The People's Republic of China emerged as a great power and one of the three big players in the tri-polar geopolitics (PRC-US-USSR) during the Cold War, after the Korean War in 1950–1953 and the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, with its status as a recognized nuclear weapons state. Currently, China has one of the world's largest populations, second largest GDP (nominal) and the largest economy in the world by PPP. By law, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has authority over the country's foreign policy.
In 1950–1953 it fought an undeclared war in Korea against the United States. Until the late 1950s it was allied with the Soviet Union but by 1960 they began a bitter contest for control over the local communist movement in many countries. It reached détente with the United States in 1972. After CCP chairman Mao Zedong died in 1976, Deng Xiaoping led a massive process of reform and opening up and emphasized trade relations with the world, while maintaining a less ideological foreign policy, widely described by the phrase "hide one's talent and bide one's time".In a 1990 speech, Deng Xiaoping summarized his foreign policy as "Observe affairs calmly, maintain our position, respond with deliberation, hide our talent and bide our time, disguise our weakness, never seek leadership, and act with intention." (Original Chinese: "冷静观察、稳住阵脚、沉着应付、韬光养晦、善于藏拙、决不当头、有所作为。") The Chinese economy grew very rapidly giving it steadily increasing power and ambition.
Since Xi Jinping became general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, China has expanded its foreign policy ambitions on the global scale, even as it retains an emphasis on 'periphery diplomacy' or its neighborhood. China is investing heavily in global infrastructure, citing a desire for economic integration. It is also investing in strategic locations to secure its trade and security interests. It calls these programs the Belt and Road Initiative (formerly "One Belt, One Road") and the "Maritime Silk Road", which it sees as part of its goal of self-sufficiency.For a detailed history see John W. Garver, China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic (2nd ed. 2018).
Since 2017 it has engaged in a large-scale trade war with the United States. It is also challenging U.S. dominance in the Pacific and Indian Ocean, expanding its military naval and diplomatic efforts. Part of this is the String of Pearls strategy securing strategic locations in the Indian Ocean and Strait of Malacca region.
Foreign policy institutions According to the Foreign Relations Law of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leads the country's foreign policy. The main institutions of foreign policy are the CCP's Central Foreign Affairs Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the CCP International Liaison Department, and the CCP United Front Work Department. Generally, the head of the Foreign Affairs Commission's Office has greater authority than the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Historically, the People's Liberation Army had greater influence in China's foreign affairs, particularly during the early years of the PRC. The influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs within China's foreign policy establishment has increased since 2009.
The Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Small Group (FALSG) has historically been a semi-institutional foreign policy coordination body. Created in 1958, it was disbanded during the Cultural Revolution and restored in 1981 as Deng Xiaoping increased the number of stakeholders involved in the development of foreign policy. It became a forum for the central leadership in charge of foreign policy to meet regularly with top bureaucrats to discuss priorities, achieve consensus, and prepare recommendations for the CCP Politburo. It was the only standing foreign policy coordination body until the aftermath of the United States bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, which prompted the creation of the Central National Security Leadership Small Group (NSLSG) in 2000 to coordinate national security crisis response. In 2018, the FALSG was renamed as the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, which was a politically significant move because a commission ranks higher than a leading small group.
China's media policy on foreign affairs issues is handled by the Central Leading Group for Propaganda, Ideology and Culture in consultation with the Central Foreign Affairs Commission. Long-term and medium-term media policies on foreign affairs matters are announced at the National Propaganda Thought Work Meetings and the annual National Conferences of Publicity Department Directors.
To address policy coordination on maritime issues, CCP general secretary Hu Jintao created The Protecting Maritime Rights and Interests LSG in 2012.
In his effort to build additional institutional capacity for foreign policy coordination, Xi Jinping created the National Security Commission (NSC), which absorbed the NSLG. The NSC's focus is holistic national security and it addresses both external and internal security matters. Xi introduced the holistic security concept in 2014, which he defined as taking "the security of the people as compass, political security as its roots, economic security as its pillar, military security, cultural security, and cultural security as its protections, and that relies on the promotion of international security."
Although various actors in the Chinese party-state contest foreign policy decision making, Chinese foreign policy is overwhelmingly top-down in decision-making and implementation.
China traditionally operates separate tracks of government-to-government and party-to-party relations, the latter for example via the CCP's International Liaison Department.
