The Battle of Ravenna, fought on 11 April 1512, was a major battle of the War of the League of Cambrai. It saw a Spanish-Papal army under Viceroy of Naples Ramón de Cardona (the Holy League) defeated by France and their Ferrarese allies under Gaston of Foix, who was killed during the battle.
The battle was exceptionally bloody and saw both sides making a previously unseen usage of artillery. The Spanish artillery inflicted massive casualties, after which Ferrarese general Alfonso d'Este responded with a decisive French flanking of the Holy League with their own guns, hitting the exposed enemy cavalry and making their line collapse. The Spanish infantry beat back the first French advances, but with their cavalry routed, the Holy League army was ultimately surrounded and defeated. Gaston of Foix then died in action when he attempted to rout the retreating Spanish with a cavalry charge.
The French and Ferrarese eliminated the main army of Naples as a serious threat, although their triumph was overshadowed by the loss of their young general. The victory therefore did not help them secure northern Italy, leading the French to withdraw entirely from Italy in the summer of 1512, as Swiss mercenaries hired by Pope Julius II and Imperial troops under Emperor Maximilian I arrived in Lombardy. The Sforza were restored to power in Milan.
Background Monster of Ravenna
A month before the battle, multiple sources reported a monstrous birth which became known as the Monster of Ravenna. This child's terrifying features included a horn on its forehead, wings, an eye on its knee, and a clawed foot, according to Florentine chronicler Luca Landucci.Niccoli, Prophecy and People in Renaissance Italy, 36. Its appearance was a cause for alarm, and news spread across Europe in the diaries of contemporary writers.
Most accounts, including that of Landucci's, associate the "monster's" appearance with the battle it preceded; its appearance was taken for a bad omen of future suffering, and the French medical professional Ambroise Paré opined that the creature's birth was a direct sign of God's wrath, brought to bear in the form of Louis XII's army.Daston and Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 177; Paré, On Monsters and Marvels, 6. Regardless, the Monster of Ravenna acquired theological implications which evolved beyond the one battle and persisted well into the Protestant Reformation.
Prelude
Beginning in February 1512, the French forces in Italy, newly commanded by Gaston de Foix, Duc de Nemours, had been engaged in capturing cities in the Romagna and the Veneto, in an attempt to deny control of those regions to the forces of the Holy League. Although he had been successful in a number of sieges, Nemours was aware that the impending invasion of France by Henry VIII of England would cause much of his army to be withdrawn, and he was determined to force the main army of the Holy League into battle before that occurred. Thus, in late March, Nemours, together with an Italian contingent under Alfonso I d'Este, Duke of Ferrara, marched east from Bologna. The French army reached Ravenna on April 8 and started a bombardment of the city on the following day. A general assault was launched after a breach was made, but the attack was repulsed by Papal troops who defended the city. Over the next couple of days, the French forces attempted three "fruitless assaults".
Julius II, alarmed at the prospect of losing his last stronghold in the Romagna, demanded that an army be sent to relieve the city; Spanish viceroy Ramón de Cardona had to comply, and the Spanish army set out for Ravenna with a company of Papal troops in tow. By 9 April, they had passed Forlì and were advancing north along the Ronco River towards the city, and on the next day had reached Molinaccio, only a mile south of the French positions, but still separated from them by the Ronco. Marcantonio I Colonna, at the time in Spanish service, forced his way into the city with 600 men and brought the news. Gaston of Foix, short on supplies and increasingly anxious to give battle before he was forced to withdraw from Italy, ordered that a general attack be launched. On the morning of Easter day, April 11, the French army left camp, crossed the Ronco, and approached the Spanish–Papal position.Donvito (2012), 18 Foix issued an embassy and challenged Cardona to decide the battle through a duel, but it was rejected.Spada, La battaglia di Ravenna, 86
Battle
Dispositions
The strengths, relative positions, and commanders of the component elements of both armies are unclear, and different arrangements are given by historians.Arnold, Renaissance at War, 166; Oman, Art of War, 134–138, 143; Taylor, Art of War, 182–185, 206–207. Taylor relies primarily on the accounts by Guicciardini and Pandolfini for the positions of the units, and on the account by Sanuto for the numbers; he notes that Sanuto apparently records the official strength of each army, rather than the number of men actually present. Oman also notes that he follows Sanuto's numbers, as he considers them "more trustworthy than later details and figures given by Guicciardini and others" (Oman, Art of War, 134). The French army formed up in an arc to the east of Cardona's fortified camp; closest to the river were about 900 men-at-arms of the "vaward", under Jacques de La Palice and Alfonso d'Este.Arnold, Renaissance at War, 166; Oman, Art of War, 134–135, 143; Taylor, Art of War, 182. Taylor gives the number of men in the vaward as 910. Next to this cavalry was the bulk of the infantry. According to Charles Oman, it consisted of three separate units: 3,500 Gascon crossbowmen, 5,000 landsknechts under Jacob Empser, and 3,000 Picards and Gascons under Thomas Bohier, the Seneschal of Normandy.Oman, Art of War, 134–135, 143. Oman notes that the second group of French infantry was part of the "main-battle" rather than the "vaward". Arnold gives the identical positioning of units, but does not mention their numbers or commanders (Arnold, Renaissance at War, 166). Frederick Taylor groups the infantry into only two units: 9,500 landsknechts under Empser and 8,000 "Gascon archers and Picard pikemen" under the Seigneur de Molart.Taylor, Art of War, 183. The men-at-arms of the "main-battle", consisting of 780 men, was commanded by either Bohier alone, or by Bohier together with the Vicomte de Lautrec, Louis d'Ars, and the Chevalier de Bayard.Oman, Art of War, 134; Taylor, Art of War, 182–183. Taylor names only Bohier as the commander, while Oman lists him together with the others.
