The Battle of Ihász took place during the Summer Campaign of the Hungarian War of Independence. It was fought on 27 June 1849 around and in Ihász, a formerly existing village, today part of Marcaltő. In this battle, the Hungarian division led by General György Kmety fought against the Austrian Gerstner brigade led by Lieutenant General Adolf Schütte Edler von Warensberg. During the preparations for the Battle of Győr, the Gerstner brigade wanted to cut the Hungarians from the south, by attacking Marcaltő, but the Kmety division attacked them and halted their advance for 2 hours with its artillery, but the attack of the Austrian cavalry forced the Hungarians to retreat towards Pápa. A result of this battle was that the Kmety division was forced to retreat in Southern Hungary, so it could not support the Hungarian main (Army of the Upper Danube) army led by General Artúr Görgei in the very important battles for Győr and Komárom.
Background With the start of the Summer Campaign, in which the army of the Russian empire entered to help the Habsburg empire, the situation of Hungarian independence, won with heavy battles and tremendous bloodshed, started to look more and more hopeless. Nevertheless, the start of this campaign was won by the Hungarians when Colonel György Kmety defeated the Austrian brigade led by Major General Franz Wyss in the Battle of Csorna on 13 June 1849, in which the imperial commander died. But in the region of Western Hungary, along the shores of the Danube the Austrian main army led by Field Marshal Julius Jacob von Haynau, reinforced by a Russian division, with 82,570 soldiers,Bánlaky József: Az osztrák fősereg és a déli hadsereg műveletei, valamint az erdélyi események junius hó elejéig. Az összes osztrák seregtestek állása és beosztása a főparancsnokságnak Haynau által történt átvétele idején. A magyar nemzet hadtörténete XXI. Arcanum Adatbázis Kft. 2001 was ready to start their decisive advance towards the hearth of Hungary.
The division of Kmety had the duty to secure the left flank of the VII. corps led by General Ernő Poeltenberg. As seen above, Kmety started his duty well, when he defeated the Austrian troops from Csorna. Kmety's attack could have had very positive results for the planned general Hungarian attack, making Haynau send troops to the right banks of the Danube, thus easing the job of the Hungarian main armies, who wanted to attack in the region of the Vág river, which was on the left bank. Haynau indeed started to group his troops on the right bank, but not for defensive reasons, but because he wanted to attack.. So, Kmety's action resulted in a great Hungarian tactical success but did not have more important results. Haynau penalized the imperial officers from Wyss's half brigade, whom he found to be guilty of the defeat, continuing at the same time to prepare for his attack.
After the Battle of Csorna Kmety retreated to Tét. On 16 June he sent 6 companies of the 10. (Wilhelm) Hussar regiment, with a half cavalry battery to Pápa, and the 45. and the 2. Honvéd battalions to Marcaltő, keeping the 10., 23., and 33. Honvéd battalions, 2 jäger companies at, 2 companies of the 12. (Nádor) Hussar regiment, the other half of the cavalry battery, and an infantry battery at Tét. He detached infantry companies for each crossing of the Rába river (Marcaltő, Malomsok, Mórichida, Kisbabot, and Rábaszentmihály), sending patrols along the rivers line until Kiscell.
Starting with June the conflicts among the Hungarian commanders started to appear, which raised doubts about the possibility of organizing a successful defense against the upcoming Austrian. An example of this was the argument between General György Klapka (the deputy minister of war) and Colonel József Bayer (the chief of staff of the Army of the Upper Danube, leader of the Central Operational Bureau, which had to coordinate the Hungarian troops in Western Hungary) about who has more right to command over the Hungarian units? When, on 14 June, Klapka ordered Kmety to send most of his cavalry to Pápa, one of his brigades to Marcaltő, and with the other one to remain at Tét, Bayer protested at Görgei, saying that Klapka puts in danger the Hungarian army, the high commander agreed with Bayer, ordering to Kmety, who already fulfilled Klapka's order, to remain with all his forces along the Rába, keeping an eye, especially on the valley of the Gyöngyös river; dismantle all the bridges across the river, but to keep the material at hands, to be able to rebuild them in a couple of hours, if needed; keep his headquarters at Tét, while sending detachments at Pápa, Marcaltő, and Mórichida. And allowed him to conduct attacks against enemy units, smaller or equal to his troops, without asking permission from his superiors. Ménfő (today is a part of Győr) because here he will prevent the k.u.k. troops to cut him from the VII. corps. But in the case of an Austrian success in this matter, he will be forced to retreat from Győr, to avoid the encirclement. On 27 June Kmety received an order from the Central Operational Bureau to hold the line of the Rába as long as he can, then to retreat towards Pápa. They wrote Klapka to send him reinforcements.
On 26 June, the imperial troops attacked. According to Haynau's plan, this offensive had to fulfill several goals: to encircle the VII. corps of Poeltenberg, to occupy Győr, and to cut off the link of the VII. corps with the Kmety division.
Prelude The Gerstner brigade, after crossing the Danube with the III. corps, which part it was, on 22-23 June marched to Kövesd, on 24 to Csapod, on 25 to Mihályi, and to 26 at Szany. This brigade represented the edge of the right wing of the III. corps. On 25 and 26 June Lieutenant General Karl Freiherr von Moltke ordered the Gerstner brigade to cross the Rába at Várkesző, then to attack Kmety's division at Marcaltő. The Gerstner brigade had the hardest mission among the k.u.k. units because it had the duty to cover the back of the attacking imperial units against the Kmety division, estimated (wrongly) by the Austrian intelligence to 8000 soldiers. While the Austrian corps had to make a concentric attack against Győr, the Gerstner brigade had to do an eccentric attack. If Kmety could repulse the attack of the Gerstner brigade, it would slow the advance of the III. corps, enabling Poeltenberg to defend Győr with a greater chance of success, and win time for the Hungarians.
