Operation Brother Sam was the use of the United States Navy and Air Force in support of the coup in Brazil in 1964. With the deterioration in relations with João Goulart's government and the favorable attitude of the groups conspiring against him, the idea of an operation to ensure the success of an uprising arose. The issue was discussed between the U.S. ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, and officials in Washington throughout the administration of president John F. Kennedy and his successor Lyndon B. Johnson. They thought about logistical support, the positioning of a squadron on the Brazilian coast to "show the flag" and even, in an extreme situation, a plan for a gigantic land operation, which was not used. The operation was planned by maintaining contact with Brazilian conspirators such as general Castelo Branco, and had as an assumption the formation of a provisional government that would request foreign aid.
With the outbreak of the coup d'état, the operation was activated to transfer fuel such as gasoline by sea to the insurgent military, to leave a squadron near Brazil, and to take war supplies by air. The naval component consisted of the aircraft carrier USS Forrestal, a helicopter carrier and six destroyers from the Second Fleet, as well as four tankers. The aircraft carrier departed from Virginia, while the tankers were to load in the Caribbean. The air component was seven C-135 aircraft, eight supply aircraft, one air support and rescue aircraft, eight fighters, a communications plane, an airborne command post, weapons and ammunition. Air Force general George S. Brown was given command of the mission, which was coordinated by the Southern Command in Panama.While shipments waited at the air bases, ships began to leave their ports. However, the opposition military in Brazil quickly overthrew the Goulart government, and Castelo Branco reported that logistical support would not be needed. The operation was thus deactivated before it had any physical effect in Brazil, but it demonstrated the interventionist disposition of the American government. It came to light between 1976 and 1977 with the declassification of documents.
Context
After the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the U.S. government's attitude toward leftist leaders in Latin America hardened. Among them was the government of João Goulart in Brazil. The United States was worried by Goulart's domestic and foreign policies and bilateral relations deteriorated. As the Alliance for Progress failed to influence him with moderate methods, Washington resorted to weakening the Brazilian government with measures such as financing the opposition's electoral campaigns in 1962 and redirecting economic assistance to opposition governors.
After a certain period, disputed in the literature, Washington became favorable to the ousting of Goulart. Since 1961 some groups in the Brazilian military were conspiring against the government, and the U.S. Embassy was aware of such movements. By 1963 the U.S. government was already looking for a group in the Brazilian Armed Forces capable of overthrowing Goulart. Meanwhile, by the end of that year it was developing contingency plans and working on what to do in case of a rebellion. A concern arose that the rebels would need American support to succeed; on October 7, Kennedy asked Gordon about the possibility that intervention might be necessary. A State Department document made in November mentioned a new contingency plan with "heavy emphasis on armed U.S. intervention." The contingency plan that would lead to operation Brother Sam had a wider scope than the operation itself.
Developing the operation American Summit discussions The December 11, 1963 version of the contingency plan, probably in development since the previous months, listed four possibilities. The third, the removal of Goulart, was similar to what actually happened. The second was:
The military conspirators were called "democratic forces". At their request,
The document stressed that its premature discovery would be politically harmful. Likewise, an open intervention followed by Goulart's victory against his opponents would be an embarrassment. The idea of a naval task force was not present at this point, but the possibility of "intervening with force only if there was Soviet or Cuban intervention" could allude to such a task force or even to a ground operation.
By mid-March 1964, the Embassy reported on the worsening political crisis, the unity of military conspirators under the figure of general Castelo Branco, who could lead a coup d'état, and the adhesion of State governors to the conspiracy. A meeting at the White House on March 20 and another at the Embassy shortly thereafter established that an aircraft carrier and tankers would be sent to support the opposition. The former had the assumption that, even with Castelo Branco's supporters taking most of the country, there might be resistance in Rio Grande do Sul and Pernambuco, and a naval presence on the coast, "showing the flag", would be a show of force in favor of the rebels. Lincoln Gordon later stated that one of the goals of the task force would be to evacuate American citizens on Brazilian territory. This is possible, but it is not mentioned in his correspondence with the Secretary of State in 1964.
The idea was criticized by some experts at a meeting at the White House. For McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor, "the punishment doesn't seem to match the crime." General Andrew Goodpaster did not understand how the squad could help the oppositionists. Lincoln Gordon had to face opposition from his superiors to get his ideas across, standing out as the central figure in the entire effort to support Brazilian military conspirators.
