The 1995 Fox River Grove bus–train collision was a grade crossing collision that killed seven students riding aboard a school bus in Fox River Grove, Illinois, on the morning of October 25, 1995. The school bus, driven by a substitute driver, who was also the trainer of bus drivers in the district, was stopped at a traffic light with the rearmost portion extending onto a portion of the railroad tracks when it was struck by a Metra Union Pacific Northwest Line train, train 624 en route to Chicago.
The crash involved a signaled rail crossing located very near a highway intersection which was regulated by traffic signals. The devices were connected and operations were supposed to be carefully timed and coordinated. Such locations are known as "interconnected crossings" within the industries. Highway and railroad officials had each received numerous complaints from the public about the insufficient timing of the warnings provided by the signals in the year prior to the crash, and citizens later told of situations with vehicles unable to clear the tracks in a timely manner.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation found that, while the bus driver was not aware that a portion of the bus was on the tracks as she should have been, the timing of signals was so insufficient that, even if she had identified the hazard as the train approached, she would have had to proceed against a red traffic signal into the highway intersection to have moved out of the train's path.
Legislation and re-engineering of interconnected crossings across the state of Illinois combined with greater awareness elsewhere resulted in efforts to help to prevent similar crashes from recurring. Informational decals were also added to Illinois school buses advising drivers of the length of each bus, since the substitute school bus driver was apparently unaware of the exact length of the bus she was driving. Other states have also embraced that and related aspects and incorporated them into their school bus driver training curriculum.Ohio Pupil Transportation Safety Commission (Spring 2007). Safety News & Views . Vol. 2, issue 3. Accessed May 10, 2008.
The Fox River Grove crash stands as the worst crash involving a Metra train in its history, and one of the worst grade crossing crashes in U.S. history. At the crash site, the improved signaling system installed after the crash now protects the passing trains and motor vehicle traffic. Nearby is a small memorial to the seven high school students killed in the crash.
Collision On October 25, 1995 at 7:10 a.m., train 624 collided with the back of a school bus carrying students to Cary-Grove High School. The collision occurred at the intersection of Algonquin Road, U.S. Route 14, and a double-tracked mainline belonging to the Union Pacific Railroad. At the time of the accident, the Metra train was traveling at approximately .
The impact separated the body from the chassis of the bus and catapulted the wreckage into the intersection. Five students were killed during the collision and two later died from their injuries. Another 24 bus passengers were injured, some critically, and four passengers were not injured. Most victims suffered blunt trauma and head injuries. The most seriously injured suffered skull fractures, lacerations and internal injuries. None of the three train crew or approximately 120 train passengers were injured.
Vehicles involved Metra train 624, nicknamed "The Flyer" consisted of Metra Pullman-Standard bilevel "Gallery" cab car no. 8751 (Ex-C&NW no. 252) six Pullman-Standard bilevel "Gallery" passenger railcars and Metra F40PH locomotive number 148, owned by Metra and operated by Union Pacific. The train was in push mode, with the engineer operating the locomotive from the cab car at the front of the train, and the locomotive pushing the train from the rear. Unlike most double-tracked railroads in the United States, Metra routes operated by Union Pacific run on the left. Train 624 departed on-time from Crystal Lake station at 7:00 am bound for North Western Station in downtown Chicago. After the train departed Crystal Lake, it bypassed Cary station as it was an express train, before increasing speed to .
The school bus involved in the accident was a 71-passenger school bus built by American Transportation Company (which was acquired by Navistar International at the time of the accident), and was owned and operated by School Districts 47 and 155 through a Transportation Joint Agreement. At the time of the accident, 35 students were on board. The driver was a substitute driver that was normally the assistant transportation director for the districts. The driver had not driven the route before on a bus, and had not crossed the railroad crossing in a school bus or personal vehicle.
Casualties The following people lost their lives in the disaster:
Jeffrey J. Clark (16) Stephanie L. Fulham (15) Susanna Guzman (18) Michael B. Hoffman (14) Joseph A. Kalte (16) Shawn P. Robinson (14) Tiffany L. Schneider (15)
Of the seven fatalities, five of the victims were buried in separate graves at Windridge Memorial Park and Nature Sanctuary in Cary, Illinois, one victim was interred at Memory Gardens Cemetery and one victim was interred at Shalom Memorial Park; both cemeteries are located in Arlington Heights, Illinois.
