Poland's response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has included political, military, organisational and humanitarian support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Foreign and security policy On 23 February 2022, the Sejm adopted by acclamation a resolution condemning all actions by the Russian Federation aimed at violating Ukraine's sovereignty. On the same day, one day before the invasion, President Andrzej Duda visited Kyiv. Later in 2022, he visited Ukraine three more times, including on 22 May, when he addressed the Verkhovna Rada. Bartosz Cichocki, Poland's ambassador in Kyiv, was the only ambassador from a European Union member state who did not leave Kyiv after the Russian invasion. In March 2022, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki visited Kyiv together with the prime ministers of the Czech Republic and Slovenia and the leader of Law and Justice, Jarosław Kaczyński. It was the first high-level foreign visit to Ukraine after the outbreak of the full-scale war. Other members of the Polish government also visited Ukraine in the following months.
Political support for Ukraine continued after the change of government in Poland in December 2023. Prime Minister Donald Tusk made his first visit to Kyiv on 22 January 2024, one month after taking office. In September 2025, Kyiv was visited by Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski and Minister of National Defence Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz.
The Council for Cooperation with Ukraine operated within the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland. From 9 April 2024 it was chaired by Paweł Kowal.
In July 2024, Poland and Ukraine concluded an agreement on security cooperation.
Support for Ukraine in international politics On 28 February 2022, the presidents of eight Central and Eastern European states, including Poland, called for Ukraine to be granted European Union candidate status immediately and for accession negotiations to begin. Ukraine received candidate status in June 2022, and negotiations were formally opened in June 2024. During the Polish presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2025, Poland sought to open at least the first cluster in the accession negotiations and intended to present this as one of the presidency's successes. The decision, however, required unanimity and was blocked by Hungary.
Poland provided assistance to Ukraine and pressed for stronger support from its partners in numerous international formats, including the United Nations, NATO, the European Union and regional initiatives. Poland also supported strong sanctions against Russia. In April 2022, Poland adopted a sanctions act, later amended several times, and became the first country to ban imports of coal and coke from Russia and Belarus. Poland supported the confiscation of frozen European assets of the Central Bank of Russia and their transfer to Ukraine. Poland participated in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG), including as co-chair of the armoured capability coalition. It also took part in recurring discussions within the Ukraine Recovery Conference on Ukraine's reconstruction.
Military support
From the beginning of Russia's aggression against Ukraine to March 2025, the value of Polish military aid to Ukraine exceeded 18 billion złoty. Owing to its geographical location, Poland became a logistical hub for international military assistance to Ukraine; more than 90% of all military aid passed through Poland. Polish support included 318 tanks (T-72, PT-91 and Leopard 2). Poland declared the transfer of Leopard 2 tanks in January 2023, which marked a breakthrough in deliveries of modern heavy weapons to Ukraine. Polish military aid also included 536 combat vehicles of various types, mainly BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles; 14 MiG-29 aircraft, which Poland declared in March 2023 as the first country to provide combat aircraft; 13 helicopters, including Mi-24 helicopters; and about 136 artillery systems, including AHS Krab and 2S1 Gvozdika. Poland also supplied portable anti-aircraft missile systems, including Piorun and Grom, FlyEye unmanned aerial vehicles, Warmate loitering munitions, Grot assault rifles, missiles, artillery and small-arms ammunition, medical and firefighting equipment, and personal protective equipment.
A significant part of this support was provided in the first year of the Russian invasion and was important during the early phase of Ukraine's defence against Russian aggression.
Internationally, Poland helped shape the discussion on assistance to Ukraine by opening debates on the transfer of Western-designed howitzers and tanks within the tank coalition, as well as combat aircraft.
From the Polish perspective, assistance on this scale created an opportunity to begin a major rearmament of the Polish Armed Forces and to move away from post-Soviet weaponry towards equipment meeting Western standards.
Poland also financed the operation of about 30,000 internet communication terminals, including the purchase of about 25,000 Starlink terminals.
Organisational support: logistics and training Since February 2022, a logistics hub has operated at Rzeszów–Jasionka Airport near Rzeszów, playing a strategic role in supplying Ukraine with weapons and humanitarian aid. About 90% of military support for Ukraine, as well as humanitarian aid, passed through this hub, making it crucial for maintaining the continuity of deliveries of weapons, ammunition and spare parts for the Ukrainian army.
In addition to serving as a diplomatic hub, Rzeszów airport functioned as a medical evacuation centre for transporting Ukrainian soldiers to hospitals in Europe. A maintenance base for weapons used by Ukraine also operated in Rzeszów.