The cavalry occupied one of two positions: according to Oman and Thomas Arnold, it was placed in the arc to the left of the French infantry, while Taylor has it behind the cavalry of the "vaward", next to the river.Arnold, Renaissance at War, 166; Oman, Art of War, 134–136, 143; Taylor, Art of War, 182–183, 207. Taylor notes that he follows Guicciardini's account in placing the cavalry behind the main line. Oman acknowledges this point by Guicciardini, but considers it "difficult to reconcile with the details of some of the later fighting given by other writers"; he believes that "it would seem more likely that they were in the true centre of the array" (Oman, Art of War, 135–136). Farther to the left of the French line—beyond the cavalry of the "main-battle", according to Arnold and Oman, or directly flanking the infantry, according to Taylor—was the "rearward" corps of the army, commanded by Yves d'Alégre.Arnold, Renaissance at War, 166; Oman, Art of War, 134–136, 143; Taylor, Art of War, 183. It consisted of about 4,000 mostly Italian infantry under Frederigo de Bozzolo, flanked, on the extreme left, by about 2,000 light cavalry under Gian Bernardo Caracciolo.Oman, Art of War, 134–136, 143; Taylor, Art of War, 183. According to Oman, the light cavalry included 300 Ferarrese mounted arquebusiers, as well as French mounted crossbowmen and stradioti. Taylor also mentions the presence of about 1,000 dismounted archers with the light cavalry; Oman includes a further 300 men-at-arms under d'Alégre. The French force also included 50 "modern cannons," built and brought by Alfonso I d'Este, Duke of Ferrara and considered the best in Europe at the time. These cannons fired all-metal cannonballs and had a faster rate of fire compared to older gunsDonvito (2012), p. 17. Spada, La battaglia di Ravenna, p. 71
Meanwhile Cardona entrenched the Holy League army in a semi-circular fortification following Navarro's advice, most likely based on his experience on Cerignola. However, the resultant fortified camp was cramped and did not adequately provide protection against artillery.Muñoz Lorente, Carlos V a la conquista de Europa, 184 The arrangement of their army is similarly a matter of dispute; Oman comments that "the array of Cardona's army, though elaborately described by more than one narrator, is not very easy to make out."Oman, Art of War, 137. At the north end of the camp, near the river, was the cavalry of the "vaward", consisting of about 670 Papal men-at-arms under Fabrizio Colonna.Arnold, Renaissance at War, 166; Oman, Art of War, 137, 143; Taylor, Art of War, 184. The Papal cavalry was positioned close to the gap in the entrenchments near the riverbank. Farther along the river were two more bodies of men-at-arms: the "main-battle", consisting of 565 men under the Marquis of La Palude, and the rearguard, consisting of 490 men under Alfonso Carvajal.Arnold, Renaissance at War, 166; Oman, Art of War, 137–138, 143; Taylor, Art of War, 184.
Taylor divides the Holy League infantry into four blocks: three divisions of Spanish infantry, each consisting of four colunellas of 500–600 men each, and one formation of Papal infantry, numbering about 2,000, all under the general command of Pedro Navarro; Taylor places the formations of infantry in a deep column parallel to the river, on the far side of the cavalry, and perpendicular to the entrenchments.Taylor, Art of War, 184. The Papal infantry is the third formation in the column, between the last two Spanish divisions. According to Taylor, Carvajal's cavalry was farther back than the last of these. Oman and Arnold place the infantry in three lines running along the length of the entrenchments; no number is given for the first of these, but the second is given as consisting of 4,000 men, and the third, placed as a reserve, as including "three Spanish foot regiments" as well as the 2,000 Papal infantry.Arnold, Renaissance at War, 166; Oman, Art of War, 137–138, 143. Oman notes that Guicciardini records the strength of the Papal infantry as 4,000, but considers it to be "probably an exaggeration". He gives several possibile names for the commander of the Papal troops: he was "a captain called Ramassot" according to Fabrizio Colonna and Bayard, "Cornelio Romaeo of Bologna" according to Köchlein, and "Hernan Magote" according to Spanish sources; Oman comments that "he is otherwise unknown" (Oman, Art of War, 138). Beyond the infantry—to the far side of it from the river, according to Taylor, or at the end of its line, according to Oman and Arnold—was the light cavalry, consisting of 1,500–1,700 Spanish jinetes and Italian mounted arquebusiers under the command of Fernando d'Avalos, Marquis of Pescara.Arnold, Renaissance at War, 166; Oman, Art of War, 137, 143; Taylor, Art of War, 184. Taylor gives the lower bound for the strength of the light cavalry, while Oman gives the higher. The Spanish also had at least thirty war wagons armed with scythe blades, forward-projecting spears and organ guns, a contraption used in Spain since the 15th century.Arnold, The Renaissance at War, p. 82; Arántegui, Apuntes históricos, 64
Artillery exchange