Victory Plan for Ukraine

In October 2024, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy unveiled the Victory plan for Ukraine, which includes the solution to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and description of future national defense guarantees. The official goal of the plan is "to change the circumstances in such a way that Russia will be forced to peace".

Points The plan includes five points: one geopolitical, two military, one economical and one related to national defense and safety. The second, third and fourth points of the plan have classified conditions included, that were introduced only to the political leaders of the US, Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy.

Inclusion of Ukraine into NATO and the end of the Russo-Ukrainian war. This implies geopolitical determination in Europe. This will be "a testament to the determination of Ukrainian partners" (mainly key Euro-Atlantic countries) and "will show how the partners see Ukraine in the renewed continental security architecture in the future". Strengthening of the national defense. Implies the strengthening of Ukrainian positions on the territory of Russia in order to avoid the creation of buffer zones on the Ukrainian territory, lifting restrictions on strikes inside the Russian territory, strengthening Ukraine's air defense to a sufficient level of protection and joint defense operations with neighboring states within the reach of their air shield; access to satellite intelligence data of Ukrainian partners in real time, irreversible strengthening of the positions of the Defense and Security Forces of Ukraine and the destruction of Russia's offensive potential on the occupied territory of Ukraine. Deterrence. Implies the placement of a comprehensive non-nuclear strategic package of deterring Russia's armed aggression and its military capabilities inside the Ukrainian territory. Strategic economic potential. Envisages the investment of international partners in the production of critically important natural resources, such as uranium, titanium, lithium and graphite. National safety. This point is designed for the post-war period. Zelenskyy assumed that in case of an agreement, Ukrainian units will be able to replace separate US military contingents stationed in Europe.

Reaction

: French ministry of foreign affairs stated that it supports the plan. : Chancellor Olaf Scholz has gone on record to say that Germany does not support the idea of inviting Ukraine to NATO during wartime.

Comparative assessment In August 2025, Nik Hynek and Michal Šenk suggested the template for analysis of peace plans in interstate war with assessments of respective suggestions during ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war. Two right-most columns are added for the November 2025 two 28-point drafts.

