Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955), was a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States holding that a non-citizen subject to a final order of deportation under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 could obtain judicial review by bringing an action for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act. Before the decision, habeas corpus was the exclusive means of judicial review of deportation orders under § 19(a) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Heikkila v. Barber. In INS v. St. Cyr (2001), the Supreme Court traced this history in considering whether the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 had eliminated habeas review of deportation orders.
Background
Before Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, the writ of habeas corpus was the sole and exclusive process for judicial review of deportation. Because the writ concerns the legality of detention, there was often no means to seek judicial review of administrative regulations or policies surrounding immigration and naturalization.
Mampriel Pedreiro sought judicial review of a deportation order in the District Court, where he alleged due process claims. The District Court dismissed the petition, stating that an indispensable party was not joined, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which held that the Administrative Procedure Act allowed judicial review of deportation orders. In another case, the First Circuit had held that judicial review of deportation was available by habeas corpus only. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split.Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro,
Supreme Court
Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro held that the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) did not preclude relief under the APA. The court explained that the APA's judicial review provisions continued to apply unless a later law expressly precluded them, and found that the INA did not do so.
The court also held that the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization was not an indispensable party to an action challenging a deportation order. Finding that a requirement to sue the Commissioner in Washington D.C. was inconsistent with the APA policy of facilitating judicial review, Justice Hugo Black delivered the opinion of the court to the effect that "the Government's defense can be adequately presented by the District Director who is under the supervision of the Commissioner."
Subsequent developments
Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro established that the Administrative Procedure Act provided an alternative means of judicial review of deportation orders in addition to habeas corpus. Congress subsequently replaced district court APA review of deportation orders under the Immigration and Nationality Act with review in the courts of appeals as the "sole and exclusive" procedure.
The relationship between APA review and habeas corpus later became relevant to the interpretation of § 704 of the APA, which makes final agency action reviewable when there is "no other adequate remedy" in court. In Bowen v. Massachusetts (1988), the Supreme Court explained that this provision was intended to prevent the APA's general grant of judicial review from duplicating specialized statutory review procedures, not to restrict the APA's broader purpose of providing judicial review of agency action. The court cited Pedreiro in stating that a restrictive interpretation of § 704 would run counter to the APA's purpose of removing obstacles to judicial review.
Habeas exclusivity resurfaced in litigation over removals under the Alien Enemies Act during the Trump administration. Dissenting from the majority in Trump v. J.G.G., Justice Sonia Sotomayor cited Pedreiro to illustrate that habeas exclusivity had not historically precluded judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
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