On 26 June Kmety reported to the Central Operational Bureau that the Austrians advance in three columns against his positions: one column from Kapuvár, through Csorna to Marcaltő, the second from Nagycenk through Mihályi and Szany in the same direction, while the third towards Pápoc. He felt his troops inferior to the attacking k.u.k. units, so he asked for 2 infantry battalions and a cavalry battery reinforcements from Poeltenberg, to defend the crossings over the Rába from Mórichida, Kisbabot, and Rábaszentmihály, so he can free the units which guarded these crossings, and concentrate them at his headquarter from Marcaltő. Kmety hoped that the reinforcements promised by Poeltenberg would arrive, so he could counterattack. Poeltenberg received Kmety's request for reinforcements on 26 June. He sent, under the lead of Lieutenant Colonel Hümér Kupa, the 51. battalion, 2 battalions of the 2. (Sándor) infantry regiment, and 4 companies of the 16th (Károlyi) Hussar regiment, as well as a cavalry battery to Tét. This detachment arrived on 27 June at 6:30 a.m. in Tét, then moved to Ménfő, following Poeltenberg's order.
On 26 June, Kmety's spread his division on the Szentpéter-Marcaltő-Rábaszentmihály line, with units deployed in 8 villages. In the same evening he was informed that the k.u.k. troops crossed the Rába at Árpás and Mórichida crossed the Rába, and forced to retreat the company of the 33. Honvéd battalion, which was guarding the crossing points, led by Captain Zsigmond Horváth; 23 Honvéd battalion and the 4,000 cartridges sent to them in support by Kmety arrived too late.
In the morning of that day the Gerstner brigade, departing from Mihályi, started their attempts to cross the river at Várkesző, under the supervision of Lieutenant General Schütte, under the fire of the Hungarian units from the right banks of the Rába.
Kmety planned to gather his troops at Marcaltő, then on the next day to cross at Pápoc the Rába, and attack the enemy from behind and from the side. For this, he needed the help of the battalion sent earlier to Mórichida, but when the soldiers arrived on 27 June in the morning, he saw them too tired to undertake this long march. He also explained later that he feared that his retreat routs could be easily cut off.
On the morning of 27 June, Lieutenant-Colonel Emil Üchtritz, hearing about the imperial movements, rushed with his half artillery battery to the banks of the Rába just as the Austrians started to make a pontoon bridge over the river. Kmety then arrived to take command. When the Austrian Kaiserjägers started to shoot back, Kmety ordered a retreat to Marcaltő, then to the Ihász farm. Üchtritz later declared that he did not understand why Kmety retreated without trying to defend the Rába line.
Kmety wrote that Marcaltő was undefendable against superior enemy forces because there he could have been attacked from two sides by the enemy and that around the Ihász farm he could defend himself with more success, but only if he receives the reinforcements which he asked from Poeltenberg.
Schütte did not understand why Kmety retreated from the defendable Rába line, and he thought for a while that the Hungarians try to set a trap. Even after crossing all his troops at 8:30 a.m., he sent 2 companies of cavalry to Várkesző, Egyházaskesző and Szentpéter to guard his rear from an eventual Hungarian attack.
On 28 June at 10–11, the latter decided to attack with 14 cavalry companies, 6 battalions, and 21 cannons, hoping to force them to retreat to Mórichida. General György Klapka's (2nd in charge of the main army after Görgei) chief of general staff, Mayor Péter Szillány, ordered Poeltenberg to position his troops between Ménfő, Kismegyer, and Szabadhegy, and to stop the imperial advance. Poeltenberg hoped that, during his attack at Ménfő, Kmety would prevent the imperial's southern wing to reinforce the troops he planned to attack.
Kmety started the fight with the Austrian Gerstner brigade on 27 June, in the Battle of Ihász.
Opposing forces
The Hungarian Kmety division Commander: Colonel György Kmety Chief of staff: Captain Ignác Albert
1. (Pongrácz) brigade; 10. Honvéd battalion = 439 soldiers; 23. Honvéd battalion = 660 soldiers; 33. Honvéd battalion = 692 soldiers; 2 companies of the 12. (Nádor) Hussar Regiment = 290 soldiers, 247 horses with saddles; 2. (Üchritz) brigade; 45. Honvéd battalion = 656 soldiers, 2 horses with saddles, 14 horses for traction; 124. (2. Beszterce) Honvéd battalion = 610 soldiers, 20 horses for traction; 2 companies of the 1. Jäger division = 289 soldiers; 1 company of the 1. sapper battalion = 101 soldiers; 6 companies of the 10. (Wilhelm) Hussar Regiment = 614 soldiers, 667 horses; Artillery; 9. cavalry battery = 123 soldiers, 9 horses with saddles, 92 horses for traction, 7 cannons; 9. infantry battery = 152 soldiers, 18 horses with saddles, 92 horses for traction, 8 cannons; 1 Congreve rocket battery = 34 soldiers, 3 horses with saddles, 30 horses for traction, 2 rocket launching racks; 2. Auxiliary ammunition magazine = 32 soldiers, 24 horses for traction; Conscripts; Armed conscripts = 500 men.
Total: 5,092 soldiers, 952 horses with saddles, 272 horses for traction, 15 cannons, 2 rocket launching racks;
The Austrian Gerstner brigade Commander: Lieutenant General Adolf Schütte Edler von Warensberg Commander of the brigade: Major General Joseph Gerstner Edler von Gerstenkorn
19. kaiserjäger battalion = 697 soldiers;