The third siege of Szenttamás (now Srbobran, in the South Bačka District, Vojvodina, Serbia) was an attempt of siege during the Hungarian War of Independence of 1848-1849, as a part of the Serb uprising of 1848–49, on 21 September 1848, carried out by the Hungarian Army under the command of General Lázár Mészáros against the Serbian fortified encampment in Szenttamás and Turia held by the Serb insurgents led by Captain Petar Biga. The Hungarians committed a series of mistakes, and Mészáros did not show enough strength to ensure discipline and order in his army, in which the officers of foreign origin were not sure on which side to fight. When, despite the resistance of the besieging Hungarian army, a relief force of 3000 Serbs and 7 cannons managed to enter Szenttamás, Mészáros decided to end the siege and retreat.
Background After the failure of the second siege of Szenttamás, the public outrage was tremendous.. Mór Perczel in the Hungarian Parliament said that the defeat was caused by the treason of the commander of the besieging Hungarian troops Baron Lieutenant-General Fülöp Bechtold, who then resigned. Shortly after the Royal and Imperial (K.u.K.) High Commandment from Vienna called him to the empire's capital.Olchváry Ödön: A magyar függetlenségi harc 1848–1849-ben a Délvidéken Budapest, 1902, pp. 75 Later, during the summer campaign of 1849, he was assigned to lead a cavalry brigade in the Austrian army led by Julius Jacob von Haynau against Hungary.
Bechtold's example illustrates the questionable loyalty towards the Hungarian government of the non Hungarian officers, soldiers, and troops fighting the Serbs in Délvidék (Vojvodina)Bona Gábor: Az 1848/49-es szabadságharc tisztikara HM Hadtörténeti Intézet és Múzeum, Budapest, 2008 Many non-Hungarian born imperial officers, and troops conscripted outside of Hungary who had sworn loyalty to the Hungarian government by the order of the king, could not be trusted, because the Serb troops included not only volunteers who came from the Principality of Serbia (Servians) and local peasant insurgents, but also soldiers of the Serbian border guard regiments belonging to the Imperial Royal Army.. Therefore, many officers and military units of non-Hungarian origin, despite having received orders from the Hungarian government to attack, refused to fight against their former comrades in the imperial army. For example, when on 30 August the Serbs attacked Fehértemplom the K.u.K. troops did not help the Hungarians. The officers of the 2nd (Schwarzenberg) Uhlan Regiment led by Colonel Blomberg, camped in Versec, which had sworn previously oath to the Hungarian constitution, declared steadfastly, that they would not go to the aid of Fehértemplom and would not fight against the Serbian border guards. Therefore, the Serbs led by Stevan Knićanin were beaten back only by the 9th (Red Hatted) Honvéd Battalion and the city's militia.
Bechtold was replaced by the Minister of War, General Lázár Mészáros, who was hoping to deliver a decisive defeat to the Serbs, thus making the presence of larger Hungarian forces in Délvidék unnecessary, so he could send the larger part of this army to the Dráva, where the start of the invasion of Josip Jelačić's Croatian army was only a matter of days.Bánlaky József: A szerbek mozgalma. A magyar nemzet hadtörténete XXI Arcanum Adatbázis Kft. 2001
The Minister of War wasn't confident at all of his own abilities as a military commander, but at least he could be trusted to continue the operations with full force. Mészáros - under pressure from public opinion, outraged by the previous failed sieges - set the goal of finally capturing the Szenttamás fortified encampment.
Prelude The plan for the third siege of Szenttamás was prepared by Major József Klauzál, whom Mészáros appointed as his chief of staff. This plan, the work of several weeks, covered 46 full sheets of paper and was accompanied by numerous drawings. Egy ilyen terjedelmes haditerv azonban ennek sikeres gyakorlati kivitelére nem volt alkalmas. József Klauzál "managed" to draw up a battle plan which, as in the first two sieges, made it impossible to concentrate the forces.. Following the government's urging, Mészáros set the siege of Szenttamás for 19 September; but postponed it until the 21st because of rain.Olchváry Ödön: A magyar függetlenségi harc 1848–1849-ben a Délvidéken Budapest, 1902, pp. 76
Opposing forces Mészáros estimates the number of troops at his disposal: 8 line regimental battalions of 6,000 men, 8 Honvéd battalions of 8,000 men, 2,000 cavalry, 8 batteries with 48 guns, and 2 mortars. A total of about 14,000 men on foot and 2,000 on horseback. Of this force, 1 infantry battalion, 1 hussar squadron, and 1 battery were at Futak to maintain communications with Pétervárad. After deducting the sick men and the garrisons, Mészáros for the siege of Szenttamás deployed 9,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, 7 1/2 batteries, and 2 mortars. Of the National Guard, which was almost twice as numerous as the regular troops, only the detachments stationed at Óbecse took part in the siege, but even these were sent under the command of Colonel Fach to Turia, but not for offensive actions, but only in support of the main attack.
The Serb forces and commanders remained generally the same after the siege of 19 August. At Szenttamás and Turia were 5,784 men and 24 guns. Petar Biga was in command at Szenttamás and Petar Jovanović at Turia. At the same time in Csurog, in the area of the Šajkaši battalion, under the command of Captain Mihajlo Jovanović, the 3rd and 4th battalions of the Pétervárad Border Guard Regiment and 6 guns were on standby to assist, if needed, Szenttamás and Turia and to cover the Roman Ramparts.
