The urban combat of the São Paulo Revolt of 1924 was the most violent of its kind in Brazilian history, raging in the city of São Paulo from 5 to 27 July 1924. Rebel tenentist revolutionaries, led by general Isidoro Dias Lopes, intended to take over the city in a few hours, but were trapped in combat in the central region against forces loyal to the government of president Artur Bernardes. On 8 July, the loyalists withdrew to the city's outskirts, organizing themselves in general Eduardo Sócrates' "Division of Operations in the State of São Paulo", restarting the fight in the working-class neighborhoods to the south and east of the city. There was not a complete siege; the rebels had roads open to their territory inland, along which they withdrew from the city on the night of 27 July and continued their rebellion.
In the first hours of the revolt, the rebels took over units of the Brazilian Army and the main barracks complex of the Public Force of São Paulo in the Luz neighborhood. The rebels did not get the expected reinforcements from the 4th Infantry Regiment, they did not manage to cut the telegraph communications in time, they were repelled in the attack on the Campos Elíseos Palace, seat of the state government, and canceled their plans to invade Rio de Janeiro due to the 4th Battalion of the Public Force changing sides, in Luz. Both sides had about a thousand combatants at the start, and the first few days of fighting were indecisive. Makeshift trenches crowded the city's center. On 8 July, artillery pressure against São Paulo governor Carlos de Campos led him to abandon the center, and loyalist troops did the same. This decision was controversial, as it handed the city over to the rebels who, prior to that point, were thinking of giving up.
With their command post in Guaiaúna, in Penha, the loyalists, divided into five brigades, began an offensive in a semicircle from Ipiranga to Vila Maria, concentrated on the tracks of the São Paulo and Central do Brasil Railways. Continuous reinforcements from the Brazilian Army, Navy and other states' Public Forces gave them a great numerical advantage (about 15 thousand soldiers against more than 3 thousand rebels) and in artillery, with which an intense bombardment was launched from 11 July, hitting mainly civilian targets. The government controlled the hills around the city, while the rebels had observation positions atop factories and other buildings. Street barricades were rudimentary, but a motorized reserve in Luz responded to loyalist attacks.
The efficiency of the government's offensive was criticized on several points by loyalist general Abílio de Noronha. The most aggressive brigade, belonging to general Tertuliano Potiguara, in Mooca, exposed its flanks on 14 July and was forced to retreat, exposing the right flank of the Carlos Arlindo brigade, which lost its gains in Liberdade and Cambuci. But government pressure continued, even using tanks and military aviation. The rebels improvised these weapons as best as they could, building an armored train and recruiting battalions of immigrants. From 23 to 27 July the loyalists conquered important strongholds such as Largo do Cambuci, Fábrica Antárctica, Cotonifício (Cotton Factory) Crespi and Hipódromo da Mooca. The government's pressure was insufficient to lock the rebels, who retreated by train at night with their army largely intact. Only on the morning of 28 July did the government realize that the rebels had left the city.
Participating units
Both sides of the conflict had a mixed composition of federal and state regular forces. The rebels incorporated units from the Brazilian Army and the Public Force of São Paulo. Against them, loyalists from these two corporations and more from the Brazilian Navy and state forces from Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Espírito Santo and Rio Grande do Sul fought against them.
The infantry of the Army and the Public Forces were equivalent in doctrine, armament and material. The soldiers of the Public Force of São Paulo, as professional volunteers, were even better trained than the Army's conscripts. Under the influence of the French Military Mission, the Army's tactics had recently incorporated the lessons of World War I, dividing the troops into small machine-gun-centered combat groups, dispersing to avoid enemy automatic weapons fire, and advancing by fire and movement. The Public Force of São Paulo also had its own French instructional mission. Soldiers can be distinguished in photographs by their uniforms; the Army used the color khaki, and the Public Force, dark blue or white.
First phase (5-8 July)
Plan of action
The revolt was planned by tenentist officers with the final goal of removing the president of Brazil, Artur Bernardes, from Rio de Janeiro. São Paulo, the starting point of the uprising, would witness a few hours of conflict; the city would be captured in a fulminating attack, based on audacity and surprise, and from there, they would be joined by conspirators and sympathizers in other garrisons and quickly massed forces against the Federal District. But everything depended on the immediate capture of São Paulo.
The conspirators chose retired general Isidoro Dias Lopes as their leader, but plans were already in place when he assumed that position. To maintain secrecy and speed, the beginning of the uprising would take place in a few barracks: the 4th Battalion of Caçadores (BC), in Santana, the Cavalry Regiment of the Public Force, in Luz, and, in Quitaúna, the 4th Infantry Regiment (RI), the 2nd Independent Group of Heavy Artillery (GIAP) and the Train Company. In the 4th BC, the troops were previously persuaded by captain Newton Estillac Leal and lieutenants Asdrúbal Gwyer de Azevedo and Luiz Castro Afilhado. At dawn, captain Joaquim Távora and lieutenant Eduardo Gomes would pick up soldiers from that barracks and head to the Public Force barracks complex in Luz, where they would have the crucial support of the Cavalry Regiment inspector, major Miguel Costa. In addition to this regiment, the neighborhood hosted the 1st, 2nd and 4th Infantry Battalions or Public Force Battalions (BFP), the School-Corps and the Public Prison.