Timeline
All times are approximate, given in the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report as the best approximation of when the events occurred as a result of their investigation. All times are given in Central Daylight Time. 6:15 am: Bus scheduled to leave bus garage. 6:30 am: Substitute bus driver arrives to perform pretrip inspection. 6:35 am: School bus leaves garage. 6:55 am: First passengers are picked up on bus route. 7:00 am: Metra express commuter train 624 leaves the Crystal Lake station, bound for downtown Chicago. 32 seconds before impact: The crossing processor detects the presence of the Metra train. The thumbwheel on the device calculates the speed of the train, which is at this point . The train is from the center of the crossing. The device determines that it can safely wait eight seconds to notify the highway system of the train's approach. 24 seconds before impact: Rail system notifies the highway system of the train's approach. The train is from the crossing, and its speed is unchanged. 23 seconds before impact: Preemption cycle for the traffic signal begins; lights on U.S. 14 prepare to change to red, but pedestrian traffic must be given time to clear the intersection. The engineer first sees the school bus crossing the south (outbound) track at "a very slow speed." The train is now from the crossing. 12 seconds before impact: The pedestrian clearing phase ends, and the traffic signals for U.S. 14 turn yellow. The train is from the crossing. Its speed has increased to , just short of the speed limit on that section of track. 7.5 seconds before impact: Signals on U.S. 14 turn from yellow to red. 6.0 seconds before impact: Signals on U.S. 14 end their "all red" interval, and signals for the bus turn green. The train is now from the crossing, traveling 5.0 seconds before impact: The engineer, realizing the bus has not moved from the track, activates the emergency brakes. The train is from the crossing, and its speed has decreased to . 7:10 am: Train impacts school bus. 7:13 am: First 911 calls are reported to the Cary Police Department. The Fox River Grove police chief had witnessed the collision and immediately radioed for assistance. 7:18 am: First responders from Fox River Grove arrive on scene with an ambulance, a fire truck, and four EMTs. 7:27 am: Local hospital activates disaster plan, and sends two doctors to the scene.
Causes
Failure of judgment The initial cause of the crash was the failure of the bus driver to properly judge the distance between the railroad tracks when the vehicle stopped at a traffic signal across the tracks. The failure of judgment meant that around of the back end of the bus protruded over the nearest rail. The body of the Metra train protruded past the rail. All of the injuries were sustained during this initial impact.
The crossing was of inherently dangerous design, in that a long vehicle could be partially trapped on the crossing while held by a red light at the intersection. If the driver had realized the danger, she would still have been forced to pull through a red light to clear the track when the warning bells sounded.
Children began joking that the driver, Patricia Catencamp, was oblivious to the fact that a crossing gate lowered on the bus, then started screaming for her to move forward. She did not understand their message and diverted her attention away from the traffic signal. The NTSB concluded that the traffic signal turned green six seconds before impact, but Catencamp was distracted, trying to attend to what she presumed was a crisis within the bus.
Highway modified
As with most transportation crashes, there were other conditions present that created an environment in which this type of collision could occur. These causes take root in the history of the road, the railroad, and the crossing.
Prior to the early 1990s, the Northwest Highway ran as a two-lane road (one lane in each direction) parallel to the former Chicago & North Western rail line (Union Pacific Railroad after April 1995). The distance between the road and the railroad is relatively constant in the state—roughly , assuming a two-lane road and impediment-free alignment. This distance was more than enough to hold a bus.
When the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) modified the highway, three lanes were added to the road to create a four-lane highway with turn lanes at the intersection. To limit the impact of the road expansion to businesses on the northern side of the highway, IDOT reduced the distance between the road and the railroad from 60 feet to around . They also erected a modernized traffic signal to ensure traffic cleared the crossing in front of an approaching train. These actions increased the chances of a train impacting a school bus, but were not leading causes.
Crossing design The type of crossing where the crash occurred is known as an interconnected crossing because of the need to link the railroad signals to the road signals to ensure safe passage. On this particular route, bus drivers on Algonquin Road had been known to cross the tracks to stop at the line at Northwest Highway, leaving them vulnerable to passing trains if they happened to still be stopped when the gates lowered. In addition, vehicle sensors were only present on the north side of the railroad tracks. Buses, trucks and other large vehicles were forced to pull through the railroad crossing in order to activate the signals at the intersection.
Improper preemption programming According to tests conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board, the warning lights on the railroad crossing activated 20 seconds before the arrival of the Metra train. However, the traffic light clearing the rail intersection only allowed cars to clear 18 seconds after the railway signals activated, giving vehicles only two to six seconds to clear the tracks. Roadway signal timing was under the jurisdiction of IDOT, while railway timing was under the jurisdiction of Union Pacific. No communication took place between both parties with regards to interconnected signal timing.