The second raid on the Suez Canal was the second operation conducted by the Ottoman Empire against the Suez Canal during the Sinai and Palestine Campaign of World War I. The objective of the operation was to pin British forces down in Egypt to prevent their deployment to the Western Front and, if possible, to liberate Egypt. It was anticipated that if the canal were crossed, Egyptian nationalists would revolt against the British alongside the Ottoman army. The operation was to be carried out under the command of Djemal Pasha, commander of the Fourth Army and Minister of the Navy.
The offensive took place on 27 July 1916 with a force of 10,000 men under the command of the German Miralay (Colonel) Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein, who was serving in the Fourth Army. However, after suffering a severe defeat, the Ottoman forces were compelled to retreat to El Arish.
Background
By the end of 1915 it had become clear that the Turks were likely to make a second attempt on the canal. A series of Turkish victories in Mesopotamia and in Gallipoli late that year seemed to signal a change, if only temporary, in the balance of power in the Middle East. Discussions about a British withdrawal from Gallipoli began in October and by the end of 1915 the British had abandoned their attempt to force the Dardanelles. The final departure of the Allied army from Gallipoli opened the way to preparations for another Turkish assault on the canal.
Turkey had never abandoned the idea of a second attack: in parliament Enver Pasha represented the first invasion as no more than a highly successful reconnaissance in strength in preparation for a much larger offensive to be undertaken at a later date. The key to a successful second invasion was to be an improved transport system. In the autumn of 1914, the Turkish railhead in Palestine had reached as far as Sileh, some 275 miles from the canal. Under the supervision of Meissner Pasha, by November 1915 the railway had been extended from Sileh to Beersheba (and by May 1916 was to reach to El Auja and beyond). This greatly improved network suffered from one major flaw: the need to transfer supplies from standard gauge to narrow gauge at Rayak en route from Constantinople. The alternative supply route from the imperial capital was a road that crossed the Taurus and Amanus mountains.
In the first part of the war this major route was upgraded so that by 1916 it could take motor transport. von Kressenstein’s view was that "from the first day of the war to the last, the lines of communication worked badly, and to this must be largely attributed the series of disasters which befell the Turks in Iraq, Palestine and the Hedjaz".
Other military developments were also encouraging the Turks in their preparations for a second invasion. The British campaign in Mesopotamia had run into difficulties and had suffered a serious defeat at Ctesiphon in November 1915. The British were soon to be faced also with the possibility that another theatre of war—Thessaloniki—could open up in the east as Bulgaria made clear its support for the Turks. The Turks were now in a position to release troops from these fronts to help create a new expeditionary force for a renewed attack on Egypt. The defeat of Serbia by the Central Powers in the autumn of 1915 also enabled the Germans to open a supply line running directly from Germany to the Middle East. However, the tide was not turning entirely in Turkey’s favour. A new Russian offensive in the Caucasus early in 1916 caused reserves to be diverted to this front, so reducing the number of troops that could be spared for operations against Egypt.
Prelude
Reorganization of forces in Egypt
The British policy toward a possible second attack was slowly taking shape. Maxwell had informed Kitchener in October that in the event of a new invasion, the response would be "similar to that of February 1915, except for organizing a counterattack, which he was unable to do due to water shortages and the nature of the orders he received." By the end of 1915, the War Office decided to reinforce the troops guarding the Channel by sending additional divisions from the United Kingdom. The forces evacuated from Gallipoli and sent to Egypt for a period of rest and recuperation also increased the numbers. Although they were thot to be useful in the event of a Turkish invasion, these units were understaffed, and in the short term, over-relying on these battalions, which had suffered heavy casualties against the determined Turkish forces, would clearly have been imprudent. The scale of the task of bringing the Gallipoli veterans to full combat readiness was described by Sergeant Harold Clark of the Middlesex Regiment, who arrived in Egypt from Gallipoli in December 1915. From Alexandria, they were transferred to a two-division accommodation camp located north of Cairo, with extensive grounds for training and rest: "... The regiments were arriving in droves every day, and after Christmas, another division arrived... This was an operation that the Commander-in-Chief, his staff, and the supply services richly deserved credit for. Transporting, feeding, and re-equipping approximately 100,000 men was a colossal task, and achieving it with minimal disruption, as they did, was highly commendable. Transporting, feeding, and re-equipping approximately 100,000 men was a colossal task, and achieving it with minimal disruption, as they did, was highly commendable."
