The Mann Gulch fire was a wildfire reported on August 5, 1949, in a gulch located along the upper Missouri River in the Gates of the Mountains Wilderness (then known as the Gates of the Mountains Wild Area), Helena National Forest, in the state of Montana in the United States. A team of 15 US Forest Service smokejumpers parachuted into the area on the afternoon of August 5, 1949, to fight a lightning-caused blaze, assisted by a local recreation guard. As the team approached the fire, an unexpected change in wind direction caused the fire to ignite heavy fuels, creating a "blowup" and cutting off the men's escape route to the Missouri River. The crew was forced to retreat uphill into a lightly timbered area with a dense groundcover of extremely flammable grass and brush. The fire moved rapidly up the slope, burning in ten minutes and claiming the lives of 13 firefighters, including 12 of the smokejumpers. Only three of the smokejumpers survived. The fire would continue for five more days before being controlled.

Timeline of Events The following chronology combines two parallel narratives: 1) Canyon Ferry District Ranger John Robert Jansson's effort to provide support for the smokejumpers and 2) the events surrounding the deaths of the 13 crewmen led by foreman R. Wagner Dodge in Mann Gulch.

4 August 1949

4:00 pm – An intense electrical storm passed over Gates of the Mountains Wild Area, sparking eight fires. John Robert Jansson, Canyon Ferry District Ranger, quickly organized the suppression of the four fires that had been reported in his jurisdiction.Maclean, 2017. p. 87-88 A lightning strike on the upper south slope of Mann Gulch (within the Canyon Ferry RD) produced a holdover fire (a so-called "sleeper") that initially went undetected.Maclean, 2017. p. 88US Forest Service, 1991 Fire danger rating on 4 August was not critical, ranking 16 out of a possible 100, but temperatures in recent days had been in the upper 90s °F (upper 30s °C) with low humidity.Maclean, 2017. p. 88: "... conditions [on the 4th] were not critical ..." The cooler and wetter 1948 summer had provided for a prolific grass understory and seed production in the spring of 1949..Lillquist, 2006. p. 565: "... an early August heat wave ..." and "The elimination of commercial cattle grazing on the gulch, due to its 1948 designation as part of the Gates of the Mountains Wild Area [now wilderness area] "was relatively insignificant ... because the north side of Mann Gulch was generally too steep and lacked water for cattle."

Concerned about sleeper fires, Jansson requested an aerial survey of the district for 6:00 am on the following day, 5 August.US Forest Service, 1991: "... so concerned in fact, that he requested that a plane fly his District at 6:00 am."

5 August 1949

8:00 am – US Forest Service aerial observers report no new fires at Mann Gulch.

9:00 am (approx.) – Ranger Jansson contacted James O. Harrison, former smokejumper and recreation guard at the Meriwether Canyon guard station and directed him to conduct a foot patrol in Mann Gulch to search for possible sleeper fires.

11:00 am – Jansson flew observation over Mann Gulch, but saw no evidence of fire and returned to the Helena airport.US Forest Service, 1991: "Ranger Jansson was still concerned, so he flew the District, including the Mann Gulch area, at 11: 00 am. He reported no new fires, and landed in Helena at 12:25."

11:30 am ("late morning") – Jim Harrison located a new fire on Mann Gulch.Maclean, 2017. p. 71

12:15 pm – Harrison attempted to report the fire to Missoula office and the Canyon Ferry RD by radio, but was unable to establish contact. He climbed from the Meriwether Guard Station to reach the fire perimeter and began to work on the blaze with his Pulaski about 1:30 pm.

12:18 pm – Colorado Mountain Lookout, 30 miles away, reported smoke in Mann Gulch.Maclean, 2017. p. 89 Jansson, arriving back at Helena airport detected smoke on the district, but was perplexed because he just flew Mann Gulch and had seen nothing.Lillquist, 2006. p. 565: "... officially sited by Colorado Mountain lookout (located about 29 miles southeast of Mann Gulch) at 12:18 ..."

12:55 pm –Returning to Mann Gulch to fly a second survey, Jansson located a fire along the upper south slope of the gulch. He considered the rate of growth of the sleeper "unusual" and "exceptional."Maclean, 2017. p. 89: "... eight acres in extent (six acres by a later survey)."US Forest Service, 1991: " The fire was doing some minor crowning in juniper and pine reproduction, but was not spreading excessively, even though it had already grown to 8 acres in an hour."Lillquist, 2006. p. 565: "... fire covered eight acres ..."

1:00 pm (early afternoon) – Jansson begins to assemble and mobilize ground crews to fight the Mann Gulch fire.Maclean, 2017. p. 90-91

1:45 pm – Helena National Forest Supervisor Arthur Duncan Moir believed the fire required a rapid response and ordered the deployment of twenty-five smokejumpers to the remote site. The blaze was regarded as manageable for a small firefighting crew until a larger ground crew arrived.Lillquist, 2006. p. 565Rothermel, 1993. p. 2: "One of the basic tenets of firefighting is to reach a fire quickly [and] attack it when it is still small. Smokejumpers are very effective" in this regard.

Mobilization

2:30 pm – A C-47 departed from Missoula's Hale Field, west of the gulch carrying 16 jumpers and their equipment – the airplanes maximum capacity. (Additional smokejumpers were available for action, but all other transport planes were engaged on other projects). The smokejumpers, including the foreman, ranged in age from 17 to 33 (average age, 22). The majority of the firefighters were attending forestry classes at the Montana State University in Missoula. For most of them, this was their first year in the smokejumper program.Maclean, 2017. p. 49, p. 91Rothermel, 1993. p. 2

2:30 – 4:30 pm – Jansson and his alternate, Ranger Harry Hersey, recruited nineteen able-bodied ground firefighters, just three of whom had served previously on fires. Logistical and transportation delays plagued the mobilization. On the way to the planned assembly area at the mouth of Mann Gulch, Jansson suspected that the fire might be encroaching into Merriweather Canyon, a scenic area. He directed Hersey to ascend the Meriwether trail with the 19-man ground crew and attack the fire at the Mann Gulch/Meriwether ridge.Maclean, 2017. p. 71: "a tourist treasure ..."p. 93Lillquist, 2006. p. 566: "... to prevent from burning into the beautiful Meriwether Canyon."US Forest Service, 1991: "Jansson instructed [Hersey] to take all 19 men and to attack the fire from the Mann Gulch/Meriwether Saddle, and to try to hold the fire on the ridge." The temperature at Helena, 25 miles to the south, was reaching , the hottest day on record to date. The fire danger rating was calculated at 74 out of 100: "explosive stage".Maclean, 2017. p. 49, p. 88

3:10 pm – C-47 pilot Kenneth Huber located the fire in Mann Gulch and began to circle. Spotter and jumpmaster Earl Cooley and crew foreman R. Wagner Dodge appraised the fire. They observed that since 4 August, the lightning caused blaze had scorched 50 to 60 acres, originating in Mann Gulch and spreading upslope and south to the crest at Meriwether Canyon, where it had crowned and burnt out without generating any spot fires. The fire was moving gradually downhill to the northeast (up gulch) through sparse grass. The fire appeared to be routine.Maclean, 2017. p. 48-49US Forest Service, 1991: "Spotter Earl Cooley and Jumper Foreman Wag Dodge chose a jump site at the head of Mann Gulch. The fire was estimated at 60 acres, but they still considered it a routine fire."

3:50 pm to 4:10 pm – Smokejumpers and cargo drops completed. (Figure 1) After dropping the men at the customary elevation, Huber took the C-47 to to drop the equipment because of heavy turbulence. As a result, the gear was widely scattered on the north slope delaying its retrieval.Maclean, 2017. p. 55, p. 63Lillquist, 2006. p. 565-566: "The plane had to drop its cargo from a higher elevation than normal because of turbulent air, thus the stronger winds aloft had more opportunity to caster the cargo ... fifty minutes to collect gear and cargo ..."Rothermel, 1993. p. 2 "The cargo drop did not go smoothly ... [the plane] encountered heavy turbulence at normal drop altitude and was forced to climb before dropping the remaining cargo. The firefighting gear was scattered ..."

Several of the sixteen smokejumpers experienced flight sickness due to the turbulence and one of them became too ill to jump. Merle "Skip" Stratton submitted his resignation from the US Forest Service when the airplane returned to Missoula that evening, before news of the tragedy was reported. He would be return to Mann Gulch to assist in the recovery operation of his deceased comrades.Maclean, 2017. p. 58

Dodge was not provided with topographical maps of the area and was expected to obtain them when he encountered ground crews at the site.Maclean, 2017. p. 49 The single-sideband radio was smashed when its static line broke and the chute failed to deploy.Maclean, 2017. p. 64

4:35 pm – Jansson proceeded by boat along the Missouri towards the mouth of Mann Creek to begin a survey of its south slope and to establish contact with the smokejumpers.Maclean, 2017. p. 94-95

4:55 pm – Smokejumper equipment collected and assembled at cargo area. (Figure 1) The crew was about one mile as the raven flies up the drainage from the Missouri River. They could see the fire's perimeter about to the southwest on the south slope which appeared to be burning away from the crew. The men were "not greatly impressed" with the blaze and only concerned that "the steep and rocky ground" would make mop up difficult the next morning. Smokejumper Robert Sallee later remarked, "I took a look at the fire and decided it wasn't bad. It was burning on top of the ridge and I thought it would continue on up the ridge ..."Maclean, 2017. p. 65

5:00 pm – The smokejumpers heard a shout near the fire perimeter. Foreman Dodge ordered squad leader Bill Hellman to take charge while he went to investigate. He discovered Jim Harrison near the fire line.

5:02 pm – Jansson began his ascent up Mann Gulch by foot. Visibility was about due to dense smoke. Winds in the lower gulch were between 20 and 30 mi/h (32 to 48 km/h), gusting to 40 mi/h (64 km/h), much higher than those occurring in Helena, to the south.Maclean, 2017. p. 95US Forest Service, 1991: "Jansson then headed down [the Missouri] river, trying to size up the fire. By now, the canyon was so full of smoke he could hardly see. He landed at Mann Gulch and began to scout the fire."

5:10 pm – After spending about 10 minutes tooling up at the cargo area, the smokejumpers crossed the dry gulch bottom and began to climb the south slope towards the fire. Eleven of the smokejumpers were double-tooled, bearing both a Pulaski and a shovel. Two of the men carried the two-man crosscut saws and one man shouldered the 5-gallon (19-liter) jug mounted on a backpack.Maclean, 2017. p. 65, p. 69Lillquist, 2006. p. 566

5:12 pm – 5:15 pm – Dodge called to the crew to halt when they had advanced up the slope about and he rejoined them immediately with Harrison. Dodge, in consultation with Harrison who has been on the fire for four hours, announced that the crew "had better get out of that thick reproduction [heavy fuels]" – dense stands of second-growth ponderosa pine and Douglas fir. The crew was downwind of the fire, a potential "death trap" according to Dodge.Maclean, 2017. p. 72Rothermel, 1993. p. 2: ". ... not the safest place to attack the fire ..."