The Kreuznach Conference of 17–18 May 1917 was a meeting of the political and military leaders of the Central Powers held in Bad Kreuznach, a town in the Prussian Rhineland that served as the seat of the German Army Supreme Command (OHL).
The conference took place in the spring of 1917 and was prepared with particular care by both partners. On the German side, preparations were carried out during the German Crown , while on the Austro-Hungarian side they took place during meetings of the Austro-Hungarian Crown Councils and in less formal discussions between representatives of the Austrian and Hungarian governments and the joint ministries.Within Austria-Hungary, two monarchies, each with its own institutions, coexisted, linked by common affairs and matters to be managed “by common agreement.” The former were placed under the responsibility of joint ministers accountable to the Emperor-King, while the latter were the subject of constant negotiations between representatives of the two states.
The conference was intended to allow the German and Austro-Hungarian monarchs and their diplomatic representatives to ratify an agreement on the division of prospective territorial gains in Russia and the Balkans. In the days preceding the meeting, the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ottokar Czernin, prepared a memorandum outlining the severe weakening of the Dual Monarchy after three years of war, which was meant to serve as a negotiating instrument for the Austro-Hungarian delegation. At the same time, the German leadership expressed its determination to continue the war until a victory by the Central Powers, rejecting the peace initiatives advanced by its increasingly war-weary ally.
Context
The end of 1916 and the beginning of 1917 represented a pivotal phase for the Central Powers in the conduct of the war. Military successes had allowed the Quadruple Alliance to occupy Serbia in 1915 and part of Romania in 1916. In addition, from March 1917 onward, Russia entered a prolonged revolutionary process that undermined the operational effectiveness of its armies, already weakened by widespread desertions. Despite these military and political developments, the Central Powers were unable to compel the Allied Powers to enter peace negotiations. In this context, Charles I, who succeeded his uncle Franz Joseph at the end of 1916, sought to end the Dual Monarchy’s participation in the conflict, taking into account its limited capacities in 1917.
The Quadruple Alliance and the February Revolution
The February 1917 Russian Revolution altered the strategic outlook of the war and prompted the belligerent states to reconsider, at least formally, their war aims. In response, Germany and its allies convened to evaluate the implications of the revolution for their conduct of the conflict. Meetings of ministers from the Central Powers were held in Vienna on 16 March and in Berlin on 26–27 March 1917, with the aim of redefining the conditions under which the Central Empires might negotiate an end to hostilities.
German expectations of a separate peace with the new Russian government soon diminished, as Russian leaders declared on 18 March 1917 their intention to continue the war against the Quadruple Alliance. In response, German decision-makers, advised by Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, then stationed in Bern, shifted their attention toward the Bolsheviks, who advocated immediate peace, as well as toward Russian political refugees in Switzerland, where many opponents of the war were based.
During the German–Austro-Hungarian meetings of March 1917, the military and right-wing nationalist factions expressed optimism regarding the political developments resulting from the February Revolution. In this context, they advocated for intensifying the war effort of the Dual Monarchy within the framework of the Quadruple Alliance. This approach was opposed by Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg and his close associates, who supported a compromise peace at the beginning of 1917. In a speech to the Reichstag on 29 March 1917, Bethmann Hollweg publicly stated his intention to negotiate with the new Russian government for an “honorable peace for both parties,” while also seeking border adjustments favorable to the German Empire and its allies. Negotiations were subsequently initiated in Stockholm through indirect channels. However, these talks were lengthy and complex and ultimately failed, as German negotiators were constrained by the military’s preference for extensive territorial annexations in Russia.
Alongside the opening of German–Russian negotiations, German aspirations for a victory peace through intensified military action against the new Russian government came into conflict with the internal situation of the Dual Monarchy and the awareness of this situation among Austro-Hungarian leaders.
Dual monarchy in the face of the Reich
This awareness led members of the German government to adjust their stance toward their Austro-Hungarian counterparts.
The alliance agreements concluded from 1879 onward were designed to ensure equality between the German Empire and Austria-Hungary. However, the balance of power among the Central Powers and the growing exhaustion of the Dual Monarchy during the war contributed to an increasing dominance of Germany. As a result, from the beginning of 1917, Austro-Hungarian leaders expressed reservations about the plans proposed by their German allies for their country.The Reich sought to subject the Dual Monarchy to increased vassalization as part of the realization of a Mitteleuropa in which the Reich would play a predominant role.
