This list of Internet censorship and surveillance in Europe provides information on the types and levels of Internet censorship and surveillance that is occurring in countries in Europe.

Detailed country by country information on Internet censorship and surveillance is provided in the Freedom on the Net reports from Freedom House, by the OpenNet Initiative, by Reporters Without Borders, and in the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices from the U.S. State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. The ratings produced by several of these organizations are summarized below as well as in the Censorship by country article.

Classifications The level of Internet censorship and surveillance in a country is classified in one of the four categories: pervasive, substantial, selective, and little or no censorship or surveillance. The classifications are based on the classifications and ratings from the Freedom on the Net reports by Freedom House supplemented with information from the OpenNet Initiative (ONI), Reporters Without Borders (RWB), and the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices by the U.S. State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

Pervasive censorship or surveillance: A country is classified as engaged in pervasive censorship or surveillance when it often censors political, social, and other content, is engaged in mass surveillance of the Internet, and retaliates against citizens who circumvent censorship or surveillance with imprisonment or other sanctions. A country is included in the "pervasive" category when it: is rated as "not free" with a total score of 71 to 100 in the Freedom on the Net (FOTN) report from Freedom House, is rated "not free" in FOTN or is not rated in FOTN and is included on the "Internet enemies" list from Reporters Without Borders, or when the OpenNet Initiative categorizes the level of Internet filtering as pervasive in any of the four areas (political, social, conflict/security, and Internet tools) for which they test.

Substantial censorship or surveillance: Countries included in this classification are engaged in substantial Internet censorship and surveillance. This includes countries where a number of categories are subject to a medium level of filtering or many categories are subject to a low level of filtering. A country is included in the "substantial" category when it: is not included in the "pervasive" category, and is rated as "not free" in the Freedom on the Net (FOTN) report from Freedom House, or is rated "partly free" or is not rated in FOTN, and is included on the "Internet enemies" list from Reporters Without Borders,List of the 13 Internet enemies Reporters Without Borders (Paris), 11 July 2006. or when the OpenNet Initiative categorizes the level of Internet filtering as pervasive or substantial in any of the four areas (political, social, conflict/security, and Internet tools) for which they test.

Selective censorship or surveillance: Countries included in this classification were found to practice selective Internet censorship and surveillance. This includes countries where a small number of specific sites are blocked or censorship targets a small number of categories or issues. A country is included in the "selective" category when it: is not included in the "pervasive" or "substantial" categories, and is rated as "partly free" in the Freedom on the Net (FOTN) report from Freedom House, or is included on the "Internet enemies" list from Reporters Without Borders, or is not rated in FOTN and the OpenNet Initiative categorizes the level of Internet filtering as selective in any of the four areas (political, social, conflict/security, and Internet tools) for which they test.

Little or no censorship or surveillance: A country is included in the "little or no censorship or surveillance" category when it is not included in the "pervasive", "substantial" or "selective" categories.

This classification includes countries that are listed as "free" on the Freedom on the Net list from Freedom House, are not listed as "Enemies of the Internet" by Reporters Without Borders (RWB), and for which no evidence of Internet filtering was found by the OpenNet Initiative (ONI) in any of the four areas (political, social, conflict/security, and Internet tools) for which they test. Other controls such as voluntary filtering, self-censorship, and other types of public or private action to limit child pornography, hate speech, defamation, or theft of intellectual property often exist. The various nation sections, below, include ratings by ONI, RWB, etc.

Pervasive censorship or surveillance

Belarus

Rated "not free" by Freedom House in Freedom on the Net in 2011 (score 69), 2012 (score 69), 2013 (score 67), 2014 (score 62), 2015 (score 64), 2016 (score 62), 2017 (score 64), and 2018 (score 64)."Belarus", Freedom on the Net 2011, Freedom House, 2011. Retrieved 13 June 2015."Belarus", Freedom on the Net 2012, Freedom House, 2012. Retrieved 13 June 2015."Belarus", Freedom on the Net 2013, Freedom House, 2013. Retrieved 13 June 2015. Listed as selective in the political, social, conflict/security and Internet tools areas by ONI in November 2010."ONI Country Profiles", Research section at the OpenNet Initiative web site, a collaborative partnership of the Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto; the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University; and the SecDev Group, Ottawa Listed as an Internet enemy by RWB in 2012.Internet Enemies , Reporters Without Borders (Paris), 12 March 2012

The Internet in Belarus, as a space used for circulating information and mobilizing protests, has been hard hit as the authorities increased the list of blocked websites and partially blocked the Internet during protests. As a way to limit coverage of demonstrations some Internet users and bloggers have been arrested and others have been invited to “preventive conversations” with the police. Law No. 317-3, which took effect on 6 January 2012, reinforced Internet surveillance and control measures.