In advance, lieutenants Filinto Müller and Custódio de Oliveira would take a battery of cannons from the 2nd GIAP to Campo de Marte, to provide fire support. Custódio de Oliveira would return to the barracks in Quitaúna, where he would help a group of revolutionaries, led by captain Juarez Távora, to rebel the 4th Infantry Regiment. This regiment, transported in rented cars in a garage in São Caetano, would carry out the second phase of the plan, storming the barracks of the 3rd and 5th Infantry Battalions, the Fire Brigade, the Secretariat of Justice, the State Palace, the Civil Guard Headquarters and the Campos Elíseos Palace, seat of the state government. Lieutenant Villa Nova, commander of the palace guard corps, had pledged his support to the uprising.
Telephone, telegraph, and rail connections would be cut, delaying the government's response. From the National Telegraph, the news of the revolution would be broadcast to the garrisons in the other states. All strategic points in the city would quickly be under control. With that done, open combat in the center of the city would not be necessary. The plan required a lot: rapid progress and buy-in from other units. The government's victory condition was much simpler, just keeping the loyalist forces together and stalling the rebels in prolonged urban combat.
Capture of the barracks at Luz
For security reasons, only the leaders knew the date of the uprising. Isidoro Dias Lopes was expected in São Paulo on the morning of 4 July, but he arrived 20 hours late, disrupting the plan's execution. On 4 July, lieutenants Filinto Müller and Custódio de Oliveira took a cannon battery from the 2nd GIAP to Ponte Pequena, on the pretext of exercises. On the way, a cannon wheel passed over Oliveira's foot, he was delayed, and in a few hours he was arrested. At 03:00 on the morning of 5 July, a convoy of taxis with revolutionaries led by Juarez Távora approached the barracks in Quitaúna. In the absence of their internal liaison (Custódio), and armed only with pistols, they thought that an attack on the barracks would be suicide and returned to São Paulo. On the way, they realized another mistake: they forgot to order the cut of telegraphic communications.
The first phase started according to plan. In Santana, the 4th BC was revolted at 03:00. The commander was absent and the troops were led to Luz. There were only 80 soldiers; the bulk of the unit, about 400 men, were absent as it was Saturday. At 04:15, this contingent surrounded the barracks of the Public Force. Índio do Brasil, captain of the Public Force, asked a sentry sergeant in one of the barracks to inspect the ammunition. 30 soldiers and two army lieutenants entered the unguarded door, arrested the officers who were sleeping in the barracks and led the troops to the Cavalry Regiment. In this unit, Miguel Costa, with a revolver in hand, arrested his commander, put the soldiers in formation and ordered the soldier's call bell to sound, signaling the success of the revolt. The commander of the Public Force, colonel Quirino Ferreira, was awakened in his home by Juarez Távora and taken to jail in his pajamas. The entire complex fell without resistance. Isidoro Dias Lopes installed the revolutionary command in the general headquarters of the Public Force, and Miguel Costa assumed command of the corporation.
A detachment of 15 soldiers from the Cavalry Regiment, led by lieutenant José de Oliveira França, occupied the Sorocabana Station; lieutenant João Cabanas, with another 15 men, interrupted traffic at the Luz Station, positioned machine guns in the tower and controlled the telegraph; lieutenant Arlindo de Oliveira, with 30 soldiers, entrenched the North and Brás Stations. With these stations, access to Rio de Janeiro and Santos was under control.
Unforeseen events in the plan's execution General Abilio de Noronha, informed of the revolt in the 4th BC at 04:30, alerted the state government and the Ministry of War and in half an hour visited this barracks, where the commander had just arrived. Revolutionary officers had already moved to the city center, and the barracks were again under government control. The commander of the 2nd RM proceeded to the barracks of the 4th Battalion of the Public Force at 5:30 and, without firing a shot, asserted his authority, arrested the sentries of the 4th BC who were on guard and released the loyalist officers. When trying to do the same in the School Corps, he was arrested by general Isidoro, but he and other loyalist officers created the first unforeseen events in the revolt; the rebels were not the only ones to pull off actions of audacity and presence of mind.
Jaurez Távora ordered lieutenant Villa Nova to present the guards of the Campos Elíseos Palace to Miguel Costa, in the Luz square. But the rebels did not know that Villa Nova was a government informant. Instead of organizing the guard, he notified his superiors. Major Marcílio Franco, head of the Casa Militar, organized a defense with 27 men from the Civil Guard and the Fire Department. Then, Távora went to the barracks of the 4th BFP. At 6:30 am, he and his companions still did not realize that the barracks, silent, had changed sides. Over the course of an hour, dozens of soldiers and officers who entered this barracks were arrested, including captains Joaquim and Juarez Távora and lieutenant Castro Afilhado. It was a great loss; Joaquim Távora was the rebels' main strategist.