On 3 April 1917 in Bad Kreuznach, Charles I proposed to German Emperor Wilhelm II that the Dual Monarchy cede its Silesian territories in exchange for the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France. The proposal was rejected by German leaders, including the German Emperor.
On 13 April 1917, a few days before the first Kreuznach Conference, Ottokar Czernin, the new Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, presented Emperor Charles I with a memorandum titled “Austrian military power in the process of disintegration.” Dated the previous day, the memorandum, officially addressed to the Emperor-King but in practice intended for the German interlocutors of the Austro-Hungarian political leadership, assessed that the Dual Monarchy was no longer in a position to continue the conflict in the spring of 1917. Charles I immediately communicated the document to Wilhelm II as a means of pressure on the German government, while hoping that it would serve as the basis for negotiations aimed at peace talks with the Allies. Czernin also sent a copy to Matthias Erzberger, who was in Vienna on a mission for the new German Chancellor, Georg Michaelis. After reviewing the memorandum, Erich Ludendorff and Paul von Hindenburg expressed reservations and opposed the Austro-Hungarian aims, urging the minister to prioritize the continuation of the conflict rather than the satisfaction of domestic demands. Charles I and Czernin, convinced that they had secured a means of pressure on the German government, ultimately succeeded only in irritating their civilian and military counterparts in the German leadership. At this stage of the war, the German government and supreme command had not abandoned the goal of resolving the conflict through military victory or pursuing the political and economic expansion that such a victory would make possible.
The memorandum and the German government’s response highlighted the limited practical equality between the Central Powers, as the German Empire was unwilling to accept the demands of its Austro-Hungarian ally. Consequently, Wilhelm II, with the support of his civilian and military advisers, set the political and economic conditions under which the Quadruple Alliance would be willing to end hostilities.
Preparations
The May conference, which was the first meeting between the German monarch and his Austro-Hungarian counterpart, was prepared during earlier meetings held on 16 March in Vienna and on 23 April 1917 in Kreuznach. The Vienna meeting brought together German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg and Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Ottokar Czernin. At the April meeting, Emperor Wilhelm II convened the main German political and military leaders, including the Chancellor; Oskar von der Lancken, head of the political section of the General Government of Brussels; the military leaders Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff; and Henning von Holtzendorff, Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial German Navy.Several other preparatory meetings were held during this period, notably on 17 April, but historiography has retained only the .
Preparatory meetings
At the conference of 23 April 1917, the German military leaders Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, as well as the Austro-Hungarian military leader Conrad von Hötzendorf, were present. In accordance with the imperial order of 20 April, German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg attended the meeting, accompanied by Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann. Oskar von der Lancken, head of the political section of the General Government of Brussels, was also present.
During the conference, the issue of the parallel diplomacy pursued by Charles I to withdraw Austria-Hungary from the war was discussed. The discussion occurred in a context of mutual mistrust between German and Austro-Hungarian representatives. Although Charles I informed the German leadership, Foreign Minister Ottokar Czernin did not fully disclose the progress of negotiations to the German delegation.
In parallel, Austro-Hungarian leaders held repeated preparatory meetings to define their position in the emerging negotiations. On 6 May, a joint council of ministers chaired by Czernin established the Dual Monarchy’s negotiating stance.
Preliminary negotiations The exchanges between German and Austro-Hungarian leaders in the period leading up to the May conference became increasingly tense, particularly between German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg and Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Ottokar Czernin. The question of the war aims pursued by Germany and those pursued by its allies became a significant point of contention. During these preliminary talks, Austro-Hungarian representatives, aware of the Dual Monarchy’s exhaustion, openly expressed their desire to conclude a compromise peace with the Allies as soon as possible.
The first negotiations concerning the division of the Central Powers’ expected territorial gains were initiated in Berlin. According to the minutes of these meetings, the territorial, political, and economic benefits acquired after the conflict by Germany and its allies were to be proportional to the resources each had deployed, thereby strengthening Germany’s position in Europe and globally, including relative to its allies. As early as 3 April 1917, the German Army Supreme Command supported holding a conference bringing together representatives of Germany and Austria-Hungary to clarify their respective war aims.In Poland and in the Balkans, each of the two allies aspired to exercise decisive influence, thus exacerbating rivalries between the Reich and the Dual Monarchy.