General Sir Hubert de la Poer Gough ( ; 12 August 1870 – 18 March 1963) was a senior officer in the British Army in the First World War. A controversial figure, he was a favourite of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) on the Western Front, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, and the youngest of his Army commanders.

In 1916 Gough commanded the Reserve Corps, renamed the Reserve Army in April and renamed the Fifth Army in October during the Battle of the Somme. He was originally earmarked to command the exploitation forces, both infantry and cavalry, in the event of a decisive breakthrough being achieved, although he may also have been intended to command in Flanders in the event of British offensive efforts being switched to that sector.

After the First Day of the Somme he was placed in command of the hilly northern sector of the battlefield, tasked with capturing important defensive ground and drawing off German reserves from the main BEF effort by Rawlinson's Fourth Army. Gough's Army fought over Pozieres and Mouquet Farm in the summer, and in the autumn captured Thiepval and Schwaben Redoubt, both of which had been targets for the initial BEF attack on 1 July.

Fifth Army conducted the final attack of the Battle of the Somme, at Beaumont Hamel in cold and wet weather in November. This was authorised by Haig largely for political reasons, to appease the French and so that he could report a recent success at a conference at Chantilly. Haig and his chief of staff Launcelot Kiggell visited Gough several times beforehand to discuss the political considerations and to ensure that there was a reasonable prospect of success. The attack began well on 13 November, reflecting improvements in artillery tactics which had been made since July that year, but as with many offensives in the middle years of the war the following days were less successful. Throughout the Battle of the Somme Gough had added to his controversial reputation as an aggressive, domineering commander under whom many other generals found it difficult to serve.

The Somme

Initial phases Training cavalry Haig originally wanted to launch an offensive in Flanders, and told Gough to be prepared to take I Corps, of which he was still GOC, up there for this offensive – Gough sent the painter Paul Maze, a member of his staff, to prepare sketches of the ground.Farrar-Hockley 1974, p. 178 Haig did not completely abandon his hopes for a Flanders Offensive, and as late as 30 June 1916 Aylmer Haldane noted in his diary that several corps commanders senior to Gough (Hew Fanshawe of V Corps, Fergusson of II Corps) were being removed, and speculated that this was to clear the way for Gough to command Second Army in Flanders.Travers 1987, p. 11

Gough was appointed GOC Reserve Corps on 4 April 1916, which was to push through and exploit any breakthrough achieved at the Somme.Beckett & Corvi 2006, p76Robbins 2005, p. 48 Gough spent most of the next two months supervising the training of the cavalry divisions, including staff rides and tactical exercises. He was asked for his opinion on the battlefield conditions which would be necessary for massed cavalry to move through, and on the organisation needed to control such a force both behind the lines and after the breakthrough. His staff, initially run by Edward "Moses" Beddington, were initially an adjunct of Haig's GHQ. Beddington had to liaise with XIII and XV Corps (on the right of Rawlinson's Fourth Army) to draw up contingency plans in case "things went as we hoped for" and with Jacob, who was to be given command of II Corps, although it was not yet clear what divisions this would contain.Farrar-Hockley 1974, pp. 181–182

An officer recorded that "Goughie ... was in his element when ordering cavalry brigades around" while a major thought him "drunk with power" for sacking so many officers who were not up to scratch "yet the Chief [i.e. Haig] can see no wrong in him". By mid-June he was also supervising the training of the 1st Indian Cavalry Division and 2nd Indian Cavalry Division.Farrar-Hockley 1974, p. 183

Plans for exploitation

In May, after discussions with Rawlinson, Gough proposed that two brigades of cavalry should be used, one in the north and one in the south, to assist the infantry in the event of a German collapse. He also suggested (letter to the BEF chief of staff, Kiggell, 1 May 1916) that a further entire cavalry division should be used in the north to help roll up the enemy second line,The enemy lines were closer together north of the Albert-Bapaume Road, but the ground hillier and less favourable for the attacker. At this stage Haig's plan was to capture the first and second German lines in the northern sector, including the high ground around Thiepval and Pozieres, and then conduct a shallow exploitation south-east along the ridge, possibly linking up with a thrust from Montauban to encircle the German defenders in between. The plans would change in June – see below. [Prior & Wilson 2006, pp. 49-50] but this was vetoed by Haig, who wrote in the margin of the document that the [high] ground was unsuitable for "masses of cavalry", and who ordered Gough to restrict himself to a brigade each in the Ancre Valley and at Montauban (near the north and south of the British positions respectively).Prior & Wilson 2006, p. 49

