The Irish Boundary Commission () met in 1924–25 to decide on the precise delineation of the border between the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland. The 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, which ended the Irish War of Independence, provided for such a commission if Northern Ireland chose to secede from the Irish Free State (Clause or Article 12), an event that occurred as expected two days after the Free State's inception on 6 December 1922, resulting in the partition of Ireland.On 7 December 1922 (the day after the establishment of the Irish Free State) both Houses of the Parliament of Northern Ireland resolved to make the following address to the King so as to opt out of the Irish Free State: "MOST GRACIOUS SOVEREIGN, We, your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Senators and Commons of Northern Ireland in Parliament assembled, having learnt of the passing of the Irish Free State Constitution Act 1922, being the Act of Parliament for the ratification of the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland, do, by this humble Address, pray your Majesty that the powers of the Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State shall no longer extend to Northern Ireland". Source: Northern Ireland Parliamentary Report, 7 December 1922 and Anglo-Irish Treaty, sections 11, 12 The governments of the United Kingdom, of the Irish Free State and of Northern Ireland were to nominate one member each to the commission. When the Northern government refused to cooperate, the British government assigned a Belfast, Unionist newspaper editor to represent Northern Irish interests (Joseph R. Fisher).
The provisional border in 1922 was that which the Government of Ireland Act 1920 made between Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland. Most Irish nationalists hoped for a considerable transfer of land to the Free State, on the basis that most border areas had nationalist majorities. However, the commission recommended relatively small transfers, and in both directions. This was leaked to The Morning Post in 1925, causing protests from both unionists and nationalists.
To avoid the possibility of further disputes, the British, Free State, and Northern Ireland governments agreed to suppress the overall report, and on 3 December 1925, instead of any changes being made, the existing border was confirmed by W. T. Cosgrave for the Free State, Sir James Craig for Northern Ireland, and Stanley Baldwin for the British government, as part of a wider agreement which included a resolution of outstanding financial disagreements. This was then ratified by their three parliaments. The commission's report was not published until 1969.
Provisional border (1920–25) The Government of Ireland Act 1920 was enacted during the height of the War of Independence and partitioned the island into two separate home rule territories of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, to be called Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland. In its determination of this border, the Parliament of the United Kingdom heard the arguments of the Irish Unionist Party, but not those of most of the elected representatives of the Irish nationalist population. Sinn Féin, the largest nationalist party in Ireland following the 1918 General Election, refused on principle to recognise any legitimate role of the London Parliament in Irish affairs and declined to attend it, leaving only the Irish Parliamentary Party present at the debates, whose representation at Westminster had been reduced to minuscule size. The British government initially explored the option of a nine-county Northern Ireland (i.e. the entirety of Ulster province); however, James Craig, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, told the British House of Commons unambiguously that the six northeastern counties were the largest possible area that unionists could realistically "hold". Craig posited the idea of a Boundary Commission "to examine the distribution of population along the borders of the whole of the six counties and to take a vote in districts on either side of and immediately adjoining that boundary in which there was no doubt as to whether they would prefer to be included in the Northern or the Southern Parliamentary area." However, the idea was rejected as likely to further inflame divisions, and the Government of Ireland Act 1920 was passed based on a six-county Northern Ireland delimited using traditional county borders.
The Boundary Commission's ambiguous terms During the discussions that led to the Anglo-Irish Treaty, the British prime minister David Lloyd George raised the possibility of a Boundary Commission as a way of breaking the deadlock. The Irish delegation, led by Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins, reluctantly acquiesced to the idea, on the basis that the resulting boundary line based on population at the finely granular district electoral division (DED) level would likely be highly advantageous to the Irish Free State, creating a small and weak Northern Irish polity which would likely be unviable in the long run. However, the final treaty included the statement that economic and geographical factors were also to be taken into account, and Lloyd George assured James Craig that "mere rectifications of the Boundary are involved, with give and take on both sides."
