The failed defense of Rome (also referred to as the German occupation of Rome) refers to the events that took place in the Italian capital and the surrounding area, beginning on 8 September 1943, and in the days immediately following the Armistice of Cassibile and the immediate military reaction of the German Wehrmacht forces deployed to the south and north of the city, in accordance with the operational directives established by Adolf Hitler in the event of Italian defection (Operation Achse).G. Rochat, Le guerre italiane 1935-1943, p. 426.R. De Felice, Mussolini l'alleato. La guerra civile, pp. 82 e 84.
Due to the absence of an organic plan for the defense of the city and a coordinated conduct of military resistance to the German occupation, as well as the simultaneous flight of Victor Emmanuel III along with the court, the head of the government and the military leadership, the city was quickly conquered by Nazi Germany's troops, which were vainly and disorganizedly opposed by the troops of the Royal Army and civilians, lacking any coherent orders, leaving about 1,000 dead on the battlefield.
From many quarters the rapid collapse of the Italian forces was blamed on the military and political leadership, who were accused of willfully failing to arrange what was necessary for the city to be adequately defended.Cfr. Ruggero Zangrandi,1943: 25 luglio - 8 settembre, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1964
Historical context
The fall of fascism and the armistice of Cassibile
General Vittorio Ambrosio, chief of the General Staff of the Italian armed forces, gave the first operational directives for the concentration of forces around Rome on 21 July 1943, even before the dismissal of Benito Mussolini following the events of 25 July; on that date, in fact, the so-called “Motorcycle Army Corps” was formed, which, consisting of three mobile divisions, was to protect the capital; General Giacomo Carboni assumed command of this new formation.Cfr. F. W. Deakin, La brutale amicizia, vol. I, p. 587. The provisions of the Supreme Command stipulated that General Carboni's mobile unit was officially to defend Rome in the event of Allied landings on the Lazio coast, but in reality General Ambrosio, a participant in King Victor Emmanuel III's plans to remove Mussolini, intended above all to have well-equipped troops to prevent possible German-backed "Fascist countermeasures".F. W. Deakin, La brutale amicizia, vol. I, pp. 587-588.
The "failed defense" occurred as a result of a series of contexts (actions and decisions of the political and military leadership) that rendered the fighting futile, which in any case began independently as early as the evening of 8 September and on the 10th also recorded the participation of civilians.
Beginning on 9 September 1943, some units of the Regular Army attempted to prevent the Germans from occupying Rome; alongside the Italian soldiers fought a few hundred civilians, who largely rushed in a spontaneous and uncoordinated manner in order to attempt a last, and almost desperate, defense of the city; among the civilian casualties (241 according to the official tally, about 400 according to another assessment) the best known is Raffaele Persichetti.. According to other estimates, 414 Italian soldiers and 183 civilians were killed in the fighting in those days, supported by units and divisions of the Motor Armored Corps and the Capital Defense, which were also joined by handfuls of private citizens.Summary statistical statement published in: Albo d'oro dei caduti nella difesa di Roma del settembre 1943, edited by the Associazione fra i Romani, Rome, 1968, p. 79
After suffering some losses, the Germans briefly took over the capital. The unacceptable risk on the German side of seeing its forces involved for a long time in the battle for Rome, instead of being free to move quickly to the Allied beachhead at Salerno was skillfully avoided by Kesselring by engaging in negotiations with the Italian military authorities and taking advantage of the chaos within them brought about by the abandonment of command posts by most politicians and generals, followed by a deceptive "peaceful cohabitation" agreement, soon betrayed with the complete occupation of the capital by the Wehrmacht. Rome came nominally under the government of the Italian Social Republic, which was formed on 23 September 1943, but in fact was in the hands of the German military authorities, who intended in this way to exploit its great political and military value to the full. The political climate and the feelings of the population were oriented in an anti-fascist and anti-Nazi direction.
The Germans, well aware of the political value of Rome, with the presence of the Vatican, attempted to make propagandistic use of the merely formal and never recognized "open city" declaration issued by the Badoglio government, which had unilaterally declared Rome an "open city" thirty hours after the second Allied bombardment of the capital on 13 August 1943. On 11 September the military commander, General Calvi di Bergolo, issued a communiqué stating that German troops were to remain outside the city's territory; however, on the same day Field Marshal Kesselring declared that Rome was part of the war territory, that the city was subject to the German rules of war, that "strike organizers, saboteurs and sharpshooters [would] be shot," and that the Italian authorities were to "prevent all acts of sabotage and passive resistance."Quoted in: .
