The Battle of Jalalabad (, ) also known as Operation Jalalabad or the Jalalabad War, was a major battle that occurred in the spring of 1989, marking the beginning of the First Afghan Civil War. The battle broke out following the Peshawar-based Seven-Party Union (an alliance of seven Afghan mujahideen groups also known as the Afghan Interim Government or "government-in-exile"),'Mujahidin vs. Communists: Revisiting the battles of Jalalabad and Khost . By Anne Stenersen: a Paper presented at the conference COIN in Afghanistan: From Mughals to the Americans, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 12–13 February 2012. Retrieved 1 February 2018. supported by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), attacked Jalalabad, which was then under the administration of the Soviet-backed Republic of Afghanistan.
Although the mujahideen quickly captured the Jalalabad Airport and Samarkhel, the former base of the Soviet 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, they were successfully recaptured by the Afghan Armed Forces.
Background The Soviet Union officially withdrew from Afghanistan on February 15, 1989, marking the end of the Soviet–Afghan War. The war was fought between mujahideen guerilla groups (supported by Pakistan, the United States, Saudi Arabia, China, Iran, and other nations) and the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. However, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which the mujahideen perceived as a "puppet government", remained in power after the withdrawal.
The mujahideen were supported by Pakistani intelligence. ISI Director Hamid Gul's stated goal was to establish a mujahideen government in Afghanistan, led by Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.Kaplan, p. 178 Analysts disagree as to whether Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was kept in the dark about the ISI's plan to overturn Afghanistan or was aware of the attack. One analyst stated that U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Robert B. Oakley was exhortating this mujahideen attack.
The Americans reportedly were motivated by their wish to humiliate the Marxists and send them out of Afghanistan "clinging to their helicopters" to avenge the fall of South Vietnam. Pakistan wished to establish a friendly government in Kabul that would not support Baloch and Pashtun separatists in western Pakistan. The plan was for Jamiat-e Islami to close the Salang Pass, paralyzing the Afghan Government's supply lines. The plan was to establish an interim government in Jalalabad that would be recognized by western nations as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.
On 6 March 1989, a private meeting was held by Bhutto and ISI officials, responsible for their strategy in Afghanistan, to discuss Hamid Gul's proposal to attack Jalalabad. Bhutto, out of concern for the ISI's plan, invited the U.S. ambassador, Robert Oakley, to attend the meeting. Although Oakley had not received specific instructions from Washington, he attended the meeting. Various strategies were discussed, and former ISI director Hamid Gul promised Bhutto that Jalalabad would fall within a week. Bhutto later noted that Hamid Gul spoke so passionately and confidently that she believed Jalalabad might fall within 24 hours. Steve Coll additionally states that the idea of attacking Jalalabad did not originate with the Mujahideen, rather, it was the Pakistani government, in collaboration with the CIA, that planned the attack and directed the Mujahideen to participate in the operation's execution.
Al-Qaeda positions in Nangarhar Province According to Mustafa Hamid, an Egyptian journalist and al-Qaeda member who had close connections to Jalaluddin Haqqani, claimed that the Arab fighters were positioned in a crescent-shaped line surrounding the city, extending from the Saracha line to the left of the main road up to the Jalozai area, covering a distance of about 15 kilometers. They had established approximately 30 posts or bases, with each post housing between 8 and 145 or 300 fighters. These positions were strategically aligned for the occupation of Jalalabad, and they launched a broad offensive against the city.
In Samar Khel, three posts—two at the bottom of the Samar Khel mountain and the third along the main road leading to Jalalabad. The peak of the mountain was used as an al-Qaeda observation center, but it was elevated and lacked water, so personnel were rotated every 24 hours Karez-e-Buzurg Village, located two kilometers south of the Jalalabad Airport Zahrani Base (also known as "Farm Two” or “Olive Farms”). Large trenches were dug here and covered with roofs. Heavy weapons were stored here, and at one point, 3,500 BM-14 rockets were kept. It also served as a resting place for al-Qaeda fighters Several logistical and reserve bases located in Zahrani (referred to as “Farm Four”) Lalmai Village: One of the most important bases, named "Suraqa”, housed thirty Al-Qaeda fighters. Other groups were also concentrated in Lalmai, including Abu Tariq's and Zamari's groups, who eventually captured the Dawlatzai area. This served as the command center for al-Qaeda jihadists in Jalalabad Ibrahim Bahraini Base, located between Dawlatzai and Lalmai, commanded by Zamari Three posts positioned ahead of Saracha Bridge. They were well-equipped, including anti-armor weapons. These groups would ambush in the canals leading to the main road A post near the Afghan Army’s 11th Infantry Division. In this post, alongside Arabs, forty Bengali fighters were also stationed Another large post, not far from the 11th Division headquarters, under the command of Abu Humam Saidi. In this base, in addition to Arab fighters, forty Bengali fighters were present and were equipped with a BM-12 device. Over a kilometer to the west, they had another post equipped with a BM-12 Jalozai Post: Two active tanks were stationed there under the command of Abu Ali Yemeni, while Abu Khalid Masri trained fighters on tank operations. Abu Ali Yemeni was previously a soldier in South Yemen The command center post in Lalmai Village had about thirty personnel The forward command center post in Lalmai Village was named Sakhri. The Sabaa Layl post was behind the command center in the Lalmai village and was equipped with a BM-12 device Qaba Base, situated atop the Samar Khel Mountain, responsible for reporting intelligence on the movements of government forces to other bases Behind Qaba Post One, a command center equipped with 82mm mortars was active Ghani Khel Post, near the Markore mountain and another post at the junction of the main road with the secondary road leading to Ghani Khel village Al-Qaeda base at the Torkham border crossing