At the beginning of 1916, 14 infantry divisions, several cavalry brigades, and local yeomanry brigades had arrived in Egypt. When the rest and recuperation processes were complete, Egypt would have far more troops than it would need. The War Office did not see Egypt as the permanent station for these troops; it considered them a strategic reserve force ready to be dispatched to other fronts where reinforcements were needed. However, the temporary winter quarters in Egypt allowed the military authorities to reconsider the idea of an allied landing at Ayas, west of the Gulf of Iskenderun. One of the reasons for the revival of this idea was John Maxwell belief that the Gallipoli evacuation would lead to "disastrous consequences both morally and materially" unless England delivered a severe blow to Turkey elsewhere. Although there were obvious advantages to cutting the Turks' communication lines with Iraq and Syria, the scale of the naval and ground forces required and the risk of failure were equally significant. Kitchener was reluctant on this matter, and the arguments put forth by the French against this idea—decisive ones—reflected the concern of British soldiers about being in a region they viewed as their sphere of influence after the war. England's struggle with Turkey would continue to be based on the defense of the Suez Canal.
Strength of British forces Discrepancies exist regarding the total strength of British forces in Egypt and Palestine during the period. Major Larcher states that there were 152,000 combatants with a ration strength of 195,000, noting that the number of combatants was subsequently increased by approximately 20,000. However, in a supplementary note to Larcher's work, Lieutenant Colonel Nihat calculates the total British force in Egypt and Syria as follows:
197,000 British personnel
93,000 Indian personnel
160,000 laborers
The resulting total of 450,000 personnel aligns with the figures provided by Generals Allenby and Robertson.
Ottoman preparations
As the primary step for the Second Suez Offensive, Djemal Pasha established a desert command in Ibin, headed by Kress von Kressenstein. This was intended both to manage harassment operations against the Canal and to secure the logistical preparations being undertaken in the desert. Continuing his efforts, Djemal Pasha prepared an extensive twenty-six-article report on 14/15 June 1915 to be submitted to the Acting Commander-in-Chief (Ottoman Turkish: ). In said report, the conditions necessary for the execution of a new canal operation were summarized as follows:
The order of battle for the Egyptian mobile army has been established; according to this order of battle, the mobile army consists of 57 infantry battalions, 20 machine gun companies, 8 cavalry or camel corps companies, and 23 batteries. The occupation forces for Syria and Palestine must be organized as follows: One division of 9 battalions each for the Aleppo and Adana sectors. One division of 6 battalions for the Lebanon sector. One corps consisting of two divisions for the Palestine sector (each division consisting of 9 battalions). An additional division to serve as a reserve.
The fact that the British did not invade Syria and Palestine during the First Suez Offensive does not guarantee they will not do so during the Second. On the contrary, it is probable they will attack to seize the Egyptian railway, which is very close to the coast. Therefore, an excellent Turkish Division is required. It is essential to ensure that the daily subsistence of the army, which will remain in front of the Canal for an extended period, is regularly dispatched from the terminal railway point to the Canal, and to ensure that one month's reserve provisions are stored in desert warehouses before operations commence. Based on this principle, two Desert Stage Inspectorates (Menzil Müfettişliği) will be established in Beersheba and Ibin. 5. In accordance with the first and third articles, the quantity of wagons and camels required for the transport of provisions and ammunition from both the operational zone and desert warehouses has been determined. In addition to existing materials, new supplies must reach Beersheba by 1 November 1331 (14 November 1915) from Constantinople. For urgent transport, automobile units consisting of 120 vehicles each must be established. Along with these vehicles, gasoline and repair crews must also be sent. I request 4,156 wagons, deducting from the previously requested 4,656. Stage organizations will be utilized for water requirements in the desert. Furthermore, materials necessary for water transport must reach Damascus by 1 October 1331 (14 October 1915). Equipment and gear to be sent from Germany must reach Damascus by 1 October 1331 (14 October 1915). 10. I request that the aviation detachment and wireless telegraph personnel be carefully selected from among the Germans. Due to the special importance of the Egyptian Expedition, I deem the addition of the following command echelons to the army essential. The army headquarters is extremely deficient. In all probability, the army will remain before the Suez Canal for weeks during the operation. The command structure for the Second Suez Offensive was established with a focus on officers who had participated in the previous campaign. Accordingly, Fakhri Pasha was appointed to the command of the Syrian Mobile Force, while the commander of the 8th Army, (Mersinli) Djemal Pasha, was assigned to the Palestine Defense Force. Additionally, Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein (Von Kress Bey) was placed in command of the First Expeditionary Force. The camel issue constitutes the basis of all preparations. I request the dispatch of funds for the fulfillment of this task. Furthermore, medical supplies, medical officers, and veterinarians must be sent. The points I have submitted are the minimum requirements to ensure the execution of the Egyptian Expedition."
+ Figures of requests in Djemal Pasha's report to the Acting Supreme Command Wagons Camels For the desert cadre 4,460 For water transport 9,392 For provision transport 4,786 14,667 For ammunition transport 1,533 4,509 To be stationed at various points in the desert 3,000 10% Reserve allocation 3,603 5% Reserve allocation 316 Total 6,635 39,631