The 1688 invasion of England by William III of Orange was a large-scale military operation mounted by the Dutch Republic to secure England as an ally against France in the coming Nine Years' War. Although framed as a defence of English liberties, the expedition was planned primarily to prevent an Anglo-French alignment and avoid a repeat of the crisis of 1672. With an invitation from seven English politicians providing political cover, William assembled one of the largest fleets in European history, carrying an experienced and well-equipped army to England in November 1688. The Royal Navy attempted to intercept the invasion fleet, but adverse winds frustrated its efforts, allowing the Dutch to land at Torbay largely unopposed.
The subsequent land campaign was marked more by desertion and the political collapse of James II's regime than by major fighting. James's retreat from Salisbury surrendered the strategic initiative to William, while his eventual flight to France allowed Dutch troops to occupy London with little resistance. James was subsequently deposed, and in 1689 William and his wife Mary, James's daughter, were crowned joint monarchs of England. The invasion thus precipitated the political settlement known as the Glorious Revolution and helped bring England into the war against Louis XIV.
Prelude
To prevent an alliance between England and France in the upcoming Nine Years' War and a repeat of 1672, William III of Orange and the Dutch States General resolved to stage a pre-emptive strike on England. William was careful not to appear as a conqueror, and his marriage with Mary Stuart combined with domestic unrest in England allowed him to request an invitation from seven important English figures. The invitation from the "Immortal Seven" in early July 1688 gave William's planned expedition the veneer of legitimacy he wanted.
Preparations The seven politicians who invited William III to intervene in England were confident of the invasion's prospects for success. They assessed that "nineteen parts of twenty of the people are desirous of a change," noting widespread dissatisfaction among army officers and a strong aversion to Catholicism among the soldiers. Despite this optimism, William III deemed it essential to assemble a formidable army and navy to ensure nothing was left to chance. While the English conspirators recommended a small force supported by a large fleet, William insisted on commanding enough troops to decisively confront James II's army if necessary.
The preparations for the expedition were managed collaboratively by William, Hans Willem Bentinck, Gaspar Fagel, Job de Wildt (Secretary of the Amsterdam Admiralty), and Lieutenant-Admiral Cornelis Evertsen. Financial backing came primarily from the States General, which decided in late July to expand the Dutch fleet by 9,000 personnel. To fund this expansion, a state loan of 4 million guilders was issued at William's request. Additional financial support came from Francisco Lopes Suasso, a financier of Portuguese-Jewish origin, who lent 2 million guilders. When asked about collateral, Suasso famously responded, "If you succeed, I know you will repay me; if not, I will accept the loss."
The actual invasion force comprised around 15,000 Dutch soldiers, reinforced by between 1,000 and 5,000 British and French volunteers. To safeguard the homeland against the threat of a French attack, 30,000 troops stayed behind, bolstered by an additional 19,000 elite German and Swedish forces that were hired by the Dutch. Half of the troops and the entire fleet crew were funded by the city of Amsterdam, with minimal involvement from the other Dutch admiralties except Rotterdam. The combined expenses for the army and navy exceeded 7 million guilders. The operation was conducted in secrecy, and while it was impossible to fully conceal such a vast invasion force, uncertainty persisted in England until November as to whether the fleet was aimed at France or intended for an invasion of England: in part because it was hard for James II and other experienced naval officers to imagine that the Dutch would risk such a fleet to the autumn weather.
Until September, William and his confidants had deliberately concealed whether the growing Dutch military force was intended for France or England, waiting to see how Louis XIV would react. The French king, confident in James II's position, saw little cause for concern regarding England. He had threatened to declare war on the Republic as soon as its fleet set sail; and, in the worst case, he assumed that William III would become entangled in a prolonged conflict there. The French fleet was in the Mediterranean because Louis was seriously considering an invasion of the Papal States and therefore unable to come to James's aid. When Louis, in September, ordered the occupation of Papal Avignon, deployed a garrison to Cologne and the Palatinate, and laid siege to Philippsburg, William III deemed it the right moment to disclose the planned expedition to the Dutch States General. Louis had with his actions in effect cleared the path for William's mission to England.