The enclosed trench of Szőreg behind the Almáska marsh was defended by Melentije Budimirović with a squadron of infantry and a 3-pounder gun.
Deployment of the Hungarian troops for the battle The attack was carried out by the Hungarians in three columns..
Right column. Commander General Frigyes Éder, leading 5 infantry Battalions. Most of the cavalry of the army was in this column under Colonel Kolowrath. The cavalry operated in the direction of the Roman ramparts to prevent the enemy from breaking out, while the battalion led by Éder, under whose covering the smaller part of the artillery, with two 30-pound mortars had to bombard the city and the Pétervárad bridgehead.
On the left bank of the canal, the columns of Bakonyi and Aulich pushed forward against the camp, which was heavily entrenched also at the rear.
Central column. Commander General Baron Sándor Bakonyi. Under his command were 2 line regiment battalions, 2 Honvéd battalions, most of the army's artilleryOlchváry Ödön: A magyar függetlenségi harc 1848–1849-ben a Délvidéken Budapest, 1902, pp. 76-77 were sent to attack against the Verbász ramparts on the left bank of the Ferenc Canal.
Left column. Commander Lieutenant Colonel Lajos Aulich - (under General Bakonyi) commanded 2 infantry battalions, and one cavalry squadron.Olchváry Ödön: A magyar függetlenségi harc 1848–1849-ben a Délvidéken Budapest, 1902, pp. 77 It was sent against the Verbász entrenchments on the right bank of the Krivaja.
All the columns departed from Óverbász. At a greater distance from Szenttamás, a mobile bridge was built across the Ferenc Canal to enable the right column to cross it and maintain communication.
Fack, a retired colonel was sent from Óbecse with low-quality, mostly national guards, to operate against the ramparts of Szenttamás which were in the direction of Óbecse. Further troops were sent to Ókér to attack from there the Szőreg rampart, and other units were detached to Kiskér to maintain the connection with the army.
The plan was primarily to attack, from the right bank, under the fire support of the mortars, the bridge over the Ferenc Canal; at the same time the battle would also begin on the left flank, and Fack's brigade had to advance and all troops had to continue their operations according to the opportunities occurred during th
According to Klauzál's plan, the Serbian fortified camp had to be attacked simultaneously and surprisingly by all Hungarian columns from several directions, and in order to have the greatest chance of success, the three columns had to assemble around midnight on 21 September and to attack before the dawn. Mészáros, on arriving at the assembly point, found the troops in disorder and not fully prepared. It took him some time and great difficulty, to get them into order, then finally the troops departed. But during the march, they lost their way. Because of all these problems, it was only after dawn by the time the troops reached Szenttamás. At sunrise, however, a thick fog descended, which obstructed the troops' view and orientation. The army advanced from Óverbász on the north bank of the Ferenc Canal, and the right column crossed it to the right bank of the canal (probably, on the mobile bridge sat up earlier) at a suitable distance from Szenttamás.
After the right column had crossed the canal, Mészáros ordered Colonel Kollowrath to conduct reconnoiter with all the cavalry in the direction of the Szőreg entrenchment and the Roman ramparts, to prevent the enemy's approach, or if it came near, to repel it.Olchváry Ödön: A magyar függetlenségi harc 1848–1849-ben a Délvidéken Budapest, 1902, pp. 78
Siege The cannonade began at about 5 1/2 o'clock in the morning, and continued, more or less vigorously, until 2 1/2 o'clock in the afternoon.
Then a battalion was designated as an assault column, with orders to besiege the Pétervárad bridgehead; while the Székely border guard battalion was ordered by Mészáros to advance as far as the bank of the canal, there to draw the enemy's attention by firing, and at the same time to serve as a reserve for the assaulting battalion. This reserve battalion reached the canal probably somewhere around the floodgate, abreast with the Verbász entrenchments. However, as we shall see below, its deployment heavily backfired, causing the failure of the attack against the Verbász entrenchments.
According to György Klapka, only a quarter or a fifth of the army was engaged in the actual attack, while the rest of the troops were deployed in a long line along the entrenchments and were left in inactivity.
As soon as the firefight was underway on the right bank, it started on the left bank as well, but prematurely, against the commander's intention. On the left bank of the canal, the center column under Bakonyi and the left column under Aulich were advancing.
The first to engage the enemy was Bakonyi's column, which soon drove back the enemy's vanguards from the vineyards; Bakonyi then began to besiege the ramparts, but suddenly his flank came under fire.
Unfortunately, the Székely battalion sent by Mészáros, in the thick fog mistook Bakonyi's troops for the enemy, and shot at them from the right bank of the Ferenc Canal, as a result of which Bakonyi ordered a retreat. Then Bakonyi repeated the attack against the entrenchments, but the Székely battalion shot in his troops again. As, because this friendly fire, the troops had lost several officers and soldiers, and believing that there was enemy on their right flank, Bakonyi retreat with his troops 800 paces, and began to shoot the entrenchments with his 12-pound battery.Olchváry Ödön: A magyar függetlenségi harc 1848–1849-ben a Délvidéken Budapest, 1902, pp. 78-79