparedness with external opportunity in a complicated way, so that measurement is likely to be no easy task."
An extension of the capabilities approach was published in 2013 in Freedom, Responsibility and Economics of the Person. This book explores the interconnected concepts of person, responsibility and freedom in economics, moral philosophy and politics. It tries to reconcile the rationality and morality of individuals. It presents a methodological reflection (phenomenology versus Kantian thought) with the aim to re-humanise the person, through actions, and through the values and norms that lead to corresponding rights and obligations that must be ordered. The book extends the capabilities approach in a critical form. In particular, it considers freedom in relation to responsibility, that is, the capacity of people to apply moral constraints to themselves. By contrast, Sen's capability approach considers freedom as a purely functional rationality of choice.
Agency Amartya Sen defines an agent as someone who acts and brings about change, whose achievement can be evaluated in terms of his or her own values and goals. This differs from a common use of the term "agent" sometimes used in economics and game theory to mean a person acting on someone else's behalf. Agency depends on the ability to personally choose the functionings one values, a choice that may not correlate with personal well-being. For example, when a person chooses to engage in fasting, they are exercising their ability to pursue a goal they value, though such a choice may not positively affect physical well-being. Sen explains that a person as an agent need not be guided by a pursuit of well-being; agency achievement considers a person's success in terms of their pursuit of the whole of their goals.
For the purposes of the capability approach, agency primarily refers to a person's role as a member of society, with the ability to participate in economic, social, and political actions. Therefore, agency is crucial in assessing one's capabilities and any economic, social, or political barriers to one's achieving substantive freedoms. Concern for agency stresses that participation, public debate, democratic practice, and empowerment, should be fostered alongside well-being.
Alkire and Deneulin pointed out that agency goes together with the expansion of valuable freedoms. That is, in order to be agents of their lives, people need the freedom to be educated, speak in public without fear, express themselves, associate, etc.; conversely, people can establish such an environment by being agents. In summary, the agency aspect is important in assessing what a person can do in line with his or her conception of the good.
Nussbaum's central capabilities Nussbaum (2000) frames these basic principles in terms of 10 capabilities, i.e. real opportunities based on personal and social circumstance. She claims that a political order can only be considered as being decent if this order secures at least a threshold level of these 10 capabilities to all inhabitants. Nussbaum's capabilities approach is centered around the notion of individual human dignity. Nussbaum emphasizes that this approach is necessary since even individuals within a family unit can have vastly different needs. Given Nussbaum's contention that the goal of the capabilities approach is to produce capabilities for each and every person, the capabilities below belong to individual persons, rather than to groups. The capabilities approach has been very influential in development policy where it has shaped the evolution of the human development index (HDI), has been much discussed in philosophy, and is increasingly influential in a range of social sciences.
More recently, the approach has been criticized for being grounded in the liberal notion of freedom:
The core capabilities Nussbaum argues should be supported by all democracies are: Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.