Porto Alegre was the primary center of conspiracy during the Revolution of 1930 and the stage of fighting in its early days. The state government of Rio Grande do Sul, led by Getúlio Vargas, organized a national uprising against the Brazilian government of President Washington Luís. State military forces and internal conspirators overpowered the federal Army garrison commanded by General Gil de Almeida. The entire 3rd Military Region either defected to the rebel side or was defeated, paving the way for the revolutionary march on the federal capital and Vargas' inauguration as President of Brazil.

The revolution was scheduled for 17:30 on 3 October, following the end of the workday at the barracks. Its outbreak came as no surprise to the population. The preceding months had been tense, and General Almeida had brought federal reinforcements to Porto Alegre, anticipating a possible confrontation with the state government. Artillery positioned on Menino Deus Hill posed a threat to the city center. Yet, the Army itself was rife with revolutionary sympathizers. Vargas promised to maintain peace, but his subordinates were conspiring with Tenentist officers and representatives from Minas Gerais and Paraíba. The revolutionary General Staff, led by Lieutenant Colonel Góis Monteiro, had been operating clandestinely in Porto Alegre since September.

The revolutionary forces were divided into four groupings, one in reserve and the others for attacks on the regions of the headquarters of the 3rd Military Region, the barracks of the 7th Light Infantry Battalion (7th BC) and Menino Deus Hill, where federal reinforcements were concentrated. Loyalist resistance was sporadic and isolated. Machine guns were sabotaged and officers and soldiers were arrested on the street when they left work. Revolutionaries within the Army deserted and civilian volunteers joined the uprising. General Almeida was arrested inside the HQ after a brief and bloody fight. The 7th BC, in Praça do Portão, resisted throughout the night until signing a ceasefire, and at dawn the next day, a formal surrender.

General Almeida and other loyalist officers were imprisoned aboard the ship Comandante Ribber, anchored in the Guaíba River. Following the victory in Rio Grande do Sul, volunteers enlisted for the military campaign, and the police arrested enemies of the revolution. On 11 October, Vargas handed over the government to Oswaldo Aranha—the revolution's general coordinator—and boarded a train bound for the battlefront and the federal capital, where he would assume power following the revolutions' national victory.

Background

Political context

In 1930, Porto Alegre was a modest city with a commercial center bounded by Praia Street and the Guaíba River. As the capital of Rio Grande do Sul, it would serve as the main hub of the conspiracy behind the Revolution of 1930. The state held a unique position within the First Brazilian Republic's federal system: it stood outside the traditional dominant axis of São Paulo and Minas Gerais, and yet it was powerful enough to challenge for central authority. Getúlio Vargas, state governor since 1928, healed the wounds of past civil wars by incorporating the former opposition into his administration. The Rio-Grandense Republican Party (PRR) and the Libertador Party united to form the Frente Única Gaúcha.

Internal unification was followed by an alliance with Minas Gerais and Paraíba to launch Vargas' candidacy in the 1930 presidential election. The alliance members knew that the country's electoral system would not allow for a peaceful opposition victory; indeed, the results designated Júlio Prestes—also from São Paulo—to succeed Washington Luís, who was likewise from São Paulo. Even before the election, the radical wing of politicians from Rio Grande do Sul—represented by Oswaldo Aranha, João Neves da Fontoura, Batista Luzardo, and Flores da Cunha—was plotting an armed revolt against the government. In September 1929, Vargas sent the first emissaries to contact—in prison and in exile—the Tenentist military officers who had attempted to overthrow the government during the previous decade.

In late 1929, Vargas and Aranha met in Porto Alegre with Luís Carlos Prestes, a hero of the Tenentist movement. They provided funds for him to purchase weapons, but he was already too much at odds with his associates. In May 1930, he broke with the conspirators, labeling the Liberal Alliance "bourgeois." The radical wing still had to overcome resistance within the PRR, such as that of former governor Borges de Medeiros. Vargas himself was cautious and avoided making an open commitment. Senator Firmino Paim Filho was tasked with reassuring Washington Luís, whose administration had feared a rebellion ever since the election results. It was known that, should one occur, it would begin in Rio Grande do Sul and involve the Military Brigade and provisional units.

The conspirators decided that the movement would be headquartered in Rio Grande do Sul, with Oswaldo Aranha providing general coordination and separate leaders for the civilian and military wings. Rumors of an insurrection were mounting, and the state government's mobilization for a conflict was evident. Everyone knew that the revolution would come sooner or later. Speeches were inflammatory, and the press stoked patriotic fervor. By September, rumors circulated that the decisive moment would arrive during the Independence Day parade.

