The Sikh–Sindhian Relations refer to the political and diplomatic interactions between the Sikh Empire under Maharaja Ranjit Singh and the Talpur Amirs of Sindh during the early nineteenth century. The correspondence began in 1802, initiated by the Amirs to foster friendly relations with the expanding Sikh Empire.The Sikhs initially harbored ambitions for Sindh, leading to multiple confrontations with the Talpur Amirs and the British, who were also keen on expanding their influence in the region and consequently interfered in these interactions.
During the diplomatic efforts, the Sikh-Sindhian Frontier experienced a series of armed conflicts between 1823 and 1838. These included punitive raids by the Baluch tribes allied with the Talpur Amirs, prompting several Sikh expeditions to the lower Indus led by the Multan Governor of the Sikh Empire to pacify them. None of these encounters turned into a full-scale war, mainly because the British intervened, viewing the Sikh advance as an obstacle to their plans for Sindh.
Through a series of treaties, notably the Indus Navigation Treaty of 1832 between the Sikh Empire led by Ranjit Singh and the East India Company under Lord William Bentinck, as well as the Tripartite agreement between Shah Shuja Durrani, Ranjit Singh, and Lord Auckland, the situation eased. British influence continued to grow in Sindh, while Ranjit Singh was content with the tribute levied upon the Talpur Amirs.
Background
The region of Sindh is located between the Makran coast to the west, the Rann of Kutch to the east, and stretches from Multan in the north down to the Arabian Sea in the south. Sindh was ruled by the Talpur Dynasty, who were of Baloch origin and came to power in 1783. Meanwhile, in the Punjab region, Ranjit Singh of the Sukerchakia Misl began uniting the Misls and incorporated them into his newly established Sikh Empire, based in Lahore. The first contact between these two regional powers was established in 1802, following Ranjit Singh's first Multan expedition. The Talpur Amirs, observing the expansionist Sikhs, sent their Vakils to earn their goodwill. In 1818, the Sikh conquest of Multan, followed by the subjugation of Bahawalpur, allowed Maharaja Ranjit Singh to expand his empire right up to Sindh's borders. This advancement alarmed the Amirs of Sindh, who feared the Sikhs might invade further into Sindh and seize several cities. Sikh Expeditions Between 1823 and 1836, border disputes emerged between the Sikh Empire and the Talpur Dynasty, who were neighboring powers. The Balochis, nominally under the control of the Amirs of Sindh, carried out several raids into Sikh territory, escalating tensions between the Sikhs and the Amirs. The Sikhs used the raids by the Balochis as a justification to advance into Sindh. Three Sikh Expeditions To pacify the Balochi raiders, Maharaja Ranjit Singh launched his first expedition into the lower Indus in 1823 to punish the Balochis for attacking a Sikh outpost near Multan. According to historian Sethi, the real motive was to occupy Shikarpur. During this incursion, the Sikhs, personally led by Maharaja Ranjit Singh, advanced as far as Sultan Shahi. Along the way, they successfully subdued the Balochi tribes and collected tribute from them and the surrounding territories. The expedition was successful, and Ranjit Singh returned to his capital, Lahore. The Sikh expedition alarmed the Talpur Amirs, prompting them to send their envoys to Ranjit Singh's Darbar with gifts.
In October 1824, following Dushera, Maharaja Ranjit Singh led an expedition down the Indus to subdue the Balochis. He advanced to Bukkur before successfully returning to Lahore in December of the same year. In 1825, after Dussehra, Ranjit Singh led his third expedition to Sindh, but upon discovering that the region was plagued by famine, he returned to Lahore in November of that year. Diplomatic exchange In the winter of 1825, Maharaja Ranjit Singh dispatched an emissary to the Talpur Amirs of Sindh demanding the payment of tribute. The Sikh ruler argued that, having conquered much of the former Afghan dominions in northern India, he had inherited the rights and obligations that previously bound Sindh to Kabul. The Amirs dismissed this claim, arguing that their prior submission had been exclusively to the Durranis, though they did send Vakils with gifts for the Sikh ruler.
Despite the disagreement, both sides maintained diplomatic contact. The Amirs sent their vakils envoys to Lahore with presents, and by the late 1820s two permanent Sindhian representatives Darvesh Muhammad and Asa Nand, one Muslim and one Hindu were stationed at Ranjit Singh’s Darbar. They were granted a combined monthly allowance of Rs. 700, later increased to Rs. 1,000 in May 1831.
British Intervention and Missions British involvement with Sindh began under the Kalhoras in 1758. Ghulam Shah Kalhoro granted an English merchant named Sumption trade privileges. These included permission to open factories and to reside in Sindh. In 1809 the Talpur Amirs agreed that no person from France would be allowed to settle in Sindh. In 1820 a new accord required the Amirs to restrain Khosa and Baluch raiding into Company territory.