The Belarus government has moved to second- and third-generation controls to manage its national information space. Control over the Internet is centralized with the government-owned Beltelecom managing the country's Internet gateway. Regulation is heavy with strong state involvement in the telecommunications and media market. Most users who post online media practice a degree of self-censorship prompted by fears of regulatory prosecution. The president has established a strong and elaborate information security policy and has declared his intention to exercise strict control over the Internet under the pretext of national security. The political climate is repressive and opposition leaders and independent journalists are frequently detained and prosecuted."ONI Country Profile: Belarus", OpenNet Initiative, 18 November 2010

Substantial censorship or surveillance Russia

Rated "partly free" by Freedom House in Freedom on the Net in 2009 (score 49), 2011 (score 52), 2012 (score 52), 2013 (score 54), and 2014 (score 60) and as "not free" in 2015 (score 62), 2016 (score 65), 2017 (score 66), and 2018 (score 67)."Russia" , Freedom on the Net 2009, Freedom House, 2009. Retrieved 26 October 2015."Russia" , Freedom on the Net 2011, Freedom House, 2011. Retrieved 26 October 2015."Russia" , Freedom on the Net 2012, Freedom House, 2012. Retrieved 26 October 2015."Russia" , Freedom on the Net 2013, Freedom House, 2013. Retrieved 26 October 2015. Listed as selective in the political and social areas and as no evidence in conflict/security and Internet tools by ONI in December 2010. Listed as under surveillance by RWB from 2010 to 2013. Listed as an Internet Enemy by RWB in 2014.

The absence of overt state-mandated Internet filtering in Russia before 2012 had led some observers to conclude that the Russian Internet represents an open and uncontested space. In fact, the Russian government actively competes in Russian cyberspace employing second- and third-generation strategies as a means to shape the national information space and promote pro-government political messages and strategies. This approach is consistent with the government's strategic view of cyberspace that is articulated in strategies such as the doctrine of information security. The DoS attacks against Estonia (May 2007) and Georgia (August 2008) may be an indication of the government's active interest in mobilizing and shaping activities in Russian cyberspace."ONI Country Profile: Russia", OpenNet Initiative, 19 December 2010

In July 2012, the Russian State Duma passed the Bill 89417-6 which created a blacklist of Internet sites containing alleged child pornography, drug-related material, extremist material, and other content illegal in Russia.Internet Restriction Bill Passes First Reading, The Moscow Times, 8 July 2012, retrieved 9 July 2012"Law concerning the illegal websites register has come into force" , Lyudmila Ternovaya, Кызыл тан, 30 July 2012, accessed 7 August 2012 The Russian Internet blacklist was officially launched in November 2012, despite criticism by major websites and NGOs.

Selective censorship or surveillance Moldova

Listed as selective in the political area and as no evidence in social, conflict/security, and Internet tools by ONI in December 2010.

While State authorities have interfered with mobile and Internet connections in an attempt to silence protestors and influence the results of elections, Internet users in Moldova enjoy largely unfettered access despite the government's restrictive and increasingly authoritarian tendencies. Evidence of second- and third-generation controls is mounting. Although filtering does not occur at the backbone level, the majority of filtering and surveillance takes place at the sites where most Moldovans access the Internet: Internet cafés and workplaces. Moldovan security forces have developed the capacity to monitor the Internet, and national legislation concerning illegal activities is strict."ONI Country Profile: Moldova", OpenNet Initiative, 19 December 2010

Ukraine

Rated "free" in the Freedom on the Net report by Freedom House in 2012 (score 27) and 2013 (score 28), and as "partly free" in 2014 (score 33), 2015 (score 37), 2016 (score 38), and 2017 (score 45)."Ukraine", Freedom on the Net 2012, Freedom House. Retrieved 3 January 2016."Ukraine" , Freedom on the Net 2013, Freedom House, 30 September 2013. Retrieved 5 February 2014."Ukraine", Freedom on the Net 2014, Freedom House. Retrieved 3 January 2016."Ukraine" , Freedom on the Net 2015, Freedom House. Retrieved 3 January 2016.Ukraine , Freedom on the Net 2016, Freedom House. Retrieved 26 March 2018.Ukraine , Freedom on the Net 2017, Freedom House. Retrieved 26 March 2018. Listed as no evidence in all four areas (political, social, conflict/security, and Internet tools) by ONI in December 2010."ONI Country Profile: Ukraine", OpenNet Initiative, 21 December 2010.

The Freedom on the Net 2013 report found the Internet in Ukraine to be "largely unhindered" with "no practice of institutionalized blocking or filtering, or a regulatory framework for censorship of content online", but that "there have been attempts at creating legislation which could censor or limit content" and would "present indirect threats to freedom of information online."

Ukraine possesses relatively liberal legislation governing the Internet and access to information. The Law on Protection of Public Morals of 20 November 2003, prohibits the production and circulation of pornography; dissemination of products that propagandize war or spread national and religious intolerance; humiliation or insult to an individual or nation on the grounds of nationality, religion, or ignorance; and the propagation of "drug addiction, toxicology, alcoholism, smoking and other bad habits."