Achmad Arnold Baramuli (20 July 1930 – 11 October 2006) was an Indonesian prosecutor, politician and businessman. His highest position was chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council over 1998 to 1999 under President B.J. Habibie. A key vote-winner for Golkar Party, Baramuli was involved in the 1999 Bank Bali scandal that contributed to Habibie's failure to win re-election.
Early life, religion and education Arnold Baramuli was born on 20 July 1930 in Pinrang, a traditional trading area in southern Sulawesi in the Dutch East Indies. He was one of six children born to Julius Baramuli, a Protestant from Manado, and Adolfina La Roempoeh (familiarly known as Ibu Pole), a Muslim woman of Bugis ethnicity. Her nickname 'Pole' means 'welcome' in the Bugis language. The Baramuli family's Poleko group of trading and manufacturing companies was named after Ibu Pole. Baramuli had five siblings: Annie, Eddy, Hengki, Mariyani, and Rita Arifien.
Baramuli was raised as a Christian, but later converted to Islam in what his critics viewed as an attempt to improve his political career in Jakarta. In June 1988, at age 57, Baramuli announced he had converted to Islam and augmented his name to Achmad Arnold Baramuli (although he was thereafter more commonly called Arnold Achmad Baramuli or simply A.A. Baramuli). “Now the foundation of my life is Islam. The development of my life is Islamic and the purpose of my life is Islam,” he said. His wife remained a Protestant, as did two of their children, while three of their children followed Islam.
Baramuli completed elementary school in Pinrang in 1945, the year that Indonesia proclaimed its independence. He then attended Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs (Mulo) in Makassar until 1948, before completing his schooling at Bestuur School, also in Makassar, in 1950.
In 1955, he graduated in law at the University of Indonesia, where he was a student activist. As a member of Djakarta Student Council, his contemporaries included Benjamin Mangkudilaga (a future Supreme Court justice), Ismail Suny (a future constitutional law professor) and Adnan Buyung Nasution (a future human rights lawyer).
Baramuli completed an Intelligence Course in Singapore in 1957. He later studied at Indonesia's National Resilience Institute from 1981 to 1982.
Civil service career In 1954, Baramuli began his career as a state prosecutor at Jakarta District Attorney's Office, where he served for two years. In 1956, he was appointed chief of the Makassar Attorney's Office in South Sulawesi. He was later promoted to the Supervisory Board of the Sulawesi High Prosecutor's Office and concurrently served as a Military High Prosecutor for Eastern Indonesia with the rank of lieutenant colonel.
In Makassar, he investigated cases of alleged smuggling by “non-indigenous” entrepreneurs, who parked wealth abroad in Singapore and Hong Kong. Baramuli's team of investigators included Baharuddin Lopa, a future attorney general.
On 23 March 1960, when 29 years old, Baramuli was appointed governor of North-Central Sulawesi province (later split into two separate provinces), making him the youngest governor in Indonesia. His appointment required a decree from founding president Sukarno, as the minimum age for a governor at that time was 30 years old. He served in the position until 15 July 1962.
The position gave him many business opportunities, but he later recounted he had to develop the new province with little budgetary assistance from the central government, and he found it challenging to provide monthly salaries for civil servants. He also had to contend with the Permesta rebellion led by Ventje Sumual. In Manado, Baramuli pioneered the provision of housing at Bumi Beringin for employees of the governor's office.
During the final years of the Sukarno regime, Baramuli served as an advisor to the minister of home affairs from 1963 to 1965.
In 1965, when General Sumarno became home affairs minister, Baramuli was made head of the Board of Control of Regional Enterprises (Bappeda). The board had been formed in 1958 to take control of many regionally based Dutch enterprises, which had been nationalized. The Bappeda companies were operated by provincial governors, usually military officers. The appointment of Baramuli to the helm of Bappeda led to him being viewed as a “financial general”.
After Amirmachmud became Minister of Home Affairs in 1969, Baramuli was brought to Jakarta as an expert staff in charge of state assets in the region. In the early years of the Suharto regime, Baramuli served as head of the Home Affairs Ministry's economy and finance team from 1970 to 1973. He was then deputy chairman of the ministry's Economic, Finance and Development Council from 1973 to 1974. He was appointed deputy chairman of the Indonesia-Japan Committee in 1974.
In the mid-1970s, Baramuli resigned from the civil service to focus on his family's Poleko Group consortium.
Political career Baramuli was a member of Golkar's Development Faction in parliament for four terms from 1972 to 1997. From October 1997 to 2004, he was a member of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), representing South Sulawesi.
He was a co-founder and deputy chairperson of Golkar's Board of Trustees.
Exposure of Eddy Tansil loan scam In February 1994, as a member of the national parliament's Commission VII, Baramuli exposed a banking fraud scandal involving tycoon Eddy Tansil. At a hearing between Commission VII and Bank Indonesia governor Sudrajad Djiwandono, Baramuli raised questions over Tansil's bad loans with state-owned Indonesian Development Bank (Bapindo). He said the loan procedure was flawed as Tansil had not put up any collateral. Tansil, assisted by his business partner Tommy Suharto, had obtained loans totaling $430 million from Bapindo for his Golden Key company to develop petrochemical plants, but the plants were never built and the loans not repaid. Tansil was in August 1994 sentenced to 17 years in jail but in 1996 bribed his way out of prison and left Indonesia.
