183rd Siege Battery (183rd SB) was a heavy howitzer unit of Britain's Royal Garrison Artillery (RGA) in World War I. Formed in June 1916, it served on the Western Front, at the Somme and Arras and was then stationed on the Flanders coast. In December 1917 the battery was reorganised, giving up its 9.2-inch howitzers and reforming with more mobile 6-inch howitzers. In the last year of the war it fought against the German spring offensive and participated in the final Allied Hundred Days Offensive. After the Armistice with Germany the battery served in the Allied occupation of the Rhineland until it was disbanded later in 1919.
Mobilisation and training Once the fighting on the Western Front had bogged down into Trench warfare in 1914, there was an urgent need for siege artillery, and a large number of new RGA units were hurriedly formed over the following years.Farndale, Annex E. The Army Council instructed that 183rd Siege Battery would be formed as a heavy howitzer battery in the Portland Garrison with effect from 23 June 1916.Army Council Instruction No 1307, 30 June 1916.Frederick, pp. 702–7. The new battery began to assemble at Weymouth, possibly including some Territorials of the Dorsetshire RGA who manned the Portland coastal batteries. One of the recruits training at Weymouth who was posted to the new battery in mid-July was the painter and artist Wyndham Lewis. In August the battery proceeded to Lydd to carry out its live firing course before deploying overseas. Lewis wrote to his friend Ezra Pound that 'first blood is drawn at this so called "live" camp. But it is chiefly signallers that are killed'. He was being hyperbolic, but the previous month another inexperienced battery had nearly caused multiple casualties during a training shoot. Lewis had applied for an officer's commission, and left the battery in mid-September to transfer to 196th SB (due to deploy later) while his application was being processed.Beach & Rosenquist.
Western Front The personnel of 183rd SB embarked for the Western Front on 26 September 1916.'Embarkation Dates', The National Archives (TNA), Kew, file WO 162/7. On arrival at Boulogne next day, they took over the guns (four 9.2-inch howitzers), stores and mechanical transport waiting for 175th SB, whose personnel had been detained in the UK because of an outbreak of measles. 183rd SB was allocated to III Corps' Heavy Artillery of Fourth Army in place of 175th SB.CCRA III Corps War Diary September 1916, TNA file WO 95/690/3.
Somme When 183rd SB arrived III Corps was heavily engaged in the latter stages of the Somme Offensive, including the Battle of the Transloy Ridges and the Attacks on the Butte de Warlencourt. Much of III Corps HA's firing during October and November was directed at Le Sars (captured on 7 October), at the 'Gird', 'Gallwitz' and 'Grevillers' trenches and their environs, or on counter-battery (CB) fire against the 32 hostile batteries identified in its sector.Becke, Pt 4, pp. 145–51.Miles, 1916, Vol II, pp. 433–4, 436–8, 442, 446–7, 473, 524–5, Sketches 42, 44.III Corps RA HQ War Diary October 1916, TNA file WO 95/690/4.III Corps RA HQ War Diary November 1916, TNA file WO 95/690/5. After the conclusion of the offensive 183rd SB was transferred to 30th Heavy Artillery Group (HAG) on 30 November.
183rd SB joined 3rd HAG on 28 January 1917. Its targets were much the same as in late 1916: Grevillers Redoubt, the Butte de Warlencourt and Little Wood. However, on 4 February 3rd HAG's batteries were taken out of action, and next day 183rd SB was posted back to 66th HAG. It travelled north to the Arras sector, where it joined 66th HAG on 10 February, the date that group joined VII Corps HA with Third Army.3rd HAG War Diary September 1916–November 1917 TNA file WO 95/297/2.VII Corps HA War Diary December 1916–June 1917, TNA file WO 95/813/2.
