The Rapacki Plan (pronounced Rapatz-ki) was a proposal presented in a speech by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki to the United Nations General Assembly on 2 October 1957 as a limited plan for nuclear disarmament and demilitarization in Central Europe by establishing a nuclear-free zone. The plan declared that the People's Republic of Poland would not station or produce any nuclear armaments within their territory, if the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic agreed to do the same. Czechoslovakia would later include itself in support of the nuclear-free zone.David Stefancic (1987). "The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy." East European Quarterly 21.4: 405 The plan followed attempts by both Western Powers and the Soviet Union to de-escalate Cold War tensions and push for greater disarmament during the mid-1950s.
Overview The plan was supported by all of the Soviet-dominated states of the Warsaw Pact. However, during a NATO Council meeting in Paris in December 1957, it was rejected on the basis that it would leave Western Europe vulnerable to communist conventional armies that were perceived to be a relatively greater military threat. The United States believed that supporting the plan would mean a loss of the balance of power in Europe – evidenced by the Eisenhower administration's response. The United Kingdom also saw the plan as a threat to the security of NATO countries because of how it would enable the dominance of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. West Germany was strongly opposed to the idea of a denuclearized zone as it was feared that the plan would diminish the state's power and influence as a part of NATO, and further, would violate the Hallstein Doctrine through the signing of a treaty with East Germany.Arms, Rapacki Plan, 733. Not all NATO members were opposed to the plan however, with the governments of Norway, Denmark and Canada publicly expressing their support for it. Rapacki in 1958 presented several modified versions of his original plan to cater to Western concerns, but won little support from them. One iteration included a two-stage plan; the first stage would ensure that no new nuclear weapons would be brought into the Central European zone, while the second stage would see NATO and the Warsaw Pact work together to eliminate all remaining nuclear armaments in the area. Support for the plan effectively lost its traction when Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, tried to force West Germany to accept it during the Berlin Crisis of 1958–1959.Stefancic, The Rapacki Plan, 409.
Historical Context
Geneva Summit 1955
Held on July 18, 1955, the summit sought to effectively end the Cold War and bring together the major powers to discuss peace based on sustained global security. At this summit two "Eden Plans'' were proposed. The first focused on a possible limitation and inspection zone for West Germany as well as a call to demilitarize East Germany. The second plan proposed a zone of inspection along the line demarcating East and West Germany. The first plan was rejected by the Soviet Union as it was conditional on the necessity of German reunification, while the second was rejected by Western nations. This summit marked the first major conference to introduce the issue of disarmament between West and East Germans, and in turn, bringing to the attention of international forums the matters of sustained European security premised on this geographic region.Political and Security Council Affairs Reports, Note on the Rapacki Plan, UN Archives (21 Feb 1958), 37.
Poland and West German relations during the 1950s During the mid-1950s, discussions in NATO arose over the possibility of giving West Germany nuclear weapons. This was, in part, driven by President Eisenhower seeking to extricate American troops from Europe. In Poland, there was much fear predominated that if the Germans were to receive such weapons, they could act aggressively to regain territories along the Oder and Lusatian Neisse Rivers that Poland had administered since the end of World War II. A formal treaty had not given the land to Poland, however, the Polish government had an agreement with East Germany granting the land as part of their own; something vehemently rejected by the West Germans.Stefancic, The Rapacki Plan, 404-416
Throughout 1955, the Polish government attempted to open diplomatic relations with the West Germans to no avail. This was in part due to the Polish recognition of East Germany, an act deemed unacceptable under the Hallstein Doctrine, adopted by the West German government at the time. Władysław Gomułka, first secretary of the Polish Workers Party, attempted to push for the formation of diplomatic relations in 1957 but was met with a negative reply similar to earlier attempts. With fears of West German revanchism to acquire lost territories in the East and NATO's pledges to provide nuclear weapons to the West German armies, the Poles became increasingly driven to propose a disarmament plan.Stefancic, The Rapacki Plan, 403.
Soviet Attempts at Overture Amid suppression of the Hungarian Revolt, the Soviet Union made several proposals for disarmament during the mid to late 1950s. In November 1956, the state introduced a disarmament plan before the United Nations General Assembly that focused on reducing men in armies of great powers, banning nuclear weapons, and an overall reduction in military expenditures in all countries. The plan was initially turned down by Western nations, but it was suggested that a more limited plan might be considered acceptable.Stefancic, The Rapacki Plan, 406.
