The 71st Guards Rifle Division was reformed as an elite infantry division of the Red Army in March 1943, based on the 1st formation of the 23rd Rifle Division, and served in that role until after the end of the Great Patriotic War.
As the 23rd it had fought in the Battle of Stalingrad and distinguished itself during Operation Ring in the 21st Army. It remained assigned to that Army when it was redesignated as the 6th Guards Army and remained under its command for most of the rest of the war. It moved north to the Kursk area joining Voronezh Front and played an important role in the defense of the south face of the salient as part of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps during Operation Zitadelle. Following this victory it fought in the Belgorod-Kharkov Offensive in August and continued advancing toward the Dniepr River into the early autumn. With the rest of its Army it was transferred north to the 2nd Baltic Front where it took part in the later stages of the Battle of Nevel as well as the slow, grinding assaults towards Vitebsk during the winter. In the opening stages of Operation Bagration, now as part of 1st Baltic Front, the 71st Guards won a battle honor for the liberation of that city and soon entered the so-called "Baltic Gap" that had opened between Army Groups North and Center; its rifle regiments would all win the honorific "Polotsk" after helping to take that city. The division would remain in the Baltic states for the rest of its existence, advancing through Latvia and Lithuania eventually to the Baltic coast, assisting in the liberation of Riga and Klaipėda and then serving in the Kurland Group of Forces containing and attacking the German units isolated there right up to the final surrender. The division remained in the same area until it was disbanded in mid-1947.
Formation The 23rd was redesignated as the 71st Guards on March 1, a month after the German surrender at Stalingrad, and officially received its Guards banner on April 12. Once the division completed its reorganization its order of battle was as follows: 210th Guards Rifle Regiment (from 89th Rifle Regiment) 213th Guards Rifle Regiment (from 117th Rifle Regiment) 219th Guards Rifle Regiment (from 225th Rifle Regiment) 151st Guards Artillery Regiment (from 211th Artillery Regiment) 76th Guards Antitank Battalion (from 106th Antitank Battalion) 72nd Guards Reconnaissance Company (from 88th Reconnaissance Company) 82nd Guards Sapper Battalion (from 131st Sapper Battalion) 102nd Guards Signal Battalion (from 45th Signal Battalion) (after December 25, 1944 102nd Guards Signal Company) 74th Guards Medical/Sanitation Battalion (from 61st Medical/Sanitation Battalion)Charles C. Sharp, "Red Guards", Soviet Guards Rifle and Airborne Units 1941 to 1945, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, Vol. IV, Nafziger, 1995, p. 73 78th Guards Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Company 75th Guards Motor Transport Company 656th Field Bakery 68th Guards Divisional Veterinary Hospital 60th Field Postal Station 158th Field Office of the State Bank Col. Ivan Prokofievich Sivakov, who had commanded the 23rd since December 11, 1942 remained in command; he would be promoted to the rank of major general on September 15. His chief of staff was Lt. Col. Pavel Ivanovich Lyubomudrov.Valeriy Zamulin, The Battle of Kursk - Controversial and Neglected Aspects, ed. & trans. S. Britton, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2017, p. 203 The division inherited the Order of the Red Banner and the "Kharkov" honorific that the 23rd's predecessor, the 1st Ust-Medveditskaya Rifle Division, had earned during the Civil War,Sharp, "Red Legions", Soviet Rifle Divisions Formed Before June 1941, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, Vol. VIII, Nafziger, 1996, p. 24 as well as the Order of Lenin the 23rd itself had received for its work on the construction of the Kharkov Tractor Works in 1932. In April, after the 71st Guards had recovered part of its strength from the Stalingrad fighting, it was noted that its personnel were roughly 50 percent Russian and 50 percent of various Asian nationalities, nearly all from the year groups 1903–1925.David M. Glantz, Colossus Reborn, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2005, p. 596
Battle of Kursk The 21st Army began moving north by rail to the middle part of the overall front before it was redesignated, along with much of the rest of Col. Gen. K. K. Rokossovsky's former Don Front, now Central Front. The STAVKA directed him, on March 7, to attack with his forces toward Oryol. In turn he sent orders to the Army commander, Lt. Gen. I. M. Chistyakov, to go over to the offensive on the morning of March 10 with his 51st, 52nd, 71st Guards and 375th Rifle Divisions. The attack was to begin on a line from Trosna to Chern, pass through the units of 13th Army, and continue in the direction of Oryol and Kromy, eventually reaching Rzhavets by March 13. In the event, due to the German counteroffensive that recaptured Kharkov, at 0200 hours on March 11 Chistyakov was ordered to move his Army by rail south to the region north of Belgorod where it came under command of Army Gen. N. F. Vatutin's Voronezh Front.Glantz, After Stalingrad, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2011, pp. 338-39, 364-65
During the preparations for the German summer offensive the 71st Guards was assigned to the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps, joining the 67th and 90th Guards Rifle Divisions. 6th Guards Army was responsible for the eastern sector of the south face of the Kursk salient where the attack of the 4th Panzer Army was most likely to be made. The division was assigned to its Army's right (west) flank, adjacent to 40th Army. As of July 1 the Corps had the 67th and 71st Guards deployed in the first echelon and the 90th Guards in second echelon. The boundary between the 67th and 71st was secured with assets of the latter including a battery of its 151st Guards Artillery Regiment, a battery of regimental guns, two batteries of 82mm mortars, 11 antitank guns, 14 antitank rifles, three heavy and nine light machine guns. The 67th Guards disposed of somewhat fewer weapons. These were located southwest and south of the village of Cherkasskoe, behind a minefield and an antitank ditch.Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, ed. & trans. R. W. Harrison, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2016, Kindle ed., Book One, Part One, chs. 1, 2
