The Western Uganda campaign of 1979 was a military operation by Tanzanian forces and allied Ugandan rebels, mainly the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA), against Uganda Army (UA) troops loyal to Ugandan President Idi Amin during the Uganda–Tanzania War. The operation was launched by the Tanzania People's Defence Force's (TPDF) "Task Force", consisting of two brigades, in February 1979 to cover the Tanzanians' western axis of advance into Uganda. After securing the important city of Mbarara against Uganda Army counter-attacks, the TPDF Task Force captured several cities as well as the Kilembe Mines in the Rwenzori Mountains. These operations coincided with an expansion of the separatist Rwenzururu movement, a rebel group that exploited the collapse of the Uganda Army along the Uganda-Zaire border to secure territory and weaponry for itself. From the Rwenzori Mountains, the Task Force advanced to Hoima; there, it combined forces with another Tanzanian force, the 205th Brigade. Together, the TPDF formations advanced to Masindi, capturing it after a battle south of the city. With western Uganda largely under Tanzanian control, the Task Force and 205th Brigade subsequently split up again to capture northwestern and north-central Uganda.
Background
In 1971, Idi Amin became President of Uganda when his predecessor, Milton Obote, was overthrown in a military coup. This event precipitated a deterioration of relations with the neighbouring state of Tanzania. Amin ruled the country under a repressive dictatorship. Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere allowed anti-Amin insurgents to operate from Tanzania. These Ugandan rebels included Obote and his followers as well as several smaller factions, including Yoweri Museveni's Front for National Salvation (FRONASA).
In October 1978, the Uganda Army (UA) launched an invasion of Tanzania under disputed circumstances, resulting in open war. Tanzania halted the assault, mobilised anti-Amin opposition groups, and launched a counter-offensive. The Tanzanians initially only secured a number of strategic locations across the border. When Amin failed to renounce his claims to Kagera and the Organisation of African Unity failed to condemn the Ugandan invasion, Nyerere decided that Tanzanian forces should occupy southern Uganda, specifically the two major towns there: Masaka and Mbarara. Based on assurances by Obote, the Tanzanians hoped that capturing these towns would cause the Uganda Army to disintegrate and result in a mass uprising against Amin's regime, allowing the Tanzanians to exit the war.
The Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF) and allied rebels captured Masaka on 24 February, followed by Mbarara on the next day. At the latter town, the TPDF only encountered token resistance by the Simba Battalion which fled after a minor clash with FRONASA insurgents. The TPDF and anti-Amin rebels destroyed both settlements in revenge for the destruction caused by Ugandan soldiers in Kagera. No mass uprising against Amin materialised. However, locals urged the Tanzanians not to withdraw again, claiming that they would be massacred once Amin's forces retook the area. The Ugandan President substantiated these fears as he made public statements, threatening southern Ugandans for collaborating with the TPDF.
Following the capture of Masaka and Mbarara, the TPDF halted. Nyerere feared international repercussions and condemnation if the TPDF advanced even further, yet ultimately decided to sanction a continuation of the offensive so that "several million people in southern Uganda [would not be left] at the mercy of Amin". However, he wanted the next phase of operations to involve the anti-Amin rebels in a greater capacity; Ugandan opposition representatives were consequently sent to occupied towns as administrators and to urge locals to enlist in the rebel militias. In Mbarara, Yoweri Museveni was able to enlist 2,000 for his FRONASA contingent. In addition, the TPDF reorganized, adapting to the fact that the following operations would take place on two geographically relatively isolated axes. The western thrust was entrusted to a newly formed "Task Force", an army consisting of the 206th Brigade and the Minziro Brigade, supported by allied Ugandan insurgents. This force would operate semi-autonomously from David Musuguri's eastern army.
Opposing forces The TPDF's Task Force was placed under the overall command of Major General Silas Mayunga, while the 206th Brigade was led by Brigadier Roland Makunda and the Minziro Brigade by Brigadier Ahmed Kitete. The 206th Brigade consisted of the 2nd Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Maganga, 14th Battalion under Mfinanga, 20th Battalion under Lt. Col. N. D. Nshimani (also spelled Shimanya), 25th Battalion under Lt. Col. Kamanda, 79th Battalion under Mtumwa, 80th Battalion under Major Mosha, Task Force Battalion under Major Kessy, and Special Force Battalion of Lt. Col. Hadji. The Ugandan rebels assigned to the Task Force consisted of FRONASA militants under Museveni, though he spent more time dealing with political and administrative issues than military ones and was largely absent from the frontlines in April and May. FRONASA had entered Tanzania with about 146 fighters and recruited more during the march from the border to Mbarara. In the reorganization period at Mbarara, FRONASA split its troops into colums of 538 which were mainly supposed to operate as guerrillas and auxiliaries for the TPDF. Journalists Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey argued that the FRONASA forces generally "proved to be next to worthless" for combat and guerrilla missions, a charge denied by Museveni who claimed that his followers were eager and comparatively effective in their auxiliary role. In addition to the FRONASA troops accompanying the Task Force, Kikosi Maalum militants loyal to Obote also operated on the western axis.