In the summer of 1957, the Soviet Union introduced a new limited disarmament plan before the U.N Disarmament Commission. The plan proposed armed force reductions for the U.S., China, Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain. The plan called for renouncing the use of nuclear weapons, and furthermore, a compliance system based on aerial photography of locations in Europe where the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces were stationed. The plan was ultimately rejected by the West once again. This then led the Polish government to suggest a disarmament plan of their own.
A Polish Proposal to the Soviets The initial idea for a nuclear-free zone first appeared in the journal Swiat a Polska in early 1957. The Soviets were initially delayed in considering the Polish proposal, however, in September 1957 the Soviet Chargé d'affaires in Poland told the Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland, Minister Marian Naszkowski, that the Soviets sought to support the plan. The plan, with further development, would eventually take the name of former Polish Workers Party member Adam Rapacki.Maruzsa, Denuclearization in Central Europe, 235.
Rapacki's Presentation to the U.N Assembly, 2 October 1957 Rapacki's proposal at the UN General Assembly was largely made in the context of disarmament and limited to an undertaking by Poland, Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany to refrain from importing, manufacturing, or maintaining nuclear weapons within their territories. In his speech, Rapacki focused on the proposal's value as a first step towards breaking the disarmament deadlock between the Soviet Union and the West and employed the term "constructive coexistence". Furthermore, he emphasized its separate nature from other proposals for neutralization, demilitarization, and European security suggested by the Soviets and Western nations. The speech also spoke to the potential consequences of nuclear weapons in Central Europe, and moreover indicated that the Polish delegation would give its unfettered support to any initiative that sought to curb nuclear testing.
The Plan Following the announcement of the Plan at the UN General Assembly, Rapacki sent a memorandum to the Warsaw embassies of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the UK, the US, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the USSR, and Sweden on February 14, 1958, detailing how the arrangement of a zone of disarmament would work.Political and Security Council Affairs Reports, Note on the Rapacki Plan, UN Archives (21 Feb 1958), 39.
Main Clauses
The zone was defined as West Germany, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, would ban the production and storage of nuclear weapons as well as the use of such weapons in the zone. Commits the four powers (France, UK, US, USSR) to not bring nuclear weapons into the zone or use nuclear weapons against the countries inhabiting the zone; prohibits all countries who have military forces in the zone from possessing weapons. Countries included in the zone would set up a control machinery to maintain the nuclear weapons ban including air and ground checks. An international treaty would be the best way to commit states to the plan, however, if this is not possible multilateral or unilateral declarations between countries in the zone and the four powers are suggested.Political and Security Council Affairs Reports, Note on the Rapacki Plan, UN Archives (21 Feb 1958), 4.
Responses to the Rapacki Plan After the Rapacki plan was drafted by Foreign Minister Rapacki, Poland sought approval from its own allies in Eastern Europe (especially the Soviet Union) before presenting the plan to the United Nations, where both the United States and West Germany would decide on it. Despite the diplomacy of Adam Rapacki, the plan was ultimately rejected.
Czechoslovakia In October 1957, the Czech government came out in favor of the plan with Vaclav David, the foreign minister, giving a speech about the state's interest in participating in a nuclear-free zone and subsequently added Czechoslovakia to the list of states participating in the Rapacki Plan. The speech also outlined how the Polish proposal was a constructive step towards disarmament of Central Europe more broadly.Stefancic, The Rapacki Plan, 408.
Soviet Union Soviet response to the plan was generally favorable from the beginning, especially when the plan aided in the Soviet's aims and problems. In 1957, the Soviet Union saw the plan as a means of tackling two of its most pressing issues. First, preventing West Germany from being able to arm itself with nuclear armaments. Second, it re-earned its own prestige after its aggressive suppression of the Hungarian Uprising in 1956, which after a United Nations investigation, concluded that Soviet involvement violated the human rights of the Hungarian people.Stefancic, The Rapacki Plan, 410. On December 21, 1957, the Supreme Soviet passed a 17-point resolution that included a pact of non-aggression between Warsaw Pact states along with the Rapacki Plan.Stefancic, The Rapacki Plan, 402. Throughout 1957–58, the Soviet Union thoroughly supported the plan. A meeting was set up between Adam Rapacki and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in February 1958, which ended in favor of a nuclear-free zone as delineated in the plan. Later in March 1958, Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, said in his speech at the Twenty-First Party Congress that the Soviet Union supported implementing the plan and creating an "atom-free zone" in Europe.Khrushchev, N. S. (1959–1965). "Extraordinary 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: ON CONTROL FIGURES FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S.S.R. NATIONAL ECONOMY IN 1959-1965.-Report by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev". MARXIST INTERNET ARCHIVE | SOVIET ARCHIVES. Other Socialist states gave favorable responses in agreement with the plan as well.
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