301st Siege Battery (301st SB) was a heavy howitzer unit of Britain's Royal Garrison Artillery (RGA) in World War I. Formed in November 1916, it served on the Western Front at the battles of Messines, Ypres and Cambrai, against the German Spring Offensive and in the final Allied Hundred Days Offensive. After the Armistice with Germany the battery served in the Allied occupation of the Rhineland until it was disbanded in 1919.
Mobilisation and training Once the fighting on the Western Front had bogged down into Trench warfare in 1914, there was an urgent need for siege artillery, and a large number of new RGA units were hurriedly formed over the following years.Farndale, Annex E. The Army Council instructed that 301st Siege Battery would be formed at Portsmouth with effect from 17 November 1916, conforming to the establishment laid down for 6-inch breechloading howitzer batteries.Army Council Instruction No 2223, 29 November 1916.Frederick, pp. 704–7. After training, the battery was mobilised at Larkhill on 14 March 1917 and on 18 March was equipped with four BL 6-inch 26 cwt howitzers. Together with 303rd SB it embarked for the Western Front on 2 April and landed at Le Havre in France the following morning, the guns arriving on 7 April.'Allocation of Siege Batteries RGA', The National Archives (TNA), Kew, file WO 95/5494/4.RGA Siege Btys at Long, Long Trail.Allocations of 301st–320th Siege Btys at Long, Long Trail.301st Siege Bty War Diary November 1916–February 1918, TNA file WO 95/299/2.
Western Front The two new batteries entrained on 8 April and arrived at Bailleul next day. They then marched to join 41st Heavy Artillery Group (HAG) at Dranoutre behind the southern part of the Ypres Salient held by Second Army. While its guns were overhauled at the siege park, the gunners of 301st SB began digging gun pits and dugouts. By 19 April it had 'B' and 'D' guns in position and commenced firing next day, under the command of Captain G.W. Graham (a pre-war officer of the Cork RGA (Special Reserve)Monthly Army List, August 1914..) Its first targets were the Dammstrasse and 'White Chateau', notable defensive position behind the German lines, though 41st HAG supporting IX Corps was mainly employed for counter-battery (CB) fire. 301st SB soon settled to its CB tasks, receiving some hostile fire in return and suffering its first few casualties. From 12 to 17 May the battery did no firing while its gunners worked on tramways to bring up ammunition. It then resumed its CB and trench bombardment tasks. On 20 May 301st SB was transferred to the command of 53rd HAG, which had recently arrived at Locre to join IX Corps, but the battery continued with the same tasks, firing hundreds of rounds each day on camouflaged enemy emplacements and important trenches, together with barbed wire-cutting shoots. On 27 May the front was subjected to a German cylinder gas attack, followed by gas shells on the battery positions, requiring the gunners to work in respirators for some time.Delap, pp. 8–9.41st HAG War Diary March 1917–March 1918, TNA file WO 95/472/2.53rd HAG War Diary, March 1916–June 1917, TNA file WO 95/226/1.
Messines The arrival of 53rd HAG and other artillery units and HQs was part of a build-up for an attack that Second Army was preparing against the Messines–Wytschaete Ridge (the Battle of Messines). The preliminary bombardment for the attack began on 3 June with a special bombardment of Wytschaete village on IX Corps' front, which was expected to be strongly defended.Edmonds, 1917, Vol II, pp. 41–6.Farndale, pp. 184–8.
Second Army's artillery plan emphasised CB fire, and simulated attacks were made to induce the enemy to reveal his hidden batteries: over 200 hostile battery positions were intensively shelled during two days of concentrated CB fire prior to Z Day. British artillery fire died away about 02.40 on the morning of 7 June (Z Day). Before dawn, at 03.10, the surprise element of the plan was revealed: the simultaneous explosion of 19 huge mines dug under the ridge, which blew the German front line system to bits before the infantry went over the top. IX Corps had as its objectives the line from the Spanbroekmolen salient to the 'Nag's Nose' salient at Hollandscheschuur, including the village of Wytschaete, while X Corps was to take the ridge to the north, including the Dammstrasse and the woods beyond. The British guns opened fire immediately after the mine explosions at Zero, and 53rd HAG's batteries were soon switched to their second tasks as the infantry overran the German positions. The results of the limited attack were spectacular, with the whole ridge being captured. In the IX Corps' area, the 36th (Ulster) Division found that 'the ground about the strongpoints had been literally ploughed up by the bursts of the high explosive shells during the bombardment; the barbed wire entanglements which had protected this are below the crest lay piled in twisted heaps, and everywhere was the wreckage of once solidly built dugouts and shelters'. The Dammstrasse position was successfully captured by X Corps. During the morning the battery was ordered to cease fire and pull out and park its guns, which were now out of range.Becke, pp. 185–91.Delap, pp. 10–1.Edmonds, 1917, Vol II, pp. 47–9, 54–69, Sketches 3 & 5.Farndale, pp. 188–91, Map 24.
The day after the battle the battery struck camp, loaded its lorries, and moved off to Vlamertinge behind Ypres in Fifth Army's area, where it handed two guns over to 168th and 237th SBs. After sleeping at the siege park the men went on 9 June to a rest camp at Houtkerque. While it was resting and training at Houtkerque 301st SB came briefly under the command of 88th HAG on 11 June, then transferred to 71st HAG on 13 June, then back to 53rd HAG three days later.
