The Ford-Aktion was a campaign by IG Metall to recruit members within the workforce of the Ford-Werke in Cologne, Germany from 1960 to 1966. Hans Matthöfer, the union's education expert at the time, was the of the campaign until August 1964, which he believed should not only increase the level of unionization at Ford, but also provide impetus for a company-oriented trade union policy. He specifically involved young sociologists and members of the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS). The efforts failed due to the reaction of Ford management and conflicts internal to the trade union.
Previous history Initial situation at Ford Only five percent of workers and two percent of employees at Ford in Köln-Niehl were members of IG Metall in 1960. Due to this extraordinarily weak level of organization, Ford was regarded by the union as a "cancer for the trade union movement in the Cologne area",Hans Matthöfer, quoted from W. Abelshauser: Nach dem Wirtschaftswunder. 2009, p. 141. because the workforce – Ford employed around 20,000 people at the timeK. Krahn: Die Schwerpunktaktion. 1985, p. 38. – was the least unionized in comparison with other large companies in the West German metal industry.W. Abelshauser: Nach dem Wirtschaftswunder. 2009, p. 141.
Ford was not a member of , the employers' association for automotive sector, so no regional collective agreement was applicable. Wages and working conditions were fixed between the management and the Ford works council through works agreements. Compared to collectively agreed wages, Ford paid significantly more, but this positive was legally precarious
Focus actions by the trade union At the end of 1960, IG Metall selected companies in various districts for so-called "focus actions" () to improve the previously weak union organization and membership situation in Cologne. Ford was one of these companies. The campaign was coordinated by IG Metall's new education expert, Hans Matthöfer.W. Abelshauser: Nach dem Wirtschaftswunder. 2009, p. 131 and p. 140.
The union not only hoped to improve the level of worker organization in companies that were historically hard to reach, but also to raise the level of unionization in the metal industry as a whole, which had been declining since the early 1950s.V. Delp, L. Schmidt, K. Wohlfahrt: Gewerkschaftliche Betriebspolitik bei Ford. 1974, p. 161. K. P. Wittemann: Industriesoziologie und IG Metall. Zum Verhältnis von „interner" und „externer" Sozialwissenschaft. 1984, p. 23. K. P. Wittemann: Ford-Aktion. Zum Verhältnis von Industriesoziologie und IG Metall in den sechziger Jahren. 1994, p. 43 f.
Ford and trade unions Matthöfer had long had excellent contacts with the United Automobile Workers (UAW). In 1941, after long battles, this American trade union had succeeded in organizing the Ford plant at headquarters in Dearborn near Detroit. If the Ford campaign in Germany had been successful, many of its elements could have been implemented in other companies, according to the plan.W. Abelshauser: Nach dem Wirtschaftswunder. 2009, p. 142. The company also stood for an epoch-making work organization: Fordism. Ford ended up expanding its market share in the growing German automotive industry.P. Birke: Wilde Streiks im Wirtschaftswunder. 2007, p. 162.
The contacts with the UAW went back to Matthöfer's stay in the US. He had studied at the University of Wisconsin in Madison from August 1950 to June 1951.W. Abelshauser: Nach dem Wirtschaftswunder. 2009, p. 692. The focus of his studies had been on industrial relations as well as the theory and practice of American trade unions. He had also come into contact with the Independent Socialist League around Max Shachtman, a minor party oriented towards democratic socialism with influence in the UAW. In this way, Matthöfer had become familiar with the breadth of democratic socialism, how to deal with unconventional ideas and practical ways to improve trade union work on the ground.Hierzu W. Abelshauser: Nach dem Wirtschaftswunder. 2009, p. 72–79.
Company-related trade union policy For Matthöfer, Ford was interesting because the campaign for a regional collective agreement was the starting point for what could have become a company-oriented trade union policy.See the brief characteristics in the Vertrauensleutehandbuch der IG Metall (1964),quoted at K. P. Wittemann: Industriesoziologie und IG Metall. Zum Verhältnis von „interner" und „externer" Sozialwissenschaft. 1984, p. 24. In the dispute, he was concerned with the opportunity to closely interlink a company-based collective bargaining policy, co-determination in the workplace and company-related educational work, even under difficult circumstances.K. Krahn: Die Schwerpunktaktion. 1985, p. 42. For him, focusing trade union work on workplace issues was crucial to giving it new momentum. According to Matthöfer, looking back in 1968, it was intended to call on trade union members to get involved on the ground, especially in the workplace, so that the dangers of union bureaucratization and paralyzing routines could be averted; the goal was a democratization of conditions. The question of power should not only be posed in companies, but also in the trade union itself. Decisions would be made less by union executive committees and district leaders and more in company committees, for example company bargaining committees.W. Abelshauser: Nach dem Wirtschaftswunder. 2009, p. 133. At a grassroots level, the aim would be to activate union members, recruit new members, influence working conditions and negotiate wages and salaries.W. Abelshauser: Nach dem Wirtschaftswunder. 2009, p. 138.