At 1500 hours the day before the official opening of Zitadelle the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps launched a probing attack against 22nd Guards Corps. This was necessary due to the depth of no-man's-land between the two sides, an area that was dominated by a set of hills that blocked artillery observation from the German forward lines to the first Soviet defensive belt; these hills also contained Soviet outposts. This attack was carried out by infantry backed by engineers, assault guns and tank destroyers and supported by aircraft. Elements of the 332nd Infantry Division struck the 71st Guards which at first did not offer much resistance. Fifty-seven Red Army soldiers were taken prisoner and nine more crossed over to the German lines, but the defense stiffened as the German force reached the railway line west of Gertsovka. This village was a hub of the division's forward defenses and was assaulted by panzergrenadiers of the 3rd Panzer Division. In spite of effective support from Stukas it was only in the late evening that the village was secured at a cost of 24 killed, 102 wounded and four missing, and mopping-up continued until the early morning. The Panzergrenadier Division Großdeutschland to the east struck the boundary between the 71st and 67th Guards on a ridge between Gertsovka and Butovo. This advance initially proceeded well but soon ran into the defenses noted above. The panzergrenadiers began to receive flanking artillery fire and got caught up in the minefield leading to significant casualties, especially among officers. Butovo was held by the 67th Guards which fended off the 11th Panzer Division until the morning of July 5, the start of the main battle.Roman Töppel, Kursk 1943: The Greatest Battle of the Second World War, trans. K. Straub, Helion & Co., Ltd., Warwick, UK, 2018, Kindle ed., ch. 2, sect. "The Probing Attack by XXXXVIII Panzer Corps"
The general offensive against 22nd Guards Corps began at 0600 hours. The main attack from 11th Panzer and Großdeutschland came from the Gertsevo - Butovo area toward Korovino and Cherkasskoe. The 71st Guards received up to a regiment of infantry backed by 30 tanks at 0900 but over the next hour all German efforts to break through to Korovino were unsuccessful. At about this time the 27th Antitank Brigade arrived to reinforce the boundary between the 71st and 67th Guards. After regrouping a new attack by two regiments backed by 200 tanks and up to 100 aircraft attempted to split this boundary and encircle Cherkasskoe from the west. The heaviest fighting fell on the 67th Guards in and near this village but made only limited gains at heavy cost. At the same time, in an effort to secure the flank of this thrust, the 71st Guards was struck by an infantry regiment supported by 15-20 tanks attacking toward Dmitrievka; three attempts by this group were repulsed by artillery and mortar fire and by day's end the division was continuing to hold most of its initial positions.Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, Kindle ed., Book One, Part Two, ch. 3
On July 6 the 4th Panzer Army had to solve a complex problem. While the II SS Panzer Corps had made notable progress against the left flank of 6th Guards Army the day before, the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps had been unable to penetrate the first defensive belt. Attempting to make up for lost time the latter Corps resumed its drive at 0300 hours with the objectives of breaking through along the Butovo-Iakovlevo road in the region of Olkhovka and Dubrova in order to link up with the 167th Infantry Division that was guarding the left flank of the II SS Corps. The 71st Guards was attacked simultaneously by up to 100 tanks and two regiments of infantry but held its sector from Bubny to Novo-Ivanovka to Krasnyi Pochinok to Mikhailovka for around two-and-a-half hours, after which it abandoned Krasnyi Pochinok and fell back to a new line. Advancing to the north by the close of the day the German force had seized Zavidovka, and the division's left flank had consolidated along a line from height 217.9 to Dmitrievka to Setnoe to Zarytoe to Podymovka.Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, ed. & trans. S. Britton, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2011, pp. 115-16. This source gives a figure of 300 tanks.Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, Kindle ed., Book One, Part Two, ch. 3
The XXXXVIII Panzer Corps regrouped overnight on July 6/7 for a renewed drive on the Oboyan axis. Its forces in the Zavidovka area went over to the defensive to hold its left flank. To ease command and control issues the 40th Army took command of the 71st Guards. At 2300 hours General Vatutin ordered counterstrokes against the flanks of the panzer corps to begin on the morning of July 8. The 71st Guards and 161st Rifle Divisions were to attack in the general direction of Gertsovka at 1030 hours after a 30-minute artillery preparation.Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, Kindle ed., Book One, Part Two, ch. 3 General Chistyakov's memoirs state:Chistyakov wrote that the attacks "did not bring the desired results" and were stopped by German armor, artillery and air strikes before reaching the objective, after which Vatutin ordered his forces to dig in.Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 150-51
Lt. Col. Lyubomudrov reported on the work of his subordinates during the first days of the battle as follows: