Prajñākaragupta (also: Prajñakara, Sanskrit, Tibetan: shes rab 'byung gnas sbas pa, ca. 8th–9th century) was a Buddhist philosopher of the Epistemological school. He is known for his extensive magnum opus, the Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (The Ornament of the Commentary on Epistemology), a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika which runs to over 16,200 Sanskrit ślokas.Franco, Eli, “Prajñākaragupta”, in: Brill's Encyclopedia of Buddhism Online, Editor-in-Chief: Jonathan A. Silk, Volume Editors: Richard Bowring, Vincent Eltschinger, Oskar von Hinüber. Consulted online on 14 March 2024 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2467-9666_enbo_COM_2050>Shinya Moriyama, "Prajñākaragupta: Buddhist Epistemology as the Path to the Wisdom of Non-Duality", in Edelglass (ed) et al. The Routledge Handbook of Indian Buddhist Philosophy (Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy), pp. 528-539. Routledge (2022).Franco, Eli. "Towards a Critical Edition and Translation of the Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkārabhāṣya: A Propos Two Recent Publications*". Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens / Vienna Journal of South Asian Studies, Bd. XLVIII/2004, 151-169 © 2005, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien Prajñākaragupta introduced several original innovations to the school of Dharmakīrti, such as the doctrine of backwards causation and a revised theory of perception.Mccrea, L. (2011). Prajñākaragupta on the pramāṇas and their objects. Helmut Krasser, Horst Lasic, Eli Franco, Birgit Kellner (eds), Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis. Proceedings of the Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference. Vienna, August 23–27, 2005. Wien 2011, pp. 319–328. According to Eli Franco, Prajñākaragupta is "arguably the most important and most original Buddhist philosopher after Dignāga and Dharmakīrti".
According to the Tibetan historian Tārānātha, Prajñākaragupta was a lay disciple (upāsaka). Since his disciple Ravigupta hailed from Kashmir, some scholars have argued that Prajñākaragupta was also Kashmiri.
Prajñākaragupta influenced later Buddhist thinkers like Ravigupta (9th century), Jayanta (10th century), Jñānaśrīmitra (c. 980–1040), and Yamāri (c. 1000–1060) and was critiqued and commented on by non-buddhist tenth century figures like Bhāsarvajña and Vidyānandin.
Philosophy Prajñākaragupta's philosophy is found in his extensive Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (henceforth PVA, sometimes also called Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam) which survives in a single Sanskrit manuscript.Watanabe, Shigeaki. 1998. Sanskrit Manuscripts of Prajñākaragupta’s Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam. Facsimile edition. Patna/Narita. The manuscript was discovered and photographed by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. It also survives in a Tibetan translation by Blo ldan śes rab et al. as the Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi rgyan (Tengyur, Derge edition, Toh 4221).
He also wrote the Sahopalambaniyamasiddhi (Ascertaining the Simultaneity of the Object [and Consciousness]), a proof of Yogacara idealism.Iwata, Takashi. 1991. Sahopalambhaniyama: Struktur und Entwicklung des Schlusses von der Tatsache, daß Erkenntnis und Gegenstand ausschließlich zusammen wahrgenommen werden, auf deren Nichtverschiedenheit. 2 Teile. ANISt, Alt- und Neuindische Studien 29. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
Perception and inference Prajñakara's view of the relationship between the two pramāṇas (epistemic instruments which give us knowledge) of perception (Sanskrit: pratyakṣa) and inference (anumana) differs significantly from that of Dharmakīrti. According to Dharmakīrti, only perception is a true pramāṇa, since only perception knows the true form (svarūpa) of the object of cognition. Inference on the other hand, only knows universals, which are conceptual constructs and unreal.McCrea, Lawrence. Prajñākaragupta on the pramāṇas and their objects. Helmut Krasser, Horst Lasic, Eli Franco, Birgit Kellner (eds), Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis. Proceedings of the Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference. Vienna, August 23–27, 2005. Wien 2011, pp. 319–328. However, inference can still be seen as a secondary kind of epistemic instrument, since it can lead a person to accomplish their intention (Pramāṇavārttika 3.56). Thus, since inference has pragmatic efficacy, it can be called a pramāṇa, even if it is a concept that does not know the actual form of the object, and is thus ultimately erroneous.