Fuel deliveries would prevent Goulart supporters in Petrobras from cutting off supply. This concern had been transmitted to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) by São Paulo businessman Alberto Byington. On the other hand, the December 1963 plan already mentioned fuel and stated that its provisions should be guaranteed, evidencing that the idea was not born at the last minute. In addition to fuel, there was concern about armaments. Gordon had already registered on Brazil's internal defense plan, dated March 20, how Brazilian security forces were poorly equipped.
Provisional government and state of belligerency
The December 1963 contingency plan set a condition for logistical support:
Similarly, at the time of the coup the State Department specified that fuel and ammunition supplies could come only after "the point at which some group having a reasonable claim to legitimacy is able to formally request recognition and assistance from us and if possible from other American republics." The state of insurgency or belligerency would regularize the opposition on a legal level. It was up to Brazilian oppositionists to create this new government, which suggests they were in contact with American plans. The link between this idea and the Brazilian conspiracy was senator Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco.
Magalhães Pinto, governor of Minas Gerais, threw his state into rebellion in conjunction with the local Army garrison at the beginning of the coup d'état. The day before, he had named a supra-partisan secretariat "of hermetic unity", including a Secretariat without Portfolio reserved for Afonso Arinos. Once called to Belo Horizonte on the 31st, his function would be that of "chancellor of the revolution", "the first chancellor of the Republic outside Itamaraty", in charge of getting the state of belligerency recognized abroad. According to him, Magalhães first extended this invitation in November 1963, when he mentioned the possibility of a prolonged resistance from Minas Gerais; his actions would allow, for example, the purchase of weapons abroad. According to him,
The Minas Gerais government intended to use the to receive foreign arms, especially from the U.S. It obtained the consent of the governor of Espírito Santo and defined that the Military Police of Minas Gerais would defend this logistical corridor. At the time of the rebellion, it organized the "East Detachment" near Rio de Janeiro and Espírito Santo's borders, with the 6th and 11th Infantry Battalions. Nevertheless, a rebellion could be crushed early on, as foreign supplies would take days to arrive. In case of a civil war, Minas Gerais would be at a disadvantage even if it could get arms for 50,000 volunteers. The CIA reported that the Port of Vitória would be needed to receive fuel, and the rebels could control it.
Gordon went as far as to message to several governors about the need for a legitimate government. The CIA reported that in the event of open conflict in Brazil, Argentina would request OAS intervention in Brazil.
Afonso Arinos was relevant during the coup when he informed congressman San Tiago Dantas of his planned involvement. On the morning of April 1, Dantas told Goulart that the US State Department would be willing to recognize a parallel rebel government. This was one of the reasons for the president's departure from Rio de Janeiro.
Hypothetical land operation
In his conversation with Kennedy in October 1963, Lincoln Gordon mentioned that:
Such an operation would far exceed the scale of the presence in Vietnam, where there were 16,300 American troops at the end of 1963. It is comparable to the 1940 "Pot of Gold" plan to land 100,000 men in Brazil. The six-division plan has not yet been declassified. There is a difference of opinion about being part of or distinct from Brother Sam. The contingency plan vaguely alluded to the possibility of such an operation in case of external communist interference. The air and naval operation activated during the coup, however, did not include boots on the ground. On March 30, Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted that "in a country of over 75 million people, larger than continental United States, this is not a job for a handful of United States Marines."
According to , the delivery of supplies to Brazilian ports would still require a small land presence, and in the case of an internal conflict in Brazil it would be possible to find some external communist interference as a pretext for military intervention. In this case it would be necessary to consult the American Congress and the Organization of American States, a "truly shocking scenario". noted that the ships were not carrying land contingents, and the growing involvement in Vietnam would make a second front in Brazil difficult. Moniz Bandeira emphasized the possibility of an invasion. Elio Gaspari wrote that "there is no documented record that determined an immediate landing of troops".
Final days
The operation was planned in cooperation with Brazilians, with general José Pinheiro de Ulhoa Cintra as an intermediary. On March 28, Gordon recorded how logistical concerns were coming from the conspirators and would be specified the following week through contact between general Cintra and military attaché Vernon Walters. In Marco Antonio Villa's interpretation, the operation could have in mind the Castelista coup scheduled for the first half of April, which would allow the ships to be already close to Brazil at the moment of deflagration. On the 27th, a Lincoln Gordon memo predicted the climax of the political crisis in a few days, with Castelo Branco as the leader of the "revolution."
CIA reports in Minas Gerais on the 30th recorded the imminent beginning of the movement. and . In the early morning hours of the 31st, general Olímpio Mourão Filho, commander of the Brazilian Army in Minas Gerais, precipitated the coup d'état, over the heads of Castelo Branco and the other conspirators in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.
The task force in action Beginning