Comparative Table +Current peace plans across ten comparative criteria Criterion Ukraine "Victory" Agenda Russia Maximalist Design U.S. Mediated Partition Europe–Ukraine Counter‑Initiative China–Brazil "Friends of Peace" Plan Istanbul Draft (2022 revival) U.S.–Russia Draft Plan (2025) European Proposal (2025) Enforcement mechanisms Strong emphasis on Western guaranteesHynek & Šenk, p. 12Sollfrank & Boeke, pp. 11–12 Minimal; relies on Russian dominanceHynek & Šenk, p. 14 International monitors envisagedHynek & Šenk, p. 15 EU/NATO backing; sanctions leverageHynek & Šenk, p. 16Sollfrank & Boeke, p. 15 Vague; multipolar rhetoricHynek & Šenk, p. 18 Weak; limited monitoringHynek & Šenk, p. 19 None specified; relies on bilateral recognitionMello & Saideman, pp. 31–32Cancian & Snegovaya, pp. 3–5 NATO-style guarantees from Western alliesCancian & Snegovaya, pp. 4–6 Recovery & reconstruction Western aid centralHynek & Šenk, p. 21 Russia assumes control of occupied areasHynek & Šenk, p. 22 Partition with aid to both sidesHynek & Šenk, p. 23 EU-led recovery fundsHynek & Šenk, p. 24Sollfrank & Boeke, pp. 16–17 Development aid promisedHynek & Šenk, p. 25 Limited; undefinedHynek & Šenk, p. 26 Rebuild Ukraine using seized Russian fundsCancian & Snegovaya, pp. 7–9 Western economic aidCancian & Snegovaya, pp. 8–9 Societal alignment High domestic support for sovereigntyHynek & Šenk, p. 28 Russian domestic narrative onlyHynek & Šenk, p. 29 Divisive; Ukrainians reject partitionHynek & Šenk, p. 30 Strong Ukrainian civil society backingHynek & Šenk, p. 31 Low resonance in UkraineHynek & Šenk, p. 32 Mixed; contestedHynek & Šenk, p. 33 Mixed signals; neutrality imposedMello & Saideman, p. 31Cancian & Snegovaya, pp. 9–10 Strong Ukrainian public supportCancian & Snegovaya, p. 10 Security guarantees NATO/EU integrationHynek & Šenk, p. 35Sollfrank & Boeke, pp. 14–15 Neutrality enforced by RussiaHynek & Šenk, p. 36 U.S./UN guarantees proposedHynek & Šenk, p. 37 NATO umbrellaHynek & Šenk, p. 38Sollfrank & Boeke, pp. 15–16 Multipolar guarantees (China, Brazil)Hynek & Šenk, p. 39 Neutrality clauses; weak guaranteesHynek & Šenk, p. 40 Ukraine neutral; conditional U.S. guaranteesCancian & Snegovaya, pp. 5–7 NATO Article 5 mirror; robust guaranteesCancian & Snegovaya, pp. 6–7 Territorial concessions Rejects concessionsHynek & Šenk, p. 42 Demands recognition of annexationsHynek & Šenk, p. 43 Partition envisagedHynek & Šenk, p. 44 Rejects concessionsHynek & Šenk, p. 45 Freeze lines; ambiguousHynek & Šenk, p. 46 Crimea/Donbas unresolvedHynek & Šenk, p. 47 Recognizes Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk as Russian; freeze Kherson/ZaporizhzhiaCancian & Snegovaya, pp. 3–4, 10–11 Crimea remains under Russian control; Ukraine retains claimCancian & Snegovaya, pp. 10–11 Accountability / justice War crimes prosecution centralHynek & Šenk, p. 49 Russia absolved of responsibilityHynek & Šenk, p. 50 Deferred accountabilityHynek & Šenk, p. 51 Strong emphasis on justiceHynek & Šenk, p. 52 DownplayedHynek & Šenk, p. 53 DeferredHynek & Šenk, p. 54 Amnesty, prisoner exchange onlyMello & Saideman, pp. 31–33 War crimes trials, reparations External mediation Western alliesHynek & Šenk, p. 56 Russia onlyHynek & Šenk, p. 57 U.S. brokerHynek & Šenk, p. 58 EU roleHynek & Šenk, p. 59 China–Brazil mediationHynek & Šenk, p. 60 Turkey brokerHynek & Šenk, p. 61 U.S.–Russia backchannelMello & Saideman, pp. 33–34 European-led diplomacy Neutrality / alliances Rejects neutralityHynek & Šenk, p. 63 Demands neutralityHynek & Šenk, p. 64 Neutral buffer envisagedHynek & Šenk, p. 65 NATO integrationHynek & Šenk, p. 66Sollfrank & Boeke, pp. 14–16 Neutrality promotedHynek & Šenk, p. 67 Neutrality clauseHynek & Šenk, p. 68 Ukraine constitutionally barred from NATO Ukraine eventually joins NATO and the EU Economic aid / incentives Western aid packagesHynek & Šenk, p. 70 Russian subsidiesHynek & Šenk, p. 71 Aid split between entitiesHynek & Šenk, p. 72 EU recovery fundsHynek & Šenk, p. 73 Development aid promisedHynek & Šenk, p. 74 LimitedHynek & Šenk, p. 75 Frozen Russian assets diverted; U.S. profit share Western weapons, aid Durability / stability High if backed by WestHynek & Šenk, p. 77Sollfrank & Boeke, pp. 12, 19–20 Low; coerciveHynek & Šenk, p. 78 Fragile; partition unstableHynek & Šenk, p. 79 Stronger with EU/NATO supportHynek & Šenk, p. 80 Weak; lacks enforcementHynek & Šenk, p. 81 Fragile; draft abandonedHynek & Šenk, p. 82 Politically fragile; contradiction, vague wordingMello & Saideman, pp. 32–34Cancian & Snegovaya, pp. 3–10 High if Western support sustained+ Sources Hynek, N. & Šenk, J. (2025). Ukraine–Russia peace plans: historical lessons, operationalising criteria, and comparative assessment. DOI: 10.1080/21647259.2025.2585235. Sollfrank, A. & Boeke, S. (2024). Enablement and Logistics as Critical Success Factors for Military Operations: Comparing Russian and NATO Approaches. The RUSI Journal, 169(7), 10–22. DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2024.2434137. Mello, P. A. & Saideman, S. M. (2019). The politics of multinational military operations. Contemporary Security Policy, 40(1), 30–37. DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2018.1522737. Cancian, M. F. & Snegovaya, M. (2025). The Unfinished Plan for Peace in Ukraine: Provision by Provision. Center for Strategic & International Studies, Published 24 Nov 2025: CSIS analysis. Media references: Axios (18 Nov 2025), POLITICO (19 Nov 2025), Al Jazeera (21 Nov 2025), Sky News (23 Nov 2025), Newsweek (24 Nov 2025), The Independent (24 Nov 2025).

See also

: Overview of key negotiation points

Notes

References