Prajñākaragupta on the other hand stresses the similarity between perception and inference. Prajñākara argues that due to the principle of momentariness (which says that all phenomena arise and cease in minute moments), perception also faces the same issues that Dharmakīrti levels against inference (i.e. it does not actually know the object itself directly): Even in the case of perception, how does one act? There too, one does not at all discern the form of the object to be obtained by one’s action (prāptavyarūpa), since one discerns only what is actually present. Indeed, perception itself does not prompt one to act precisely because it only apprehends what is present. Even there [in the case of perception] it is only through a determination of the unity (ekatvādhyavasāya) of that [present object] that one acts with respect to the future object (bhāvivastu). And, in the case of the inferred object too, activity is likewise due to this [determination of unity] – So how can you see them as different? (PVA 216,4–7) Here, Prajñākara argues that the initial perception of the object is not the object that one directs one's action towards and eventually obtains on the basis of perception. Since all phenomena are momentary, the perception of an object and any subsequent perception of the object one obtains are not the same. Thus, while perception has pragmatic efficacy, just like inference, it is also indirect and based on an error which sees a present perception and a presumed future perception of the object as a single entity, while in reality, there is only an ever changing stream of perceptions. As Lawrence McCrea writes, "in perception as well as inference, there is a radical distinction between the object directly presented to one’s awareness and the object of one’s activity – in both cases, what you see is not what you get."
Prajñākara's view of perception also radically departs from Dharmakīrti in another way. Prajñākara claims that when it comes to perception, the initial non-conceptual awareness that directly presents an object cannot even be considered a pramāṇa, since it does not prompt one to act (pravartaka) pragmatically.McAllister, Patrick. "Prajñākaragupta’s Argument for Two Means of Valid Cognition", in Birgit Kellner et al., eds., Reverberations of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy: Proceedings of the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference Heidelberg, August 26 to 30, 2014. Vienna 2020, pp. 221–250. The actual pramāṇa in the case of perception is the subsequent conceptual cognition (vikalpa) that immediately follows the initial act of perception. Thus, non-conceptual direct perception can only said to be a pramāṇa indirectly, since it is what prompts one to conceive of an object and then to act. This is quite different from Dharmakīrti's view which sees non-conceptual direct perception as the only real pramāṇa.
Prajñākaragupta also argues that "without inference, perception does not, at first, prompt [a person] to act; likewise inference without perception" (PVA II 244–245). That is to say, inference and perception depend on each other to function. A pure direct perception would never prompt a person to act towards some aim without relying on some kind of inference that makes a connection between that perception and some future thing to be attained. However, there is one case in which a non-conceptual perception without inference is a pramāṇa for Prajñākaragupta, and this is the knowledge of self-awareness (svasamvedana). However, in this ultimate case, there is no pragmatic aim, since there is only the experience of non-duality. As such, this case is not a pramāṇa in the conventional sense.
Perceptual diversity The school of Dharmakīrti is known to follow the view of Vijñānavāda which denies the existence of an external world and is thus a kind of idealism that holds that the world is but a chain of cognitions that arise and perish moment by moment. Each cognition is the cause of the next moment of cognition.Hisayasu Kobayashi. Prajñākaragupta on What Brings about Diversity in Cognition (認識の多様性とその根拠 プラジュニャーカラ的アプローチ), 2006.『比較論理学研究』第 3号 広島大学比較論理学フ。ロジェクト研究センター 研究成果報告書（2005) A problem which arises for this tradition is how to explain the diversity of cognitions if each cognition in the stream of consciousness is the cause of the next (e.g. what causes a cognition of blue to be followed by a cognition of yellow?). To explain this without appealing to an external material world traditional Vijñānavādins posit the existence of latent impressions (vāsanā) which are stored in a subliminal layer of consciousness called the storehouse consciousness (ālayavijñāna).
Prajñākaragupta's account of past experiences differs from previous commentators like Devendrabuddhi. For Prajñākaragupta, all cognitions (conceptual, recollections, or direct experiences) take previous or past cognitions (antaravijñāna) themselves as their object, instead of only potentials (i.e. cognitive seeds) or conceptual constructs. The way this works is that after repeated experiences, the mind is able to manifest a previous direct perception as a clear image (spaṣtākāra) which becomes the object (viṣaya) for a subsequent cognition. This event can be triggered by a previous direct cognition or a conceptual cognition. This fact is the case not just for acts of memory, but for directly experiencing objects in the present as well. That is to say, like with modern theories of Memory-Based Perception, for Prajñākaragupta, all perceptions are directly affected by our past memories and cognitions. Prajñākaragupta writes:Even in the case of direct experience, the object is not something that is newly presented (anupalabdha) at that time. Rather, it is something that has already been presented (upalabdha) and is being remembered (anusmrta). (PVA 351.5-6) As such, perceptual diversity is not just caused by past latent impressions (seeds in the storehouse consciousness), but by actual past cognitions which reappear or manifest within consciousness.
Backwards causation