The central players in this process were not primarily to be the trade union representatives or works councils, but the so-called Bildungsobleute (education officers). These activists were trained in large numbers by the education department under Matthöfer's leadership – in 1967 there were already 4,000 – and equipped with modern teaching materials. Learning was to be based on the students' current and everyday work experiences.P. Birke: Wilde Streiks im Wirtschaftswunder. 2007, p. 164 f. With the help of these education representatives, it was promising to get deadlocked conflicts between companies and trade unions moving through flexible and direct action in companies. This was to become a place of struggle, learning and change.W. Abelshauser: Nach dem Wirtschaftswunder. 2009, p. 131–137. The aim was to raise awareness and commitment among trade union members and to overcome the stagnation of class disputes, which was perceived as a danger. Overall, it was a project to renew the trade unions from within.K. P. Wittemann: Ford-Aktion. Zum Verhältnis von Industriesoziologie und IG Metall in den sechziger Jahren. 1994, p. 42. Matthöfer developed his considerations with recourse to military strategy. Explanations by Basil Liddell HartBasil Liddell Hart: Strategie. Aus dem Englischen übertragen von Horst Jordan. Rheinische Verlags-Anstalt, Wiesbaden 1955. On the reception of Liddell Hart by Matthöfer see K. P. Wittemann: Ford-Aktion. Zum Verhältnis von Industriesoziologie und IG Metall in den sechziger Jahren. 1994, p. 96-98 and p. 102-104. and findings of West German industrial and business sociology,M. Schumann, K. P. Wittemann: Betriebsnahe Politik – fast vergessener Versuch einer gewerkschaftlichen Offensive. 1985, S. 44 f. which had already formed in the 1950s as a circle of interested actors, empirically working sociologists, and as a section of the German Sociological Association.See also
Implementation Information procurement Initially, little information was available about the specific working conditions and the working atmosphere at Ford. This was mainly due to the reduced level of union organization. The hesitant and defensive position of the Cologne administrative office of IG Metall, which feared for its influence, and the largely autonomous works council under the leadership of Peter Görres, an old-style charismatic labor leader, also played a role.M. Schumann, K. P. Wittemann: Betriebsnahe Politik – fast vergessener Versuch einer gewerkschaftlichen Offensive. 1985, p. 46. V. Delp, L. Schmidt, K. Wohlfahrt: Gewerkschaftliche Betriebspolitik bei Ford. 1974, p. 163. W. Abelshauser: Nach dem Wirtschaftswunder. 2009, p. 142 f.
The information was obtained through a subversive study on the working climate.So der Begriff bei M. Schumann, K. P. Wittemann: Betriebsnahe Politik – fast vergessener Versuch einer gewerkschaftlichen Offensive. 1985, p. 47. The Frankfurt Institute for Social Research was commissioned to carry out the survey in 1961. It was conducted by Frankfurt sociology students, most of whom belonged to the SDS. 50 unionized and 50 non-unionized employees were interviewed in semi-standardized home interviews.M. Schumann, K. P. Wittemann: Betriebsnahe Politik – fast vergessener Versuch einer gewerkschaftlichen Offensive. 1985, p. 47.W. Abelshauser: Nach dem Wirtschaftswunder. 2009, p. 143.P. Birke: Wilde Streiks im Wirtschaftswunder. 2007, p. 165. Manfred Teschner and Michael Schumann led the study and analyzed it.K. P. Wittemann: Ford-Aktion. Zum Verhältnis von Industriesoziologie und IG Metall in den sechziger Jahren. 1994, p. 156–158.
Two key findings emerged regardless of the union membership of the interviewees. Firstly, the pace of work was considered extremely stressful due to the high speed of the assembly line. It demanded a very high level of performance from the workers. On the other hand, the interviewees criticized the arbitrariness of superiors. The focus here was on "nose bonuses",K. Krahn: Die Schwerpunktaktion. 1985, p. 39. which the foremen could arbitrarily grant or withdraw as a performance bonus. The interviews also revealed a surprisingly high willingness to join the union. The low level of organization was therefore obviously not related to the fact that Ford workers were satisfied and considered unions to be fundamentally superfluous. There was also widespread skepticism towards the works council, which lacked contact with the rank and file.V. Delp, L. Schmidt, K. Wohlfahrt: Gewerkschaftliche Betriebspolitik bei Ford. 1974, p. 163.Details der Umfrage-Ergebnisse bei K. P. Wittemann: Ford-Aktion. Zum Verhältnis von Industriesoziologie und IG Metall in den sechziger Jahren. 1994, p. 158–174.
Company newspaper At the beginning of 1961, Matthöfer launched a company newspaper, the Tatsachen.Hierzu K. P. Wittemann: Ford-Aktion. Zum Verhältnis von Industriesoziologie und IG Metall in den sechziger Jahren. 1994, p. 174–180. The title was based on the Ford Facts, the UAW's periodical for Ford employees. It followed the motto of the anarcho-syndicalist Industrial Workers of the World union: To Fan the Flames of Discontent. Matthöfer was active as editor, as (from 1963), as editor and often also as author for this newspaper. Tatsachen, this collective organizer,W. Abelshauser: Nach dem Wirtschaftswunder. 2009, S. 144. Abelshauser spielt hier auf ein Wort Lenins an. Siehe Wladimir Iljitsch Lenin: Wie beginnen? In: Iskra. No. 4, May 1901, contained inWladimir Iljitsch Lenin: Werke, Band 5, Dietz, Berlin (East) 1955, pp. 1–13, here p. 11. was intended to disseminate trade union discourse and information, motivate people to join the union, promote a company master agreement and dispel myths about conditions at Ford. These myths included the claim that the rate of accidents at work at Ford was below average. Tatsachen refuted this claim with figures and in this way encouraged a drastic reduction in the number of accidents through the training and deployment of safety officers. The medium picked up on the issues that led to particularly high levels of dissatisfaction with the work. To address the many Catholics in the workforce, Matthöfer repeatedly made references to Catholic social teaching.W. Abelshauser: Nach dem Wirtschaftswunder. 2009, p. 144–146.
Covert actions