The Uganda Army troops defending western Uganda included the Simba Battalion, Western Brigade, Tiger Regiment, 2nd Paratrooper Battalion (also known as "Mountains of the Moon Battalion"), Artillery & Signals Regiment, and later also the Suicide Battalion. Avirgan and Honey singled out that the Simba Battalion, "though beaten [in previous battles], seemed never to give up". Museveni later stated that the two UA commanders who gave the Task Force a "lot of trouble" were Bernard Rwehururu and Yorokamu Tizihwayo. Rwehururu commanded the Suicide Battalion, and Tizihwayo headed the Western Brigade. According to Museveni, TPDF Task Force soldiers believed that the Uganda Army troops opposing them were supported by Libyans and Palestinians. Though Libyan soldiers and Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) militants were actively involved in the war on the side of the Ugandan government, it is unclear whether they were ever present in the western theatre. Museveni considered the claims about their presence in the region doubtful.
Besides the Tanzanians, their rebel allies, and the Uganda Army, there was another force which operated in western Uganda by 1979. In the Rwenzori Mountains, a separatist rebel group called the Rwenzururu movement was waging a long-time insurgency. Though poorly armed, the Rwenzururu movement maintained control of many rural areas in the mountains during Amin's rule, had set up a sort of parallel state, and raised its own taxes. It mainly consisted of Konjo and Amba militants led by Charles Mumbere, who hoped to establish an independent or at least autonomous kingdom in the Rwenzori Mountains.
Campaign Clashes in the Mbarara area
Following its retreat from Mbarara, the Simba Battalion entrenched itself north of the town. It was reinforced by the 2nd Paratrooper Battalion, and began to shell the Tanzanian positions. In March, the Uganda Army launched three counter-attacks in the Mbarara area. The first targeted the 79th and 25th Battalions which had taken up positions at Ruharo; the Tanzanian battalions repelled the assault and killed several Ugandan soldiers before FRONASA troops arrived to assist in sweeping Ruharo's surroundings for stragglers. A few days later, Museveni ordered one of the FRONASA colums under Pipino to destroy the Akayanja bridge to sow unrest among a group of UA soldiers who camped at Rubiindi. Whether this mission was a success is disputed; Museveni claimed that Pipino's group dispatched a few guerrillas who successfully blew up the bridge, whereupon the Amin loyalists –fearing an attack from the rear– dispersed and fled. In contrast, Avirgan and Honey claimed that the FRONASA guerrillas failed to destroy the bridge, having been scared off by the presence of Uganda Army soldiers. At some point, the second UA counter-attack was launched from Rubindi through Rubaya, but easily defeated by the 2nd Battalion.
As Mayunga's force was reorganizing in Mbarara, the Uganda Army's defenses in the west were disrupted due to internal chaos. On 10-11 March, Uganda and its allies were defeated by the Tanzanians in the Battle of Lukaya on the eastern axis. The Uganda Army subsequently began to collapse. Many UA soldiers stationed in the Lukaya area deserted and fled westward, looting on the way. Western cities such as Masindi were plundered by the fleeing troops. Abdu Kisuule, the commander of the Artillery & Signals Regiment, returned to Masindi after the Battle of Lukaya, and attempted to restore some order.
On 25 March 1979, Uganda Army troops under Tizihwayo launched another attack at Rugaando in the Mbarara area. The UA contingent, including Tiger Regiment troops, had come all the way from Fort Portal, and began its assault without sufficient reconnaissance. As the Ugandans probed the Tanzanian positions at Rugaando, manned by 80th Battalion, they were thus unaware that the Task Force Battalion had been stationed on the 80th Battalion's flank. Eventually, a TPDF tank of the 80th Battalion reversed in order to resupply its ammunition; the nearby Tanzanian infantrymen believed that the tank was in full retreat and began to withdraw from the battlefield. Just as the Ugandans were making progress against 80th Battalion, however, the Task Force Battalion under Kessy counter-attacked and routed Tizihwayo's troops. Even though FRONASA troops only arrived at the scene after the battle's end, they were celebrated by the local civilians as the ones who had defeated the Amin loyalists.
After the fighting for Mbarara's surroundings had ceased, the Uganda Army attempted to attack the Tanzanians' rear positions by retaking the Kikagati area; however, Mayunga became aware of this flanking attempt and sent the 79th Battalion to intercept the Amin loyalists at the Ntungamo-Kafuunjo axis. At some point after the clash at Rugaando, a Tanzanian propaganda programme claimed that Tizihwayo was in contact with FRONASA rebels and planning on defecting. He was subsequently arrested and executed by Uganda's intelligence agency, the State Research Bureau (SRB).
Tanzanian advance into the Rwenzori Mountains