Battle
Beginning of the battle Involved in the operation were Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf's Ittehad-e Islami, and Arab fighters totaling 14,000 men. Before the battle, Afghan Arab volunteers from al-Qaeda reportedly cut the corpses of surrendering Afghan Army soldiers into pieces and displayed them to other units in the area.Akram, Assen, Histoire de la Guerre d'Afghanistan, Paris Editions Balland, 1996: p.227 General Syed Quddus, who wrote a book on his experiences during the battle, additionally claimed that the Pakistan Army shelled the city for 4 months. Reports from the Afghan government additionally confirmed that the mujahideen assault on Jalalabad was supported by rocket and artillery fire from Pakistan's 11th Infantry Division. The intense rocket and artillery bombardments on Jalalabad, marked by their scale and severity, not only highlighted the actions of the aggressors but also necessitated the creation of underground shelters, commonly referred to as "bunkers." In response, Jalalabad quickly transformed into a network of bunkers, as local authorities in Nangarhar Province recognised the importance of safeguarding civilians alongside defending the city. Faced with ongoing attacks from the Pakistani Army and its jihadist affiliates, authorities prioritized the protection of Jalalabad's residents. Orders were issued permitting the use of trees from roads and public streets for shelter construction. Local councils, urban organizations, and members of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (then referred to as the Watan Party of Afghanistan) coordinated efforts to provide medical services, food, water, and other essential supplies to the population. Within a week, Jalalabad had become an underground city, with daily life continuing under the constant threat of bombardment.
The attack began on 5 March 1989, and went well at first for the mujahideen, who captured the Jalalabad airfield before facing a counterattack. On 7 March, an Afghan Army base in Samarkhel temporarily fell to the mujahideen but was taken back by June, as well as the entire district in what would be known as the Siege of Samarkhel. On the second day of the battle, according to a report from Chief of Staff Major General Asif Delawar, an estimated force of 10,000 mujahideen fighters, Pakistani, and Arab volunteers launched a coordinate three-pronged offensive towards Jalalabad. Supported by artillery and missile fire, the mujahideen successfully breached the government's defensive positions, leading to the capture of the headquarters of the 11th Infantry Division. Notably, captured Afghan soldiers, prisoners of war, were executed by beheading by the mujahideen.
When government troops began to surrender, the attacking forces were soon blocked by the main Afghan Army positions held by the 11th Division, which were protected by bunkers, barbed wire and minefields. The government troops received on intensive air support, as the Afghan Air Force flew 20 sorties a day over the battlefield. An-12 transport aircraft, modified to carry bombs, flew at high altitude out of range of the Stinger missiles used by the mujahideen; cluster bombs were used intensively. Three Scud firing batteries deployed around Kabul, specifically the 99th Missile Brigade, fired 25 missiles in support of the Jalalabad garrison.
Despite their lack of precision, these weapons had a significant effect on the morale of the mujahideen, who were unable to defend against them. The Battle of Jalalabad is considered to be the most concentrated ballistic missile campaign since the V2 attacks on London during World War II.
By the middle of May, the mujahideen had made little progress against the defences of Jalalabad, and were running low on ammunition. In July, they failed to prevent the Afghan Army from retaking the army base in Samarkhel. Jalalabad remained under Najibullah's government control. The mujahideen suffered an estimated 3,000 casualties during this battle. Arab foreign fighters sustained over 300 casualties.Marshall, p. 7 Approximately 12,000–15,000 civilians were killed, and 10,000 fled the conflict. The Afghan Army reported around 1,500 casualties during the battle. Towards the end of the battle, the ISI-backed Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin launched an attack Jamiat-e Islami forces in Takhar Province, resulting in the deaths of 36 of Ahmad Shah Massoud's commanders. In retaliation, Massoud pursued the perpetrators and sent them to face trial in Peshawar, where they were subsequently executed. BBC reporter John Simpson, who was temporarily embedded with Jamiat-e Islami, was not allowed to film or be present during the operation to hunt the perpetrators, under the orders of Ahmad Shah Massoud. Survivors considered men who died in the initial ambush as "lucky", as those of Massoud's men who were captured were subject to mutilation and torture; having their eyes gouged out, noses and ears cut off after having their limbs broken and being disemboweled. Hekmatyar justified the treatment of the prisoners by saying actions like these happen all around the world and that every nation had factions with "slight differences".
Aftermath