Poland took steps to include Ukraine in the European energy market. Polish state-owned companies, including Orlen and PGNiG, ensured stable supplies of liquid fuels and gas to Ukraine, stabilising the energy market in the first period after the invasion and helping to develop western supply routes. In 2023, Poland accounted for 50% of Ukrainian fuel imports from the European Union. In March 2022, the emergency synchronisation of the Ukrainian power system with the European grid was launched at high speed, with the participation of Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne. Permanent integration followed at the turn of 2023 and 2024.
Work also continued on improving cross-border links. Border crossings were modernised as part of the Solidarity Lanes, and in December 2024 the new Malhowice–Nyzhankovychi road border crossing was opened.
Together with allies from NATO and the European Union, Poland carried out advisory and training activities for the Ukrainian military, including under the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM UA). Poland trained about 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers, and a key training hub, the Combined Arms Training Command (CAT-C), was located on Polish territory.
Poland also filled some positions in the command of NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) in Wiesbaden, which coordinated material and training support for Ukraine. Since 2025, the NATO–Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC) has operated in Bydgoszcz.
In 2024, under an intergovernmental agreement, Poland also offered to train Ukrainian volunteers from EU countries at Polish training grounds. In practice, however, the initiative encountered significant difficulties related to recruitment and enrolment on the Ukrainian side.
In September 2025, a training camp for Ukrainian troops was launched in Nowa Dęba.
Migration policy and integration After the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Poland became a key country of refuge for millions of Ukrainians.
Humanitarian aid According to estimates by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, as of June 2025 Poland ranked first in the world among countries supporting Ukraine as a share of gross domestic product when support for refugees was included. Poland provided assistance equal to 6.7% of its 2021 GDP, or about €40 billion in total, of which €35 billion was spent on supporting people under protection in Poland.
In October 2025, the Council for Cooperation with Ukraine at the Chancellery of the Prime Minister published a report on aid to Ukraine in 2022–2023. It estimated the total value of government aid expenditure in that period at 106 billion złoty.
On 25 February 2022, Poland opened the border with Ukraine by simplifying border checks and lifting the quarantine requirement for people crossing the border in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. By the end of 2022, 8.8 million entries from Ukraine into Poland had been recorded.
By 1 July 2025, more than 2 million people had registered for temporary protection in Poland. To serve refugees, a network of reception centres was launched in all voivodeships. At its peak, the network comprised 39 centres, the largest number of them in Lublin Voivodeship. Temporary accommodation points offering meals and medical care were also opened. In 2022–2024, they were used by 546,000 people, the vast majority of them in 2022. Until mid-2024, people receiving assistance were entitled to a one-off start-up benefit of 300 złoty for basic needs. From 2022 to mid-2024, the government paid households that provided Ukrainian citizens with accommodation and meals a subsidy of 40 złoty per person per day. According to data from the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, almost 2.1 million applications were submitted in total, including 1.3 million in 2022 and 243,000 in 2024. These measures were accompanied by additional forms of assistance, including cash and in-kind collections and organised psychological support. Ukrainian citizens were also allowed to travel free of charge in second class on PKP Intercity TLK and InterCity trains in order to reduce pressure on the reception system.
Social policy On 12 March 2022, Poland adopted a comprehensive act on assistance to Ukrainian citizens, commonly referred to as the special act. As a rule, it placed their legal situation on a similar footing to that of Polish citizens. From 16 March 2022, Ukrainian citizens who had come to Poland because of the war could apply for a PESEL-UKR number. By 2025, almost 1 million people had obtained one. People under temporary protection were granted, among other rights, access to the labour market and access to health-care benefits on the same terms as insured Polish citizens. They also received the right to use numerous social benefits, including the 500+ child benefit programme, replaced from 1 January 2024 by 800+. In subsequent years, the act was amended several times. The amendments tightened the rules, gradually phased out extraordinary measures such as subsidies for accommodation and meals, and limited the scope of rights granted to refugees. In general, the changes were intended to encourage activation and self-reliance among people under protection. On 1 July 2024, a condition was added that, in order to receive the 800+ benefit, a child had to attend school within the Polish education system. This was intended to strengthen integration into Polish society. In September 2025, a requirement concerning the parent's employment or economic activity was added. The special act established an Assistance Fund at Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK). By mid-2025, about 31 billion złoty had been paid from the fund for social benefits, health-care benefits, accommodation and reception points, and the education of Ukrainian children. The amendment to the special act extended the legality of stay of people under protection until 4 March 2026.
Education policy