Arras Third Army was concentrating a large number of heavy and siege batteries for the forthcoming Arras Offensive. 66th HAG was designated 'G' Group, setting up its headquarters (HQ) at Dainville, and by mid-February 183rd SB had one section of 9.2-inch howitzers in action, while the personnel of the other section formed working parties. VII Corps' arrangements for the offensive were disrupted by the German retreat to the Hindenburg Line (Operation Alberich). On 17 March VII Corps HA noticed a decrease in hostile artillery fire, and the forward observation officers (FOOs) reported villages on fire behind the German lines. Early next morning fires were seen in the German front line, and by noon it was reported that the enemy had evacuated the front system. They were followed up by British infantry who occupied Beaurains and Mercatel. At 20.00 VII Corps HA ordered a number of its batteries, including 183rd SB, to move forward to new positions. They spent the rest of the month improving these positions and registering new targets. The right of the corps was facing the strong new Hindenburg defences, and its left was now starting its attack from the old German front line, which had been its original first objective. On 31 March VII Corps HA began issuing the orders for the coming attack: there would be four days of bombardment (V, W, X and Y) before the assault went in on Z Day. Each group was assigned bombardment targets within a specified 'lane', to make it easier for FOOs to spot the fall of shot from. their own guns. For most of the batteries the bombardment targets were enemy trenches and barbed wire, the long-range 9.2-inch howitzers being given the more distant targets. 66th HAG was given the village of Vis-en-Artois and its approach roads as a special target. Once the batteries had completed their forward moves and ammunition stockpiled, daily bombardments began in early April with air observation by No 8 Squadron, Royal Flying Corps (RFC). 4 April was V Day when the main bombardment began at 06.30. A delay meant that 6 April became W1 Day; sunny clear weather made for good observation and a great deal was accomplished by the guns on this extra day. By 8 April (Y Day) the bombardment had become continuous, except for pauses for air photography, and was continued until two hours after the left-hand infantry divisions of VII Corps (14th (Light) and 56th (1st London)) had launched their assault at Zero (07.45) on 9 April. According to the plan, after the infantry had gained their first objective (the Black Line) and resumed their advance at Zero + 2 hours, the heavy howitzers of 66th HAG would fire barrages ahead of them within their lane, then lift back to the Wancourt–Feuchy line (the Brown Line). The 4th and 5th barrages would begin once the infantry advanced from their second objective (the Blue Line) towards the Brown Line at Zero + 6 hours. Beyond, the Green Line on Wancourt Ridge was the final objective. The two right-hand divisions of VII Corps facing the Hindenburg Line (30th and 21st) were not due to attack until 12.55 and 16.15 respectively, when it was hoped that the defenders would have been disrupted by the rest of the attack. In the event, the left hand divisions captured the Black and Blue line objectives but were held up short of the Brown (Wancourt–Feuchy) Line. The right hand divisions secured part of the front trench of the Hindenburg Line but could get no further. An additional heavy artillery bombardment of the Wancourt–Feuchy Line was arranged and 14th (L) Division attacked again at 19.00. All available guns bombarded the Wancourt–Feuchy Line at dawn next day, but 56th (1st L) Division was still clearing part of the Hindenburg Line and could not resume its advance until noon. By nightfall 14th (L) and 56th (1st L) Divisions had secured the Wancourt–Feuchy Line, but it was too late to exploit any further. They worked their way slowly towards the Green Line over the following days. Elsewhere, Third and First Armies had scored some outstanding successes, including the capture of Vimy Ridge.Becke, Pt 4, pp. 175–8.Falls, 1917, Vol I, pp. 176–80, 182–6, 198, 201–14, 244–7, 259–61, 281–2, 285, 288–9, Sketches 7, 8, 13, Appendix 28.Farndale, pp. 164–74, Map 21.
VII Corps HA now had the task of moving its guns and ammunition forward to bring their next targets within range. By 13 April 183rd SB had begun its move forward. VII Corps attacked again on 23 April (the Second Battle of the Scarpe), preceded by bombardments of villages close to the German front. 66th HAG paid particular attention to Hendecourt and Rémy. This attack was at first successful but some of the ground was lost again when the Germans counter-attacked at 20.00. However, the Germans pulled back a little next day. This advance meant another move forward for some of the heavy guns. During the lull the gunners were withdrawn in relays to get some rest. VII Corps' next operation (the Third Battle of the Scarpe) was on 3 May, preceded by three days of intense bombardment by the heavy artillery of enemy held villages. The attack was a failure. On 7 May VII Corps HA began a systematic and continuous bombardment of the Hindenburg Line with its 8-inch and 9.2-inch howitzers.Falls, 1917, Vol I, pp. 381–9, 433–8, Sketch 19.
However, the Arras Offensive was over, and the BEF began switching artillery north to Second Army for its planned operation at Messines. On 8 May 66th HAG prepared to go to Second Army, leaving 183rd SB with 59th HAG around Boisleux-Saint-Marc. Nevertheless, Third Army continued some operations against the Hindenburg Line, including an attack by 33rd Division on 20 May, with 183rd SB among the supporting artillery laying a steady barrage on the front line. With only one howitzer for every , the guns had to make minor adjustments left and right to cover the whole frontage. At 5 minutes before Zero (05.15) the heavies lifted off the front line to fire on the support line. The surprise attack was a success, the infantry easily seizing the front trench, but they could not maintain the lodgement that they made in the support line. A second attack at 19.30 found the Hindenburg Line battered almost out of recognition, but the deep dugouts were still intact, and the support line was strongly held. The attack on the support line was renewed at the unusual time of 13.55 on 27 May, with the 9.2-inch howitzers of 59th HAG concentrating on the dugouts, and the infantry succeeded in capturing a length of the line.Falls, 1917, Vol I, pp. 517–9.