DPA head and Habibie's ‘chief-of-staff’ Baramuli was close to B.J. Habibie as they shared ethnic and political interests. When Suharto resigned on 21 May 1998, Habibie became president and Baramuli was appointed head of the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA). In this position, he was described as Habibie's de facto chief-of-staff. He was accused of using 'money politics' to support Golkar and Habibie's re-election campaigns.
He led the DPA until 20 October 1999, when Habibie lost the presidency. As leader of DPA, Baramuli reportedly rejected his salary and state facilities, such as a car and housing. When he traveled to Singapore for medical treatment, he declined an offer of state facilities, saying he did not want to burden the country.
Ghalibgate phone leak In March 1999, a telephone conversation between Habibie and Attorney General Andi Ghalib was leaked to the press. Habibie instructed Ghalib to go easy on Suharto, who was being investigated for corruption. Baramuli declared the leak was an intelligence game and psychological operation planned by the military – at that time led by General Wiranto. Baramuli implied that Major General Syamsu Djalaluddin, who was the attorney general's aide for intelligence, had leaked the telephone conversation on behalf of the military's Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS). Habibie therefore removed Syamsu from his position.
Irian Jaya In January 1999, a drunk man in Yapen Waropen regency of Irian Jaya allegedly struck at a member of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI). The soldier and his colleagues responded by assaulting residents of the man's house. Baramuli reacted by saying the government should impose capital punishment on provocateurs of acts of violence. After a delegation of Papuans met with Habibie on 26 February 1999 and requested independence from Indonesia, Baramuli became a strong proponent of a proposal to split Irian Jaya into separate provinces.
Vote buying allegations and 1999 elections In the run-up to Indonesia's June 1999 general election – the first free, multi-party general election after the 32-year Suharto regime – Baramuli in late January 1999 began traveling throughout regions, especially in Sulawesi, to distribute money and gifts, as Golkar sought to remain in power.
Tempo described Baramuli as “Santa Claus” for handing out money and vehicles on a "Golkar cadre coordination visit" to Eastern Indonesia that included Biak (Irian Jaya), Ambon and Ternate (Maluku), East Kalimantan and South Kalimantan. He denied it was part of the election campaign, saying Golkar only fought for the state ideology Pancasila and defended religion.
Baramuli donated Rp100,000 ($11.10) each to village heads in Minahasa district, North Sulawesi, and in Gowa district in South Sulawesi. The head of Pasaman Baru village admitted he and his colleagues had each received Rp100,000 from Golkar.
In Gowa, Baramuli distributed Rp206 million to mosque caretakers and provided funds to Golkar representatives at the village and district levels. He also awarded scholarships to local high school and university students. Gatra magazine reported that Baramuli handed out checks and urged people to vote for Golkar. Baramuli said the money was from donations from friends of Golkar and not corruption money.
Leaders of 21 rival political parties on 11 June 1999 demanded that Baramuli be brought to court on charges of vote buying and corruption. They claimed that his presentation of “billions of rupiah” for the construction of places of worship in the name of Golkar was tantamount to bribery and money politics. Baramuli acknowledged the amounts he handed out in Sulawesi could reach Rp2 billion, but he said the funds were for the people and not for Golkar.
In reports published in June and July 1999, Tempo magazine accused Baramuli of practicing “money politics” for Golkar in North Sulawesi. The reports cited evidence that implicated Golkar and Baramuli's company, Poleko, in efforts to use money to win votes. The Central Election Supervising Committee (Panwaspus) wanted Baramuli tried for alleged vote buying, but as head of the DPA he was not brought to trial.
Baramuli was involved in the 1999 Bank Bali scandal, in which Rp564 billion from a state repayment of interbank loans was funneled to Golkar figures and cronies, ahead of efforts to persuade Golkar's provincial chapter leaders to endorse Habibie as the party's presidential candidate. Baramuli dismissed the allegations as "only nonsense" and accused the banker at the center of the scandal of being a liar and a drug addict.
Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) chairman Glenn Yusuf on 13 September 1999 testified before parliament that Baramuli had pressured him to assist in a cover-up of the Bank Bali scandal, warning him that “if you don't ... I could become involved and the president could be dragged in.”
As the scandal unfolded, Habibie rejected calls to suspend Baramuli from the DPA, even though parliament concluded Baramuli was clearly involved in Baligate. Student protesters demanded Habibie resign and also said Baramuli should step down from his position as Golkar's South Sulawesi representative in the MPR. Baramuli responded by commenting, “To withdraw is not constitutional, if I am Habibie, if I were, I was, I will not resign because I represent the people, I'm not a coward, I'm a fighter, he is also a fighter, all right?”