Cancellation of Operation Giant 2 The Allies, on the day the armistice was declared, were to proceed with the launch of an airborne division (Operation Giant 2) at four airfields near the capital (Cerveteri, Furbara, Centocelle and Guidonia). On the evening of 7 September two American officers (Maxwell Taylor and William Gardiner) secretly arrived in Rome to agree on the details of the operation and officially announce that an armistice was to be signed at 6:30 p.m. the next day. Prime Minister Marshal Pietro Badoglio, purposely woken up and given the late hour, argued that the Italian deployment could not hold out for more than six hours against the German troops and sent a radiogram for General Eisenhower calling for the cancellation of Operation Giant 2 and the postponement of the declaration of the armistice. In response, on the morning of 8 September General Eisenhower sent an ultimatum radiogram to Marshal Badoglio and demanded the return of the two American officers; moreover, after suspending - as requested - Operation Giant 2 at the scheduled time, he announced the stipulation of the armistice between Italy and the Allied forces from the airwaves of Radio Algiers.Indro Montanelli, Mario Cervi, L'Italia della disfatta, Rizzoli, Milano, 1983, p. 390 et seq.
Delaying tactics of Chief of Staff Vittorio Ambrosio The Proclamation of Armistice issued by Marshal Badoglio on the evening of 8 September 1943, did not provide for any action against German forces present at the national territory and abroad, although it ambiguously concluded as follows: "Every act of hostility against the Anglo-American forces must cease on the part of the Italian forces everywhere. They will, however, react to any attacks from any other source.”
As early as the end of August, Chief of the Defence Staff Vittorio Ambrosio had drafted for the armed forces the secret directive "O.P. Memoir 44," which was signed by Army Chief of Staff Mario Roatta and made known to army commanders between 2 and 5 September 1943. This circular ordered “to disrupt at any cost, including by massive attacks on armed protection units, the railways and main Alpine railroads” and to “act with large units or mobile formations against German troops.” Circular O.P. 44 was to be destroyed by fire immediately after notification and its implementation was conditional on subsequent orders.Ruggero Zangrandi,cit., pp. 486-7. None of the twelve copies of the document has survived.
The proclamation had been broadcast over the radio at 7:42 p.m. At around 9 p.m. the king with the queen accompanied by their son Umberto and numerous aides-de-camp, ordinance officers, service personnel and a voluminous luggage, had moved to the Ministry of War; Marshal Badoglio and Duke Acquarone were already on the scene, and General Ambrosio arrived shortly afterwards.R. Zangrandi, L'Italia tradita, p. 145. Early reports of possible German reactions seemed to be reassuring, and at first the conveners made no decisions; at 10 p.m. Badoglio retired to rest while General Ambrosio summoned General Carboni to the ministry and made arrangements so as not to hinder the peaceful passage of German troops northward through the lines of his army corps.R. Zangrandi, L'Italia tradita, pp. 153-154. In the first few hours among the Italian leaders, particularly General Ambrosio and General Roatta, the illusory belief prevailed that in the absence of hostile acts, the German army would give up occupying the capital and instead fall back without a fight to the north by spontaneously evacuating much of the Italian territory.R. Zangrandi, L'Italia tradita, p. 163. General Carboni initially manifested great optimism and assured General Ambrosio that the Germans were beating a retreat; reports were coming from the German embassy of a precipitous evacuation in progress; the commander of the armored corps took no operational action and did not alert his units.E. Aga Rossi, Una nazione allo sbando. 8 settembre 1943, pp. 116-117.
On the other hand, the situation became much more worrisome from 11 p.m. when information began to reach the command of General Roatta's Army General Staff, which had moved from Monterotondo to the Ministry of War in Via XX Settembre, about the attacks of the German troops; continuous communications about attacks also arrived from the commands of the forces stationed in the occupied territories, and all commanders asked what conduct they should take toward the Germans. General Ambrosio, however, decided not to immediately activate the famous secret directive "O.P. Memoir 44", and at 0:20 a.m. on 9 September he sent teletype No. 24202 to all armed forces confirming the need for extreme prudence and caution and ordering them not to take "initiative of hostile acts against the Germans."R. Zangrandi, L'Italia tradita, p. 155. According to Ruggero Zangrandi, earlier General Ambrosio had sent a phonogram to Field Marshal Kesselring urging him to suspend the “hostile acts” of German troops in order to avoid a “conflict between the two armies”; only at 0:45 a.m. did the chief of staff send a late and insufficient disposition ordering, “to acts of force react with acts of force.”Ruggero Zangrandi, L'Italia tradita. 8 settembre 1943, Mursia, 1971
The German 2nd Parachute Division, which could count on 14,000 men, began its advance from the Pratica di Mare Air Base and took possession of the Mezzocamino military depot, while fighting had already begun since 10:10 p.m. near the Magliana Bridge.
Later, the Chief of Staff felt that the order to the armed forces for implementation from Circular Op. 44 should be signed by Marshal Badoglio, but he was unable to track him down.The marshal did not spend the night in his residence, having retired to sleep in a room in the Ministry of War; see Ruggero Zangrandi, cit. p. 486 He made a timid attempt around 5:00 a.m., to no avail.Indro Montanelli, Mario Cervi, cit., pp. 409-411 According to Ruggero Zangrandi, Badoglio would have absolutely vetoed the directive, although the marshal would later rule out that he had ever been asked for any authorization.Ruggero Zangrandi, cit., pp. 486-487
General Roatta's order ruling out the defense of Rome