When the central government of Somalia collapsed in 1991, the once firmly regulated Somali charcoal trade reopened. In the 1990s, the Somali Civil War, destructive El Niño floods, and reduced access to the European market caused the former prosperous banana industry to collapse, leading to an increase in reliance on the charcoal trade.
Charcoal soon became a lucrative cornerstone of the political economy in Somalia and ultimately turned into one of the most important revenues for criminal networks such as Al-Shabaab. Despite international efforts to curb the trade during the 2010s, it periodically flourished and continues to be a politically destabilising factor in the Horn of Africa region.
For centuries, the trading route has been established through trade with Arabs along the East African coast. It begins with cutting down and burning Acacia trees in Somalia, then transporting the charred remains by land to ports in southern Somalia (notably the ports of Kismayo and Barawe) before it is moved north by sea for over 4000 kilometers to hubs in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Despite a UN Security Council ban on all export of Somali charcoal in 2012,United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Res 2036 (22 February 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2036 the charcoal trade is often disguised as originating from other countries, and corruption of maritime transport and customs officials is common. Once in the Gulf states, middlemen sell the charcoal in smaller quantities to retailers and restaurants for use in shisha water pipes and grilling meat, respectively.
Impacts of Somali charcoal trafficking Charcoal trading in the Horn of Africa has resulted in substantial revenues for criminal organisations. During the early 2010s, Al-Shabaab generated US$8–18 million annually by taxing charcoal traffic at a single roadblock. By 2013, the total worth of exports peaked at US$360–384 million per year. Eventually, the trade declined, and by 2018 the wholesale value stood at US$120 to US$150 million per year,Illegal charcoal smuggling earns terrorists millions warns maritime security conference. Royal Navy. 14 January 2019. Retrieved 2023-05-05. with annual revenues to terrorist organisations amounting to US$7.5 to US$10 million. After low to no trade activity in 2019–2021, illicit Somali charcoal trading resurfaced in 2022.
Charcoal trade has a detrimental impact on the environment in Somalia. Notably, charcoal production generates substantial deforestation in the regions of Jubaland, Bay, and Lower Shabelle. The United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that during the years 2011 to 2017 approximately 8 million acacia trees were felled to produce 16 million bags of charcoal. This means that on average, one tree was cut down every 30 seconds during this seven-year period. If such a rate of deforestation continues, it would result in the complete depletion of trees in Somalia by the year 2060. Deforestation in turn leaves the country vulnerable to droughts, famines, and floodings and increases the risks for conflicts over resources and severe humanitarian crises.
Drivers of Somali charcoal trafficking Drivers behind the charcoal trafficking are multifaceted. Somali charcoal traders have expressed that the trade is the only sensible livelihood, as employment is difficult to find and lack of rivers and reliable sources of water renders farming tough. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) representatives have stressed the need to address poverty and invest in opportunity for business to create conditions for other, sustainable forms of livelihood. Weak state institutions and maritime capabilities to monitor, deter and intercept the trade also drives charcoal trafficking.United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Res 2662 (17 November 2022) UN Doc S/RES/2662, paragraph 36, pp.8
A key driver of the illicit charcoal trade is the substantial demand for Somali charcoal in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, to whom the bags of charcoal are often marked as legitimate. The business has been lucrative. In 2012, a bag of charcoal that was priced at around 3–4 US$ in Somalia was sold for approximately 10 US$ in the Gulf States. The charcoal trading pattern has exacerbated Somalia's regressive imbalances. It has resulted in Somalia's political elite becoming more reliant on personal patronage and embroiled in competing rivalries, which destabilises both Somalia and the wider Red Sea region.
United Nations embargo on charcoal exports from Somalia On 22 February 2012 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed resolution 2036 which imposed an embargo on the export of charcoal from Somalia. The resolution prohibits the import of Somali charcoal by member states and calls on neighbouring countries to enforce the embargo. The resolution aimed to cut off funding for Al-Shabaab which had been earning millions of dollars from the charcoal trade to the Gulf states. In 2014, the UNSC followed up with resolution 2182, in which Member States were authorised to inspect ships suspected of carrying charcoal from Somalia in violation of the ban, and to seize and dispose of the illicit cargo by diverting the vessels to a port. Resolution 2182 also emphasized the important role played by regional organizations, such as the African Union, for successful implementation of the embargo.United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Res 2182 (24 October 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2182 The charcoal ban is still in place and was last reaffirmed in resolution 2662 in November 2022, which also stresses the need to reduce stockpiles in and around Kismayo.United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Res 2662 (17 November 2022) UN Doc S/RES/2662, paragraphs 34 and 36, pp.8
Key actors The illicit charcoal trade in Somalia is facilitated by a complex network of actors, including traders, transporters, brokers, and wholesalers, as well as those involved in producing fraudulent documents to circumvent the UN embargo on charcoal exports. Various states and international organizations have implemented anti-trafficking measures to combat the trade. This section provides an overview of the key actors involved in either perpetuating or combating the issue of Somali charcoal trafficking.
