The Kazakh–Dzungar War of 1739–1741 was the final major Dzungar invasion of the Kazakh Khanate, escalating a century-long rivalry into an existential "total war." Triggered by Dzungar dynastic instability and the emergence of political pretenders, the campaign aimed to subjugate the Middle jüz and isolate it from Russian influence. A strategic stalemate eventually shifted the conflict toward multi-lateral diplomacy involving the Russian Empire. The war effectively halted Dzungar eastward expansion and reshaped the political landscape of the Great Steppe.
Following the war, the Khan of the Middle jüz, Abulmambet, and the Sultans Ablai, Abulfeiz, and Niyaz were also forced to send hostages to Dzungaria. Russian Lieutenant D. Gladyshev, who returned from a visit to Abulkhair in Orenburg in the spring of 1742, reported on a meeting of the nobility of the Little jüz, at which a decision was made to recognize the allegiance of the Dzungar khuntaiji.Moiseev V. A. Dzungar-Kazakh relations in the 17th-18th centuries and Russian policy // Bulletin of Eurasia. — 2000. — P. 36—37. Soon after, the Khan of the Little Zhuz, Abulkhair, also sent his son to Dzungaria.
In 1743, through a delegation sent by , both sides reached an agreement and established peace; this treaty remained in effect until the death of Galdan Tseren in 1745, marking the beginning of a new phase in regional power dynamics.
Background
The geopolitical landscape of the late 1730s was defined by a significant shift in the Dzungar Khanate's foreign policy. Following the death of the Yongzheng Emperor in 1735, Galdan Tseren concluded a peace treaty with the Qing dynasty, which secured his eastern frontiers and allowed for a massive military redirection toward the Kazakh Khanate. By the summer of 1735, Dzungar forces had already re-established dominance over the Senior jüz and key southern urban centers, including Tashkent and Turkestan. Furthermore, Galdan Tseren attempted to introduce Lamaism among the local Muslim population, though this effort ultimately failed.
During 1737–1738, the Dzungars engaged in complex diplomatic maneuvers; while Galdan Tseren sent envoys to Abul Khair Khan promising "friendship," he was simultaneously massing an invasion force of 20,000 to 24,000 troops along the Irtysh and Karasu lines. He justified the impending assault to Russian authorities as "just revenge" for Kazakh raids on Dzungar cattle and territory. Despite the growing threat, the Kazakh Khan remained profoundly fragmented. The Middle Jüz and Junior Jüz were preoccupied with internal power struggles and external conflicts. This lack of strategic unity left the Kazakh borders vulnerable when the Dzungar offensive finally commenced in the spring of 1739.
First Campaign
In the spring of 1739, Dzungar troops numbering 24 thousand men under the command of Tseren- Dondoba invaded the territory of the Middle Jüz in two strike columns. According to the Orenburg Commissar Bashkir Urusov, who escaped from Kazakh
Quite numerous detachments from the Dzungar army located along the southern part of the Irtysh line, under the command of Noion Septen began to carry out separate raids on the nomadic camps of the Middle Jüz with the aim of robbery and clarification of the situation.
Second Campaign
In the winter of 1739–1740, the Dzungars resumed their offensives into Kazakh territories. The Dzungar army, totaling between 30,000 and 35,000 troops, was divided into two main groups: the first group, led by Septen, advanced towards Saryarka and the Ishim, while the second group, under the command of Sary-Manji, moved towards the Syr Darya and Jetisu. The strategic goal of these Dzungar commanders was to cut off the Kazakhs from the south across the Syr Darya and from the Russian fortified lines to the north. The tribes of the Middle Jüz along the Tobol and Ishim rivers suffered significant losses. According to the plan of Dzungarian Noions, the Kazakhs were to be sige in a semicircle and surrendered, but a harsh winter put an end to this plan against Middle Jüz On January 25, 1740, the Kazan provincial chancery reported to the senate office in Moscow. In January 1740, a force of approximately 15,000 Dzungar troops launched an offensive against the Kazakh nomadic tribes of Uaq and Kerei tribes, also Abulmamet, and Barak Sultan along the Irtysh and Ishim rivers. Facing a superior force, the Kazakh tribes were compelled to abandon their livestock and possessions, retreating toward the Yaik River before eventually resettling near the Syr Darya. Difficult natural conditions, a lack of sufficient horses, and the uncertainty of the Russian government's intentions forced the Dzungar commanders to withdraw its troops from Kazakhstan and deploy them along the Irtysh. Since the Kazakh side suffered significant losses, in order to compensate for the losses.
Russian diplomatic involvement
Following the devastating Dzungar campaigns of 1739, the leadership of the Middle Zhuz, headed by Abilmambet Khan and Ablai Sultan, adopted a dual-track policy to ensure the state's integrity in the face of Dzungar aggression. On August 28, 1740, the Kazakh elite arrived at the Or River in Orsk for a pivotal meeting with Prince , the head of the Orenburg Commission. During these negotiations, they formally accepted the protectorate of the Russian Empire and reaffirmed their oath of allegiance to Empress Anna Ioannovna. This strategic move was intended to leverage Russian diplomatic weight against the Dzungars. According to historian Vasily Bartold, such protectorates were often viewed by Central Asian rulers as a "beneficial deal," providing the prestige and nominal protection of a stronger power without imposing actual subordinative obligations.
