Rutherford v. United States (consolidated with Carter v. United States), , was a United States Supreme Court case regarding federal sentencing laws. The Court held the First Step Act's amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) are not retroactively "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for granting compassionate release.

Background Legal background Prior to 1984, federal criminal sentencing was carried out by all three branches of government.Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-64 (1989). Under this scheme, Congress was responsible for defining statutory maximum sentences, courts were responsible for imposing sentences consistent with those maxima, and the Executive—through the United States Parole Commission—determined the actual period of incarceration.Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365-66. This resulted in wide disparities in actual sentences served for a given crime—

Congress responded by enacting the Sentencing Reform Act, part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.Pub. L. No. 98-473. The Act created the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC), an independent agency charged with crafting the United States Sentencing Guidelines. In the 1984 Act, Congress authorized the USSC to open "safety valves" to reduce an inmate's sentence in the presence of "extraordinary and compelling reasons" upon a motion of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP).18 U.S.C. § 3582 Congress delegated to the USSC the authority to define what qualified as "extraordinary and compelling reasons."

In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act, a bipartisan criminal justice reform law. Section 603 of the Act removed the conditioning of safety valve relief upon the action of the BOP. Instead, individual prisoners could themselves petition for compassionate release upon exhaustion of other administrative remedies.Pub. L. No. 115-391.

Section 403 of the First Step Act clarified the sentencing requirements under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Section 924(c) prohibits carrying or using a firearm during certain felonies. Prior to the First Step Act, the section carried a 5-year mandatory minimum penalty for carrying (or a 7-year mandatory minimum for brandishing) a firearm during a felony upon a defendant's first conviction, and a 25-year mandatory minimum penalty for carrying a firearm during a felony upon a defendant's "second or subsequent" conviction, even if they occurred in the same case as the defendant's first conviction.Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132-37 (1993). The First Step Act changed this practice by requiring that a defendant's first § 924(c) conviction be "final" before applying the 25-year mandatory minimum in future cases. However, Congress only applied this new standard to cases that were pending as of or subsequent to the enactment of the Act.

Rutherford In 2003, Daniel Rutherford committed two armed robberies in Philadelphia. Rutherford was convicted in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of one count of Hobbs Act conspiracy, two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, and two counts of carrying and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). For his firearms convictions, Rutherford received stacked 7- and 25-year sentences, to run consecutively to each other and to any other sentences. For his Hobbs Act convictions, Rutherford was sentenced to 125 months' imprisonment, for a total sentence of 42.5 years. The Third Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.Rutherford v. United States, 552 U.S. 1127. In his concurring opinion in the Court of Appeals, Judge Thomas Ambro said:

In 2021, Rutherford moved pro se for compassionate release under the First Step Act. He argued that his sentence was significantly longer than one that would be received for a first-time offender after the First Step Act, and that this disparity is an "extraordinary and compelling reason" for granting safety valve relief, notwithstanding the Act's non-retroactivity. The district court denied Rutherford's petition. Its decision relied on United States v. Andrews (3d Cir. 2021), which held that district courts may not consider the First Step Act’s non-retroactive changes to § 924(c) when deciding if a defendant’s circumstances are “extraordinary and compelling.” The following day, the Sentencing Commission passed revised guidance indicating that sentencing disparities could indicate the presence of extraordinary or compelling reasons. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of Rutherford's petition. The Court of Appeals held that, given Congress express denial of retroactive relief under the First Step Act, Andrews still controlled notwithstanding the USSC's guidance to the contrary.

Carter In 2011, Johnnie Markel Carter was convicted in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of bank robbery and firearms offenses. For his crimes, Carter (then 29 years old) was sentenced to 70 years' imprisonment—13 years for the bank robberies and 57 (equal to 7 and 25 and 25) years for three stacked § 924(c) convictions. In light of the Sentencing Commission's 2021 guidance, Carter moved for compassionate release. The district court, also relying on Andrews, denied Carter's motion, holding that the Commission could not abrogate the clear text of the First Step Act's non-retroactivity provision. Carter appealed to the Third Circuit. While his appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals decided Rutherford's case, holding that Andrews foreclosed the Commission's new guidance as to the First Step Act. Based on that conclusion, the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of Carter's motion.

Supreme Court On January 30, 2025, Rutherford petitioned the Supreme Court for review. On February 11, Carter also petitioned the Court for review. Both petitions argued that the United States Sentencing Commission validly authorized courts to consider pre- and post-First Step Act sentencing disparities in its new guidance. The petitions also both pointed out that the Courts of Appeals were split on the question of whether non-retroactive sentencing changes may be considered in the "extraordinary and compelling" analysis. The First,United States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14, 25 (1st Cir. 2022). Fourth,United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 286 (4th Cir. 2020).United States v. Davis, 99 F.4th 647, 658 (4th Cir. 2024). Ninth,United States v. Chen, 48 F.4th 1092 (9th Cir. 2022). and Tenth CircuitsUnited States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1047 (10th Cir. 2021). did so allow, while the Third,United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255 (3d Cir. 2021). Sixth,United States v. McCall, 56 F.4th 1048, 1065-66 (6th Cir. 2022) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2506 (2023). Seventh,United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2021). Eighth,United States v. Crandall, 25 F.4th 582, 585 (8th Cir. 2022). and D.C. CircuitsUnited States v. Jenkins, 50 F.4th 1185, 1198-99 (D.C. Cir. 2022). did not.

On June 6, the Supreme Court granted both petitions, and consolidated the two cases. Oral arguments were heard on November 12, 2025. A ruling was issued on May 28, 2026 in favor of the United States.

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