Al-Shabaab In the early 2010s, Al-Shabaab derived its revenues from various sources related to charcoal, including production, transportation taxes, checkpoint fees, port charges, and export taxes.The taxation system imposed by Al-Shabaab has been claimed to be very sophisticated, resembling that of a small nation state.In 2012–2013, the UN monitors identified 39 charcoal traders in Kismayo. Of these, two were linked to Al-Shabaab and managed 32% of the charcoal leaving the city. Periodically, however, Al-Shabaab has also banned charcoal trade in the areas they controlled and disrupted trade to prevent revenue streams to political opponents, mainly Somali authorities. This also seems to be the current strategy.Jay Bahadur (2022). "Terror and Taxes: Inside al-Shabaab’s revenue-collection machine", Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, p. 12. Retrieved: 5 May 2023.
Kenya Defence Forces and African Union Mission In Somalia (AMISOM) According to reports of UN monitors, the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have undermined implementation of the charcoal ban. After taking control of important trade routes and key ports (most notably the Kismayo port) from Al-Shabaab through operation "Linda Nchi" in 2012, KDF and AMISOM were directly involved in the charcoal trafficking business, in stark violation of the embargo and explicit instructions of Hassan Sheikh, president of Somalia. In 2011–2012, Kenya argued for lifting the ban to clear the stockpiles around Kismayo but their proposal was rejected by the UN. In 2016, there were reports that Kenyan forces permitted the export of charcoal from Kismayo in exchange for a fee of US$2 per bag. Moreover, KDF and AMISOM have on multiple occasions been reported to deny the federal government and the UN monitors access to stockpiles sites and key ports of export to conduct investigations. KDF and AMISOM have also ignored attempts by UN monitors’ to establish contact with them regarding embargo compliance.
Somali authorities The charcoal trade in southern Somalia relies on partnerships between local business communities, mainly in Kismayo, and corrupt regional authorities. The Jubaland State has profited significantly from the illicit charcoal exports by collecting tolls and fees at checkpoints and ports. In 2016, fees of approximately US$3 per bag were levied, resulting in a monthly income of between US$1.1 million and US$1.5 million for the Jubaland administration. The Jubaland administration has also detained laborers at the Kismayo port, including suspected informants. Up until 2018, the Jubba Administration was frequently criticized by UN monitors for poor implementation of the charcoal.
In 2016, UN monitors complained that the Federal Government of Somalia did not take enough action to address existing stockpiles of charcoal, which posed dangers to peace and security in the area. The monitors warned that armed groups may compete for the commercial value of the stockpiled charcoal, and that it could be exported in contravention of the sanctions.
Although the stockpiles are yet to be cleared, the federal government acknowledges the environmental and security threat posed by the trade and has called for increased international cooperation enforce the charcoal ban. Additionally, they have shared information of specific vessels carrying illegal charcoal shipments.
Importing countries
The main importers of Somali charcoal are the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Shisha enthusiasts in the Gulf states highly value Somali charcoal because of its distinct acacia fragrance. UN monitors have repeatedly criticised the GCC states for their inaction in enforcing the charcoal embargo imposed by resolution 2036, and for their lack of collaboration with international actors such as UN officials. In 2013, it was revealed that the six largest charcoal businessmen were identified to be based in Dubai, with some of them having direct ties to Al-Shabaab affiliations.
Eventually key importing countries began to improve their embargo enforcement capabilities. For example, in 2017, Kuwait and Bahrain exhibited proactive commitment and cooperation with UN monitors, leading to seizures of charcoal shipments. In 2018, Iran and Oman declared a halt to charcoal import from countries typically declared as an origin on falsified documents, such as Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana.
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), a multinational naval partnership under the leadership of the US, has actively supported the implementation of the charcoal ban by sharing information with governments and other key actors, thereby facilitating the confiscation of charcoal. CMF have held several conferences together with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries aimed at combatting the illegal smuggling of Somali charcoal. At a 2018 conference, held in the CMF headquarters in Bahrain, the attendees agreed to enhance collaboration between CMF, relevant nations and various organisations, such as the United Nations Panel of Experts on Somalia, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), GCC, Naval Operations Centres (NOCs), and Maritime Security Centres. The aim of this strengthened partnership is to promote better information sharing and training, thus improving efforts to combat the illegal smuggling of charcoal from Somalia.