In response to Kazakh requests, the Russian administration issued formal decrees (ukaz) and diplomatic notes to the Dzungar headquarters, demanding an end to their incursions into Kazakh territories. However, the intervention remained largely symbolic. The Russian Empire was highly reluctant to provide direct military support, preferring to maintain a buffer zone without committing regular troops to a full-scale war with the Dzungar Khanate. This strategy of "paper protection" failed to deter the Dzungars. The diplomatic deadlock was further exacerbated by Russia's simultaneous demands for the extradition of Bashkir refugees hiding in the Kazakh Steppe. Russia's refusal to provide tangible military aid, coupled with their internal security priorities regarding the Bashkir rebels, ultimately proved ineffective in preventing the massive Dzungar offensive of 1741.
Bashkir Intervention
Origin The Bashkir rebel , identified as Mendykhul Yulaev in Bashkir sources, also used the names Nogai Sultan-Kerei and Karakalpak Sultan Baibolat. By claiming to be the Dzungar prince Shuno-Lozan, he provided Galdan Tseren with a pretext to intervene in the region, leading to the escalation of the Kazakh–Dzungar War. Shuno Dabo had fled to the Volga in 1727 and died in exile in 1732, but Karasakal utilized his identity for political purposes.
Political destabilization
Kazakh authorities, including , Kabanbai Batyr, Kazbek Bi, and Ablai Sultan, refused to extradite Karasakal, viewing him as an asset to incite internal strife within the Dzungar Khanate. Karasakal portrayed himself as the legitimate rival to Galdan Tseren and, supported by Oirat dissidents such as Taisha Barghai, conducted raids on Dzungar borderlands.
Despite pressure from the Russian Empire and the Dzungar Khanate, the Kazakh leadership provided Karasakal with livestock and protection. They aimed to use him to destabilize the Dzungar state by potentially installing him on the Oirat throne.
In 1742–1743, Galdan Tseren demanded Karasakal's extradition in exchange for the release of Ablai Sultan and other captives. Despite a Russian reward for his capture, no Kazakh ruler complied. Karasakal's influence led to a conflict with Sultan Barak in 1744, after the latter attempted to capture him to secure his own son's release. Karasakal avoided the trap and fled to the protection of Kazybek Bi and Kabanbay Batyr.
Third Campaign
In the second half(autumn) of the 1740, Dzungars resumed their campaign. According to information from Abyz Baibolat to the chancellor Iamyshev, Galdan Tseren began to destroy the Kazakh nomadic camps. urgently formed a detachment of 2,000 and launched counteroffensive on the Dzungars.The Kazakhs, having been prepared in advance, offered a courageous and organized resistance to Dzungars. The battles continued until the beginning of 1741. According to historian Ilya Zlatkin, between 1741 and 1745, Galdan Tseren made several diplomatic attempts to resolve territorial and political disputes in his favor, but these efforts were unsuccessful. Consequently, the Dzungar nobility launched a renewed offensive with even greater zeal against the Kazakhs, who were persistently fighting to reclaim Semirechye and expel the Oirat forces from the region. During the campaigns of 1741, the Dzungars tried to cut off the Kazakhs from the Russian fortified lines and the road to the Baraba Steppe. In one of his conversations with Lieutenant Proskuryakov, the Dzungar commander-in-chief declared that he would send two thousand Kalmyks directly to Baraba to search for the enemies of the Kassack Horde, since Kalmyks had heard that there were many Kassacks there at Baraba. Noyon Septen, having arrived at the Yamyshev fortress, confirmed this message, adding that the Dzungar troops intend to go down the Irtysh to the local Yamyshev side to Om to destroy the Kassack Horde and that is why they are now going to gather a council. The Dzungar offensive of early 1741 exploited Kazakh disunity. Abulkhair Khan of the Junior Jüz secretly negotiated with Galdan Tseren, offering submission and a political hostage (amanat) in exchange for control over Turkestan and Tashkent.
Dzungar–Russian negotiations (1740–1741)
In January 1741, a Dzungar embassy led by Lama-Dashi and Nauruz Kazy engaged in negotiations with the Siberian Governor, P. Buturlin. The envoys primarily sought to determine which Kazakh groups were officially under Russian protection and their exact locations. Buturlin replied that he was only aware of Abulkhair Khan of the Junior Jüz and his people being Russian subjects. Crucially, Buturlin failed to acknowledge that a significant portion of the Middle Jüz, led by and Ablai Sultan, had recently accepted Russian citizenship. Assured by this response, the Dzungar ambassadors promised not to attack Russian subjects but declared their intent to wage war against independent Kazakhs, requesting that Russian forces not interfere.
Although the embassy's formal pretext was to congratulate Empress Anna Ioannovna (who had died in 1740), their true objective was diplomatic preparation for the invasion of the Kazakh steppes. The envoys actively gathered intelligence from Russian officials regarding the population sizes and nomadic routes of various Kazakh tribes. Furthermore, they explicitly requested that Kazakh nomads not be allowed to cross into Russian territory. Buturlin not only agreed to this but informed the ambassadors that strict orders had already been dispatched to all fortresses to maintain tight security and treat any approaching Kazakhs as "hostile" forces.