Reserve Corps was renamed Reserve Army on 22 May 1916, (a development described as "ominous" by Prior & Wilson)Prior & Wilson 2006, p. 50 although technically still remaining part of Rawlinson's Fourth Army.Sheffield & Todman 2004, p73-4 In late June the plans were recast, despite the requirements of the Battle of Verdun causing a reduction in the planned French contribution to the offensive from 39 divisions to twelve. Instead of exploiting southeast to cover the flank of a French crossing of the Somme,the Somme bends and flows roughly north–south south of Peronne. This geography was later to be important in March 1918 Haig (memo to Rawlinson 16 June, Haig diary 21 June) now wrote that once Pozières Ridge was taken, "an effort should be made to push the cavalry through" and anticipated that Gough was to exploit northeast to Bapaume and then, once further reinforcements had moved up, turn north to Monchy to take the German Arras positions in "flank and reverse". (Arras is around from Bapaume). Jacob's II Corps was either to be under Gough or else to reinforce Allenby's Third Army (opposite Arras) directly.Sheffield 2005, pp. 191–192

Haig told Gough (Haig diary 27 June) he was "too inclined to aim at fighting a battle at Bapaume" but should instead be ready to push on, before the Germans had a chance to attack him from the North. He also rebuked Rawlinson for wanting his men to consolidate for an hour or so on the German last line rather than pushing on, and for not having decided which units Gough was to take command of. Haig would have preferred Gough to take command of the two left hand corps (VIII Corps and X Corps) at once (i.e. prior to the infantry attack) but instead, that evening, approved Rawlinson's plan for Gough to set up HQ at Albert as soon as the Pozières Heights had fallen and to push through with the Reserve Army.Sheffield 2005, pp. 192–193

By now Reserve Army had three infantry and three cavalry divisions.Philpott 2009, p. 166 Research by Stephen Badsey among the surviving evidence suggests that the final plan was probably for Gough to commit 25th Division, followed by two of the three cavalry divisions, then the II Corps (three divisions) to exploit any breakthrough achieved in the initial attack.Sheffield & Todman 2004, p76

Philip Howell wrote (30 July 1916) that Gough "became more and more optimistic as the day of the battle drew near".Robbins 2005, p. 74 Wynne later wrote to the Official Historian James Edward Edmonds (in 1930) that even after the disaster on the northern part of the British front, on the First Day of the Somme Gough was "ultro (sic) optimistic" and promoted "far reaching" plans.Robbins 2005, p. 75

Battle of Albert

On 1 July Gough visited Rawlinson twice in the morning.Farrar-Hockley 1974, p. 184 In the afternoon Haig, not yet aware of how badly the attack had gone in the northern sector and believing that Rawlinson was about to be able to push his reserves through, visited Gough and ordered him to "move up" in the evening.Philpott 2009, p. 197 Gough visited Rawlinson for the third time in the afternoon but was told that there would be no breakthrough that day, so he ordered cavalry to return to billets. At 7 pm Rawlinson telephoned to give command of X and VIII Corps (the northern sector of the Somme front, where the worst losses and smallest gains had occurred on 1 July),this brought the 36th (Ulster) Division under Gough's command, joined by the 16th (Irish) Division later in July with orders to "push them on again". Taking command on 2 July, Gough reported that VIII Corps communication trenches were blocked with dead and wounded troops and X Corps was found to be little better.Prior & Wilson 2006, p. 121 In the early hours of 3 July, Rawlinson ordered Gough to renew the attack on his sector, orders which Haig then countermanded.Philpott 2009, p. 214

Gough was ordered to attack towards Schwaben Redoubt north of Thiepval (where British survivors of the assault on 1 July were believed to be holding out). However, despite the wishes of Haig and Rawlinson that he (in the words of the BEF chief of Staff Kiggell) "damp down his operations to the lowest level", Gough obtained permission to attack an enemy salient south-east of Thiepval, with elements of the 32nd Division and 49th Division. He ordered an attack by 14th and 75th brigades (under 32nd Division, part of X Corps). In the event he attacked with six battalions (fewer than two brigades), even though he thought the attack only a gamble with "prospects good enough to justify the attempt". The attacking units were not given time to prepare, orders were delayed in transmission, 32nd Division was ordered to attack over a frontage of rather than the planned, and the attack was delayed from 0315 to 0600, to coincide with a Fourth Army attack at Ovillers. The artillery, owing to communications difficulties, had already fired off half its stock of ammunition (although the Official History, contradicting itself, also states that Gough had agreed that this would be done deliberately). Sheffield describes the attack as "a complete shambles", although he comments that Gough was not entirely to blame and that it typified the "chaos" of British operations at that stage.Sheffield & Todman 2004, pp. 78–80Simpson 2006, p. 38 Gough observed the attack and later claimed to have regretted having launched it. In the afternoon of 3 July, Reserve Army was formally made independent of Fourth Army.Farrar-Hockley 1974, pp. 185–186