Through the 1820s the Company's political interest in Sindh remained limited. When European pressure eased, earlier arrangements fell into abeyance. From 1823, under C. M. Wade at Ludhiana, British officials watched Sikh troop movements while maintaining an outwardly Neutral stance toward Sindh. Burnes mission In 1830–1831, British interest turned toward the Indus River. Alexander Burnes travelled upstream from the Arabian Sea to northern Sindh to study the river. He found that the Indus had a steady current and sufficient depth for boats throughout its course. Burnes reported that trade could move easily along the river between the sea and the Punjab, and that the rulers of Hyderabad and Khairpur appeared ready to support such navigation. The mission increased British interest in the river and alerted british officials to the Sikh Maharaja's southern ambitions. Rupar Meeting
In October 1831, Lord William Bentinck, the Governor-General of India, met Maharaja Ranjit Singh at Rupar on the Sutlej. The meeting, remembered for its splendour and ceremony, also carried important political undertones. During the discussions, Ranjit Singh raised the issue of Sindh, describing the Amirs as wealthy but militarily weak and referring to their obstruction of Burnes's passage up the Indus. He asked whether the British would approve of a Sikh expedition against them. Bentinck gave no direct answer. He had already authorised Henry Pottinger, the Company's resident in Kutch, to open negotiations with the Amirs for a commercial treaty concerning the Indus, and he chose not to reveal this to the Maharaja. Although cordial in tone, the meeting left Ranjit Singh dissatisfied. He received only a general assurance of friendship and no support for his southern ambitions.
Pottingers mission
Pottinger arrived in Sindh in late 1831. After prolonged discussions, he succeeded in concluding separate commercial treaties with the Talpur rulers. The Hyderabad treaty was signed on 20 April 1832 and ratified by Lord William Bentinck at Shimla on 19 June 1832. Complementary arrangements followed with Bahawalpur and the Sikh Empire, and on 24 December 1832 Ranjit Singh agreed to a tariff schedule governing river duties and customs collection. Although the Indus Navigation treaties soon proved commercially disappointing, its political impact was substantial. The treaties established a British foothold along the Indus and curtailed Sikh influence south of Mithankot. Policy hardening by Auckland Wade was instructed to reassure the Maharaja that the Company's activities in Sindh were confined to trade and not territorial expansion. To avoid confrontation, Ranjit Singh postponed his projected advance toward Shikarpur. Under Lord Auckland, appointed Governor-General in 1836, British policy hardened. Officials aimed both to prevent Sikh expansion along the Indus and to consolidate British influence in Sindh. Renewed Sikh-Talpurian dispute The relations between the Sikh Empire and the Talpur Amirs of Sindh deteriorated in 1836 owing to the repeated raids of the Mazari and Bugti Baluch tribes. These groups occupied a wide, poorly defined tract between Kot Mithan and Amarkot, nominally within Sindh but largely beyond effective control. Their chief, Behram Khan Mazari, from his stronghold at Rojhan, frequently crossed into Sikh territory. Sawan Mal's pacification of Rojhan
In November 1834, Diwan Sawan Mal Chopra, Governor of Multan, sent Sardar Hari Singh, the thanadar of Mithankot, to demand tribute from Behram Khan. The demand was refused, and Sawan Mal personally advanced against the Mazaris. By January 1836 he devastated their lands around Rojhan and forced the chief to submit, accepting a tribute of livestock and pledges of annual payment. The pacification was short-lived. Later that year, renewed incursions led by a follower named Nasur-ud-Din, said to be a relative of Syed Ahmad Barelvi, caused further unrest but Sawan Mal and his Sikh forces were able to expel him.
In July 1835, a Battle occurred between Behram Khan’s raiders and Sikh troops. During the engagement, the chief's mother-in-law, Jannat, was captured by the Sikhs. Maharaja Ranjit Singh demanded twenty-five camels as ransom Behram Khan immediately delivered twenty, and on 15 December 1835 she was escorted to Mithankot and released upon receipt of the remaining five camels. Sikh–Sindhian Frontier Expedition (1836) Believing that the Mazaris were aided by the Talpur Amirs, Maharaja Ranjit Singh ordered a stronger campaign. In early 1836, Maharaja Ranjit Singh ordered large-scale operations along the southern frontier. Kanwar Nau Nihal Singh was dispatched to Multan to coordinate with Dewan Sawan Mal Chopra and "exterminate the Mazaris". The local kardars of Mithankot and Multan were instructed to rally their troops under the Nau Nihal Singh's command. A fund of Rs. 60,000 was placed at his disposal for the campaign. At the same time, Kanwar Kharak Singh was directed to move against the renewed Mazari incursions and to advance his officers toward Shikarpur, so that the anticipated conquest could be attributed to him. General Jean-Baptiste Ventura led five battalions in support of the operation. According to C. M. Wade, Ranjit Singh's urgency was partly intended to pre-empt Shah Shuja Durrani, whom the Amirs had invited to Shikarpur for assistance.
Before the Khalsa Army reached Multan, the Mazaris launched another raid on Mithankot in April 1836, carrying off considerable plunder. Diwan Sawan Mal Chopra counterattacked, killing a son of Behram Khan, and subsequently captured Rojhan. The Sikh forces then advanced toward Badauni, where Behram Khan had retreated, and proceeded to Ken, another Mazari stronghold defended by a Sindhian contingent. After a determined resistance, Ken fell to the Sikhs, and Ranjit Singh demanded Rs. 200,000 for its evacuation.
The defeat broke the Mazari resistance, and the campaign effectively ended their raids on Sikh territory. With the frontier pacified, Ranjit Singh shifted attention to the Talpur Amirs, accusing them of secret collaboration with the raiders. He demanded from their vakils the cession of Shikarpur and the payment of a tribute to Lahore. To enforce compliance, Sikh forces under Prince Kharak Singh were increased to about 8,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and four guns, and the frontier post of Rukhan in Khairpur territory was occupied.