The fact that the invasion of England would take place exactly a century after the Spanish Armada sailed against England was not lost on contemporary observers across Europe. The Polish ambassador in The Hague noted:
Opposing forces
English navy During the seventeenth century, the English and Dutch navies had repeatedly competed for supremacy at sea. By the 1670s the Dutch Republic possessed Europe's largest fleet, while attempts to expand the English navy were hampered by financial and political difficulties. In 1675, Samuel Pepys reported that England possessed 92 warships, compared with 136 in the Dutch Republic. A major English building programme was subsequently authorised in 1677, providing for thirty new ships.Hemingway (2002), p. 52 However, political turmoil during the Exclusion Crisis and Charles II's increasing financial dependence on France contributed to the neglect of the navy. Pepys was imprisoned in 1679 and replaced by a naval commission he considered incompetent and corrupt, while Charles governed without Parliament during the final four years of his reign. Maintenance suffered accordingly, and of the twenty surviving English first- and second-rates, only three were in commission in 1688.Hemingway (2002), p. 219
Pepys returned to office in 1684 and under James II attempted to restore the navy. In 1686 he proposed a three-year programme costing £1.29 million, but James's deteriorating relations with Parliament left the government increasingly short of money. When the fleet was mobilised in 1688, Pepys complained that although its strength had risen to 13,000 men, he had received only £1,000 towards the £29,866 required merely to feed 8,000 sailors for four months.Samantha Middleton. 2002. The Professionalisation of the Royal Navy: 1660-1688. PhD Thesis University of Portsmouth, p. 235 Consequently, when William sailed in November, only about thirty English warships were fit for service. None of the largest ships had been mobilised, and the most heavily armed vessel available carried 70 guns. Larger ships had not been made ready in the summer and by November, it was considered too late in the season to send them to sea anyway.
While James himself had more experience in leading large fleets than any of his naval commanders, having been Lord High Admiral between 1660 and 1673, he seemingly never considered leading the English fleet himself in 1688. Instead he put George Legge, Baron Dartmouth, a personal favourite of the king, in command of the fleet. Though very loyal, Dartmouth lacked an impressive career to boast of and was naturally cautious and indecisive. He had only commanded a fleet once before, and that was a small squadron tasked with the evacuation of Tangier. Despite distinguishing himself as a ship's captain during the Third Anglo-Dutch War, Dartmouth was primarily a land officer and a politician rather than a seasoned naval commander. The British naval historian J. D. Davies writes:
English army At the time of William's invasion in 1688, the English army had undergone a modest expansion under James II but remained relatively small compared to continental standards. Following the Monmouth Rebellion in 1685, the army had grown to approximately 19,778 soldiers, including garrison troops and field units. By the autumn of 1688, bolstered by 2,820 men from Ireland and the entirety of the 2,946-strong Scottish army, James's forces theoretically numbered almost 40,000 on paper. But even on paper the actual number of trained and battle ready troops was closer to 29,000–30,000, with some still undergoing training and others on garrison duty. More modern scholarship suggests that the field army James assembled on Salisbury Plain would ultimately effectively consist of just 19,000 men. And despite the apparent growth, many of the newer regiments lacked sufficient training and equipment, reducing their effectiveness in the field.
Overlooking John Churchill, James II had appointed Louis de Duras, Earl of Feversham as commander-in-chief in 1685. Feversham was a long-time associate of James since the 1660s and the nephew of the famed Turenne. However, his leadership would prove inadequate. At the decisive Battle of Sedgemoor on 6 July, Feversham's poor judgment nearly cost James the victory, and it was through Churchill's efforts that saved the situation. Despite Feversham's incompetence, the credit of the victory went to him, and James reappointed him in 1688. James himself arrived at Salisbury on 29 November, where Feversham had already assembled part of the army, and, unlike in the case of the navy, assumed personal command. In earlier years, he had been a courageous and experienced soldier, serving with the French and Spanish armies during his exile and later commanding the English fleet against the Dutch. He had, however, never led a large army on campaign, and by 1688 it had been many years since he had last served with an army in the field. Moreover, the political and military turmoil surrounding the invasion had severely shaken his confidence.
Conspiracy Although the vast majority of James II's army remained loyal throughout the campaign, a small group of senior officers secretly established contact with William of Orange before the invasion. The conspirators included John Churchill, Charles Trelawny and Percy Kirke. On 14 August 1688 Churchill wrote to William 'I think it is what I owe to God and my country, my honor I take leave to put into your Royalle Highnesses hands'. Historian Wouter Troost argues that the conspiracy was the decisive factor in convincing William to proceed with the invasion. James was aware of the plot, and the Earl of Feversham urged him to arrest the conspirators, but the king took no action. Historians have yet to provide a convincing explanation for this apparent inaction. During the campaign only a limited number of officers and soldiers actually defected, but the conspiracy had a disproportionate psychological effect. It undermined James's confidence in the loyalty of his commanders.
William's invasion fleet
To transport William and his army to England, the Dutch Republic outfitted a massive fleet. Forty-nine warships were prepared to protect more than 400 transport and landing vessels from the English navy. As with the English fleet, one was hesitant to send the largest ships to sea so late in the year, and the largest warships carried only 68 cannon. Three new first charter three-deckers of 90 cannon were readied, alarming the English, but in late October the bad weather led to the decision to leave them in port. With 30,000–40,000 men aboard, it was the largest fleet the Republic would ever assemble and while significantly larger than the Spanish Armada of 1588, it was assembled in little more than a 10th of the time.