Ypres Fifth Army was preparing for the Ypres Offensive, and fresh batteries were constantly arriving. XIX Corps' Heavy Artillery (HA) had just taken command of the sector directly in front of Ypres and 301st SB was assigned to D Sub-Group of 70th HAG on 24 June. On 28 June a detachment from the battery moved one howitzer close to the new assigned position, but it proved impossible to move it into position in the mud, and the other gun was sent back to the siege park. It was not until 1 July that the first gun was hauled out of the mud and into position, and the detachment suffered a number of casualties from enemy shellfire while doing so; shellfire also damaged the camouflage. By 2 July the first gun was 'in action', a second was in position, and camouflage had been erected for Nos 3 and 4. The remainder of the battery arrived from Houtkerque on 3 July and the guns began firing a few rounds 'by the map', without observation. 13th HAG arrived at Vlamertinge on 4 July and took 301st SB under its command. 13th and 70th HAGs together constituted XIX Corps HA's Northern Counter-Battery Group for the forthcoming operation.70th Bde War Diary August 1916–February 1919, TNA file WO 95/323/1.13th HAG War Diary 1 July 1917–June 1919, TNA file WO 95/387/4.
It had been planned to increase RGA siege batteries' establishment to six guns, and on 8–9 July a section of 1 officer and 57 ORs joined 301st SB from the recently-arrived 371st SB, However, these only made up for recent casualties, and no additional guns were issued to the battery at this time.
301st SB continued improving its positions, digging a communication trench from the dugouts to the gun positions, building a command post and laying a tramway to bring up ammunition, the working parties suffering a number of casualties from shellfire. Meanwhile the guns continued firing, mainly map shoots or 'SOS' shoots in response to requests from the infantry, although a few targets were registered from an observation post (OP) at 'Hussar Farm' or with aircraft observation. On 16 July the preliminary bombardment for the Ypres offensive began; on that day the battery was shelled with gas and high explosive (HE), and the gunners had to wear their respirators for four hours. This was repeated next morning and No 3 gun was put out of action by a direct hit. The bombardment proceeded, 301st SB mainly on neutralisation CB shoots, 'sweeping and searching' behind enemy lines or point targets such as Zonnebeke Church. On the night of 27 July a German aircraft bombed the battery, starting a fire that was soon extinguished.
The bombardment reached high intensity from 29 July, and the first phase of the offensive (the Battle of Pilckem Ridge) was launched at 03.50 on 31 July with a heavy barrage, 301st SB firing 760 rounds on its assigned target. The infantry went forward and by dawn (04.40) they had broken through the German outpost line and advanced about up the shell-pitted slope of Pilckem Ridge. At 05.05 fresh companies leapfrogged through to continue the advance against the belt of fortified farms that protected the German second line. On XIX Corps' front some of these held out for up to 3 hours, but soon after 09.00 the British infantry had gained a foothold across the Steenbeek stream. 301st SB responded to a few calls from the OPs during the afternoon. However, the advance of the reserve brigades to the third objective was badly coordinated and towards evening the Germans counter-attacked, pushing XIX Corps back to the Steenbeek and recapturing 'Wurst Farm'. During the counter-attack the enemy fired a concentration on 301st SB, killing three gunners and wounding four. That evening heavy rain set in and continued for three days, preventing air observation and turning the battlefield into a sea of mud. This made the forward movement of reinforcements, supplies, guns and ammunition extremely difficult and delayed further operations. The sickness rate also increased.Becke, pp. 243–6.Edmonds, 1917, Vol II, pp.133–9, 150–1, 157–8, 166–74, 183–4, Sketches 10, 15.Farndale, pp. 199–204, Maps 25–6.
Over the following days 301st SB continued its 'searching and sweeping' and CB neutralisation shoots, calibrating its guns as required with shots against Zonnebeke Church. There was a steady trickle of casualties from shellfire, gas, and sickness. The offensive resumed with the Battle of Langemarck on 16 August. 301st SB fired over 650 rounds in the morning and later responded to calls from OPs and aircraft. The attack was not a success: the exhausted infantry had to wade through mud in the flooded Steenbeek valley. Many key points had not been adequately bombarded, and smoke obscured the OPs and SOS signals, so German counter-attacks were effective. XIX Corps in particular gained little ground. There was now a lull in large-scale operations as Second Army took the lead and carefully prepared for a resumption of the offensive. Fifth Army continued local attacks on the pillboxes protecting the Passchendaele Ridge. 301st SB fired hundreds of rounds a day on 'searching and sweeping' or map shoots. It received some reinforcements from the RGA Base or returned from hospital, but suffered a continual trickle of casualties. On 2 September Right Section of the battery was relieved by a section of 71st (South African) SB sent up from Third Army; the section withdrew to Poperinge for rest (though the billets were bombed).Edmonds, 1917, Vol II, pp. 194–7, 202–3, 206–8, Sketches 18 & 20.Farndale, p. 204, Map 27.
Cambrai