The boundary scholar Kieran J Rankin states, "the manner in which the Boundary Commission clause was drafted in the final document was only explicit in its ambiguity." Clause XII of the 1921 Treaty was the work of the British negotiators and although it stated that the "wishes of the inhabitants were to be ascertained" it provided no process for obtaining them. The Clause did not indicate whether transfers would be made in one or both directions. The newly established Southern Irish cabinet was given an opportunity to study the Clause yet failed to provide any suggestions for a more workable process. The historian Jim McDermott felt that Lloyd George had succeeded in deceiving the southern leader (Collins) while the northern Craig was assured that the Boundary Commission would only make small adjustments.McDermott, Jim (2001), Northern Divisions, BTF Publications Ltd, Belfast, pg. 161, ISBN 1-900960-11-7
Griffith and Collins had different forecasts on the final decisions of the Boundary Commission. Griffith was said to believe that exclusion from Northern Ireland on the basis of whole counties would not occur.
Collins was said to believe that the commission would cede almost half of the area of the six counties and that the financial provisions of the Act would make a small northern state unsustainable: Years earlier, in a 29 May 1916 letter from Lloyd George to the longtime leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (1910–1921) Edward Carson was urged to never allow Ulster join a new Irish state: "We must make it clear that at the end of the provisional period Ulster does not, whether she wills or not, merge in the rest of Ireland."Gallagher, Pg.115 Article 12 of the final Anglo-Irish Treaty, signed on 6 December 1921, describes the commission in the following terms:
The treaty was approved by the British Parliament soon after, followed by the Irish Dáil in early 1922. Some Unionists leaders warned about the use of a boundary commission. On 16 February 1922 Charles Craig (Member of Parliament for South Antrim and the brother of future Prime Minister of Northern Ireland James Craig) warned about the agreed upon boundary commission:In March 1922 Michael Collins and James Craig signed the "Craig–Collins Agreement", an attempt by them to deal with the boundary question without recourse to the British government. Despite Article 12 of the treaty, this agreement envisaged a two-party conference between the Northern Ireland government and the Provisional Government of Southern Ireland to establish: "(7) a. Whether means can be devised to secure the unity of Ireland" and "b. Failing this, whether agreement can be arrived at on the boundary question otherwise than by recourse to the Boundary Commission outlined in Article 12 of the Treaty". However, this agreement quickly broke down for reasons other than the boundary question, and Michael Collins was later killed by anti-treaty elements. Just prior to his death in August 1922, Collins made clear his feelings on cooperating with the Northern Ireland government and the Anglo-Irish Treaty: “I will use the political arm against Craig so long as it is of use. If that fails, the treaty can go to hell and we will all start again.”
The Irish Free State government thus established the North-Eastern Boundary Bureau (NEBB) in October 1922, a government office which by 1925 had prepared 56 boxes of files to argue its case for areas of Northern Ireland to be transferred to the Free State. A senior member of the NEBB Patrick McCartan, expressed how people near the border felt disillusioned: "My impression both in Armagh and Newry was that very considerable apathy prevailed and that great skepticism existed about the Boundary Commission being effective."
The Northern Ireland government adopted a policy of non-cooperation with the Boundary Commission. The Secretary to the Northern Ireland Cabinet (Wilfrid Spender) notified his contemporary in the Boundary Commission that the Northern government did not want to make any statement "with reference to the work with which the Commission is charged, nor to appear before the Commission by Counsel, or by accredited representatives, nor to submit to the Commission any evidence dealing with the question". In 1924 Prime Minister Craig did meet with Feetham warning him of "the gravity of the question he was handling and the very grave dangers that would come from any mistakes".
In June 1924 the British appointed Governor-General of the Irish Free State (Tim Healy) made the following statement on how the border should be determined: The Anglo-Irish Treaty provided no ability for either the Irish Free State or the British government to restrict the power of the Commissions Chairman (Feetham) to interpret Article 12. By December 1924 the Chairman had firmly ruled out the use of plebiscites.Phoenix, Eamon & Parkinson, Alan (2010), Conflicts in the North of Ireland, 1900–2000, Four Courts Press, Dublin, Pg 145, ISBN 978 1 84682 189 9
Northern Nationalists viewed the Boundary Commission as a way to save many of their number from a Northern Parliament while many Northern Unionists viewed it as a threat to their state which was established by the 1920 Government of Ireland Act.
The commission and its work