The 2020s have seen a significant strategic realignment in European defence and security policy, due to heightened regional geopolitical risk and strained international military alliances. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 amid broader U.S. geopolitical pressure on Europe in later years, led to a material increase in defence spending among European countries. The European Union's defence spending increased 60% from 2020 to 2025. European military demonstrations increased markedly after the U.S. threatened to annex Greenland in 2026 and the U.S.-Israeli war in Iran affected regional stability in Southern Europe.
This transformation is characterised by increased domestic defence manufacturing, military research and development, reindustrialization, and greater military integration within the European Union. European states seek autonomous defence capabilities independent of NATO and the United States.
History Prior to the 2020s, the European Union maintained its Common Security and Defence Policy that focused primarily on crisis management and peacekeeping operations. The EU successfully deployed approximately 40 international missions under this framework. However, the bloc remained heavily dependent on NATO and United States military support for territorial defence, despite provisions in the EU Treaty allowing for the creation of common defence mechanisms and mutual assistance agreements between member states.
Military inefficacy
By early 2024, there were significant disparities among NATO member states. Of the alliance's 32 members, only 18 had achieved or committed to reaching the agreed-upon target of spending 2% of GDP on defence. This represented a marked decrease from historical Cold War spending levels, when European NATO members typically allocated between 3% and 5% of their national GDP to defence expenditures. Areas described as lacking included integrated anti-aircraft defence systems and deep precision strike capabilities deemed inadequate for contemporary threats, as well as significant vulnerabilities in command and control infrastructure and logistical systems. These deficiencies emerged despite the adoption of new regional defence plans at the 2023 Vilnius NATO summit.
Despite promised commitments to increased military spending by European leaders, many European nations failed to convert their pledges into concrete manufacturing contracts. This hampered the expansion of defence manufacturing capabilities necessary for both supporting Ukraine against Russia's invasion and replenishing NATO's own military stocks. Nations along NATO's eastern flank demonstrated greater urgency in military modernisation efforts, while European nations further west generally showed less immediacy in their approach to defence spending and capability development.
Analysis from the European Defence Agency identified that lack of cooperation between member states resulted in annual inefficiencies of approximately €25 billion. Despite EU members collectively spending roughly one-third of U.S. defence expenditures, their combined capabilities amounted to only about 10% of American military capacity. Member nations also faced challenges regarding the allocation of resources between defence spending and social welfare programs, especially among nations such as Germany with ongoing economic crises.
On April 22, 2026, Germany unveiled its first standalone military strategy since the Second World War, titled "Verantwortung für Europa" (Responsibility for Europe), presented by Defence Minister Boris Pistorius. The package included a new capability profile, a personnel growth plan targeting expansion from 185,000 active-duty soldiers to 260,000 by the mid-2030s alongside a reserve buildup to at least 200,000, and an administrative reform agenda comprising 153 concrete measures. Geopolitical shifts
The United States began shifting its strategic focus from Europe to the Indo-Pacific region during the Obama administration, with both Democratic and Republican establishments increasingly viewing China, rather than Russia, as their primary strategic competitor. This shift continued through subsequent administrations, reducing American military emphasis on European defence.
The return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency in 2025 introduced significant uncertainty into transatlantic security relationships. Trump's scepticism toward NATO, suggestions that the U.S. might not defend allies who failed to meet certain financial obligations, and his threats against NATO-founding members Canada and Denmark created new urgency for European military self-sufficiency. Additional concerns arose regarding potential U.S. positions on conflicts affecting European security, particularly regarding Russia and Ukraine amid the former's invasion of Ukrainian territory. These included Trump's call and meetings with Russian president Vladimir Putin discussing peace negotiations without input from Ukraine or European parties, statements made by United States Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth critical of the lack of equal military contributions from European nations, and a speech made by United States vice president JD Vance at the 61st Munich Security Conference critical of European governance for annulling elections in favour of less anti-Russian candidates. Analysts argued that by 2026 these pressures had not remained compartmentalized, but were interacting and accumulating simultaneously within the same EU decision-making structures — converging with energy volatility, fiscal strain, and migration to constrain coherent European policymaking within increasingly narrow margins. Rearmament efforts In March 2024, the EU's von der Leyen Commission released the European Defence Industrial Strategy, which suggested a switch to "war economy mode" due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and fears over Trump's rumoured withdrawal from NATO. European Commissioner for Internal Market Thierry Breton said: "Europe must take greater responsibility for its own security, regardless of the outcome of our allies' elections every four years." The strategy established several ambitious targets for 2030, including requirements for EU member states to allocate 50% of their procurement budgets to purchases from Europe's industrial defence sector.The plan also aimed to increase collaborative equipment procurement from 18% to 40% and raise intra-European Union defence trade to 35% of the overall EU defence market value. The strategy also introduced the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) with an initial allocation of €1.5 billion for 2025–2027. This program aimed to incentivise joint weapons production and enhance collaboration between defence manufacturers across member states. The document also advocated for the incorporation of Ukraine into European defence, including Ukrainian industry participation in EU defence programs, establishment of an EU-Ukraine Defence Industry Forum, and the creation of an EU Defence Innovation Office in Kyiv to exchange combat experience and technological insights.