Military alignment

The inhabitants of Rio Grande do Sul were thought to have a military vocation. Between a quarter and a third of Brazil's Army was stationed in Rio Grande do Sul; many of the military personnel were Rio Grande do Sul natives, and the Army identified politically with the PRR. The state government relied on the Military Brigade—a true "state army"—and on irregular troops in the countryside. Porto Alegre was an exception among the state's municipalities, as the number of state troops there exceeded that of the Army garrison. The Army had approximately fourteen thousand men in Rio Grande do Sul, distributed across two units with over a thousand men, ten with five hundred to a thousand men, eight with three hundred to five hundred men, and one with two hundred men. All garrisons—including the one in Porto Alegre—were better equipped for combat than the state troops.

These dispersed garrisons, composed of soldiers recruited from the local population, were vulnerable to revolutionary psychological infiltration. Federal military personnel serving in Rio Grande do Sul were constantly urged to side with the revolution. They were targeted by speeches, pamphlets, press publications, private conversations, and offers of money. Soldiers were told: "A gaúcho does not fight against a gaúcho." Officers were appealed to on the grounds of patriotism and promised a military-dominated regime. Several colonels warned the regional command about these attempts to win them over.

The Army garrisons in Rio Grande do Sul reported to the 3rd Military Region, headquartered in Porto Alegre and commanded by General Gil Antônio Dias de Almeida, who remained loyal to the government until the end. He repeatedly warned the Minister of War, General Nestor Sezefredo dos Passos, about subversion within the ranks. The responses, when they came, were tepid. The Army maintained a makeshift surveillance service that paled in comparison to the police intelligence network. Infiltrated conspirators withheld information from the commander—particularly regarding the spread of sedition in the countryside—while keeping the revolutionary leadership apprised of all measures and resources within the 3rd Military Region.

Signs were everywhere: mysterious troop movements, ammunition thefts, and rumors. At General Almeida’s insistence, ammunition shipments were postponed. By early October, the stockpiles in Porto Alegre and Rio Grande totaled fewer than 400,000 rounds—a figure that included eighty crates of munitions delivered on the 2nd at the behest of the ordnance directorate. Yet, Intelligence Bulletin No. 18, forwarded by the regional command to the Ministry of War, remained optimistic: the Military Brigade was loyal and prepared to defend the institutions. Ambassador Hélio Lobo, in conversations with Uruguayan officials, asserted that "the police brigade and the conservative classes" would not join any movement against the federal government. In Rio de Janeiro, Washington Luís exuded confidence that an uprising was out of the question.

Army reinforcements

In late August, General Almeida proposed to the Minister of War a defensive concentration of troops in the countryside, a proposal rejected on the grounds that "the danger of revolution had passed." In September, informed by reliable sources that the revolt was imminent, the general summoned the Secretary of the Interior, João Simplício. Almeida had been his student at the Military College. He stated he felt compelled to reinforce the Porto Alegre garrison if Vargas did not take decisive measures to reassure the public, rather than maintaining "his indecisive and highly contradictory attitude." João Simplício tried to dissuade him, arguing that political necessity prevented Vargas from breaking ties with extremist elements.

Bringing reinforcements to Porto Alegre would expose the commander to fierce criticism. Even if the reinforcements succeeded in preventing the revolution, they would still be criticized as an excessive provocation. Faced with the state government's refusals, General Almeida accepted the risk and ordered the deployment of a battalion from the 9th Infantry Regiment (based in Rio Grande), the 8th and 9th Light Infantry Battalions (BCs) (from São Leopoldo and Caxias do Sul), and a company from the 7th Infantry Regiment (from Santa Maria). He assumed full responsibility for these troop movements in his report to the Minister of War. According to his memoirs, the Ministry sent a radiogram broadly authorizing the mobilization, but the message was intercepted by an officer involved in the conspiracy.

The reinforcements were stationed on Menino Deus Hill. The area housed the headquarters of the 3rd Military Region as well as the barracks for the Regional Quartermaster Service, the 7th Light Infantry Battalion (BC), and the 2.ª Companhia de Estabelecimentos. Menino Deus Hill housed the 4th Squadron of the 3rd Divisional Cavalry Regiment (IV/3rd RCD), an artillery battery from the Reserve Officers' Training Center (CPOR), and the General Staff contingent. It possessed its own water supply, the main depots for small-arms and artillery ammunition, and other strategic advantages for withstanding a prolonged siege and providing cover for units within the city.

In total, the Army had two thousand well-supplied troops in Porto Alegre, 1,500 of whom were stationed on Menino Deus Hill. A defense plan was in place, featuring designated targets for artillery bombardment of the city. In one of his bulletins, General Almeida asserted that "any one of our platoons [...] will suffice to break up any band, however large. And for us, this is a matter of honor."

Rumors and accusations