On security issues, China generally prioritizes military-to-military exchanges. China typically views military personnel as more effective interlocutors on security matters than civil personnel.
International relations framework Chinese scholars observe that the country's international relations differentiate between major powers, states on China's strategic periphery, developing countries, and multilateral international fora. These categorizations are not strict and multiple may apply. The major powers are the economically developed states, including the United States, Russia, Japan, United Kingdom, and various European Union states as well as the European Union as a whole. Strategic periphery countries are generally geographically proximate ones, traditionally including Russia, East Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. China began increasing its focus on peripheral diplomacy during the Hu Jintao era. during the Xi Jinping era, the Belt and Road Initiative is closely associated with China's peripheral diplomacy.
Generally, China tends to take the side of developing countries. In the broader category of developing countries, China distinguishes between major developing states, newly emerging powers, and other developing states.
China establishes bilateral partnerships with other countries that range from broad strategic partnerships to those with more discrete areas of cooperation. "Comprehensive strategic partnerships" are the broadest, with "strategic partnerships" and "comprehensive cooperative partnerships" used to describe relations with less broad cooperation. China generally avoids signing formal alliances and bilateral treaties. It describes this position as "relationship based on partnership rather than alliance" (jieban bujiemeng).
Chinese foreign policy documents with countries it views as strategic partners frequently assert the concepts of the validity of different developmental paths, different understandings of democracy or human rights, and noninterference in domestic affairs. In its free trade agreements and global engagement on intellectual property issues, it takes a position of non-imposition on intellectual property matters. Although it is willing to accept increased standards itself, China does not generally seek to impose standards in excess of the TRIPS Agreement.
Within the Global South, China focuses particularly on countries it views as hub states in each region. Although Chinese diplomatic understandings change over time, hub states have often included Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand (in Southeast Asia); India and Pakistan (in South Asia); Kazakhstan in Central Asia; Egypt, Ethiopia, and Nigeria (in Africa), Iran and Saudi Arabia (in the Middle East); and Argentina and Brazil (in Latin America). China conducts good relations including with hub states that are regional rivals with each other, often seeking to use summit diplomacy and regional cooperation forums in an effort to reduce tensions.
China provides foreign aid to advance both foreign policy objectives and foreign trade objectives. Since the 2018 creation of the China International Development Cooperation Agency to coordinate aid, China has placed greater emphasis on aid to facilitate foreign policy and a lesser emphasis on aid to advance foreign trade.
During the Xi Jinping administration, China seeks to shape international norms and rules in emerging policy areas where China has an advantage as an early participant. Xi describes such areas as "new frontiers," and they include policy areas such as space, deep sea, polar regions, the Internet, nuclear safety, anticorruption, and climate change. Scholars have also noted that China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' influence and profile has grown under Xi.
Problems of translation A 2022 study published by Leiden University found that almost half of the translated foreign-policy documents of the PRC from 2013 to 2019 had differences between the English and Chinese versions that might change how a reader views PRC intentions.
Long-term goals Since the late 1970s, China's primary foreign policy goals are safeguarding its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and shaping an international environment favorable to its modernization and reform and opening up.
China uses the term core interests to define the primary goals that determine its foreign policy choices. This concept was developed by diplomat Dai Bingguo during Hu Jintao's administration. The core interests are: maintaining the power of the CCP, continuing China's social and economic growth, and preservation of China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. China also views these core interests as red lines that other countries' behavior should not cross. China's emphasis on national sovereignty arises from its historical experiences following the Opium Wars.
During the Xi Jinping era, the Community of Common Destiny has become China's most important foreign relations formulation.
Political scientist Dmitry Shlapentokh argues that Xi and his top leadership are developing plans for global predominance based on rapidly growing economic power. The ideological framework is a specialized blend of Marxism–Leninism, coupled with China's pre-1800 historic claims to world dominance. China's trade policy and drive for access to essential natural resources, such as gas, are articulated in terms of these ideological approaches. Beijing balances both purely economic goals with geopolitical strategies regarding the United States, Russia and other powers. According to Shlapentokh, balancing those two powers gives China a clear advantage, for its totalitarian government could plan for generations and could change course regardless of the wishes of the electorate or clearly defined interest groups, as is the case with the modern capitalist West.
Lowell Dittmer argues that in dealing with the goal of dominance over East Asia, Beijing has to juggle its relations with the United States, which has more military and economic power in the region because of close U.S. ties with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Australia and other countries.