The €1.5 billion allocated fell significantly short of the €100 billion fund suggested by Breton. Various funding mechanisms were proposed, including the potential use of frozen Russian state assets and adjustments to European Investment Bank lending policies to include defence projects. In February 2025, NATO initiated discussions to substantially increase its defence spending targets for member nations above the previous 2% GDP benchmark established a decade earlier. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced during the 61st Munich Security Conference that alliance members would need to increase their military spending to "considerably more than 3 percent" of their national GDP. This statement came in response to U.S. calls for members to reach 5% of GDP in defence expenditure. On 14 February 2025, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen advocated for activating an emergency clause to facilitate increased defence spending by EU member states. The clause would forego typical strict budget deficit limits for member states, and would enable increased defence spending without requiring corresponding budget cuts in other areas.
Poland and the Baltic states demonstrated willingness to approach high spending levels to address potential threats from Russia. Nordic countries have also significantly increased their defense budgets. France, along with Southern European nations with high debt levels including Italy and Greece, also supported the initiative. Northern European countries with fiscally conservative governments such as the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden expressed opposition to new debt issuance during treasury discussions. The United Kingdom, advocated for more moderate targets between 2.5% and 3.5% of GDP. On 4 March 2025, von der Leyen proposed ReArm Europe, a five-point plan to boost defence spending by up to €800 billion, including €150 billion in loans to EU member states. This came a day after Trump halted all military aid to Ukraine.
National changes
Austria
With their long-standing military neutrality, Austria announced plans to double their defence budget from 2025 to 2032 after which it will hit 2% of GDP on such spending. The Austrian government confirmed a planned $5.8 billion acquisition of advanced air defence systems as well as next generation fighter jets and helicopters.
Belgium In March 2025, Belgium announced plans to increase defence spending by €4 billion by mid-year, bringing defence expenditures from 1.31% of the country's GDP to 2%. Prime Minister Bart De Wever called their planned 5% spending target a necessary but "bitter pill" as the nation announced it may take a decade to achieve.
Croatia
In May 2025, Croatia brought their defence spending to 2% of their GDP, with a stated objective of 3% of GDP by 2030. A month later, Croatia entered into a regional defence pact with neighboring Albania and Kosovo. A comprehensive multi-year modernization of their combat air fleet was completed that year. The Croatian Parliament reenacted military conscription in October. Later that month the parliament approved a €2 billion military budget focused on modernization initiatives continuing to 2030. Croatia's planned procurement of advanced Israeli military assets in 2026 was met with domestic controversy over the Israeli war in Gaza.
Denmark In February 2025, Denmark announced a significant increase in defence spending to 3% of national GDP, an increase from 2.4% in 2024. This increase, implemented through a 50 billion Danish kroner "acceleration fund" represented the highest level of Danish defence spending in over fifty years. The Danish government emphasised rapid procurement of military equipment, with defence minister Troels Lund Poulsen warning that Russia could threaten NATO countries within two years without appropriate counter-measures.
Estonia In February 2025, Estonia confirmed their intention to allocate more than 4% of the country's GDP to defence spending by 2026.
France In February 2025, French president Emmanuel Macron characterised Russia as an "existential threat" to Europe, convening a special meeting in Paris to coordinate European responses under the Weimar+ framework. Macron also stated his willingness to send ground troops to Ukraine for combat against Russia if necessary. In March 2026, Macron announced his intent to spread France's nuclear warheads across continental Europe as extended deterrence within the region's nuclear umbrella.
Finland