The Ulchin-Samcheok landings was an unsuccessful attempt by North Korea to establish guerrilla camps in the Taebaek Mountains from October 30, 1968, in order to topple Park Chung-hee's regime and bring about the reunification of Korea.
As the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) became increasingly harder to penetrate following the Blue House Raid, Kim Il Sung deployed 120 North Korean commandos along eight separate coastal locations between Ulchin and Samcheok in Gangwon Province on a mission to indoctrinate South Korean citizens. However, the attempt failed, and the North Korean commandos were routed by South Korean and American forces.
Background
Aftermath of the Korean War The Korean Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, which was purely military in nature, ended the Korean War. However it and the 1954 Geneva Conference that followed failed to deliver a peaceful political settlement to the overall conflict, resulting in an impasse which continues at present. After the war, Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung pursued opposing strategies towards reunification.
The United Nations Command (UNC) headquarters maintained operations after the Korean War. The United States assumed executive control over the UNC. Given the absence of a formal peace treaty superseding the 1953 armistice, UNC retained operational control over the Republic of Korea Armed Forces (ROKA), which consisted of the South Korean army, air force and navy in the event of large scale hostilities. United States military forces which existed out of the direct purview of UNC, remained subordinate to the United States Pacific Command (with the exception of the Seventh Fleet and the Fifth Air Force at the time). In order to grant the UNC unified control over both ROKA and United States troops, the U.S. allowed Charles H. Bonesteel III to assume multiple posts as the commander of the UNC, U.S. Forces Korea and the Eighth U.S. Army.
Vietnam War In March 1965, the U.S. deployed ground forces in the Vietnam War. Kim recognized an opportunity to achieve reunification in which the possibility of U.S. retaliation and assistance towards South Korea would be minimal. He believed that the U.S. would be preoccupied with fighting in Vietnam and become reluctant to bear the increased cost of engaging in another overseas military conflict. By instigating the removal of the U.S. from South Korea, the balance would be tipped in favor of North Korea.
North Korea also speculated about driving a wedge between South Korea and the United States. North Korea planned to exploit the United States' commitment towards a low intensity conflict in the area. North Korea aimed to antagonize the South Korean president Park Chung-hee's agenda to resolve what he perceived as a high stakes national security issue, thereby leading to the deterioration of South Korea-United States relations.
Finally, Kim sought to take advantage of South Korea's reduced military capacity. For the first time since 1953, South Korea had divided its military effort, dispatching the 9th Infantry Division to fight in Vietnam. From September 1965 to 15 October 1966, South Korea sent a combat force of over 46,000 soldiers and marines.
Widening economic and diplomatic gap between the two Koreas Kim was dependent on Soviet industrial and technological aid and agricultural assistance from China. However, after failing to plot a middle course between Nikita Khrushchev's and Mao Zedong's ideological differences over competing strains of the Communist ideology, North Korea lost Soviet aid in December 1962. As a result, conventional warfare could no longer be sustained. Meanwhile, aid from U.S. and United Nations countries in the 1950s under Syngman Rhee paved the way for South Korea's rapid economic growth, with GNP growing 5.5% annually, while industry expanded at 4.4%. After Park seized control through the May 16 coup-d'état, he continued accelerating economic growth combined with increased military spending. In light of these developments, Kim felt threatened by South Korea's emerging power and moreover, ability to invade the North. As early as December 10, 1962, Kim drafted a new "military line" to the 5th Plenum of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee, which outlined major changes in military strategy. Kim advocated for the modernization of his forces under the ideology of an army of cadres, to which force on force warfare was substituted for unconventional warfare.
Furthermore, international diplomatic developments in 1965–67 prompted Kim to accelerate his current timetable under the estimated completion of the Seven years Plan in 1967. At this time, South Korea's entrance into the international community signaled that it was not afraid of the North. In 1965, South Korea signed a treaty with Japan, which recognized an independent South Korea. Following normalized relations with Japan, South Korea received investments, loans, and trade, further bolstering South Korea's capacity. In July 1966, South Korea signed the Status of Forces Agreement with the United States. North Korea could no longer wait until 1967 to act.
1966 Workers Party Speech and North Korea's objectives On October 5, 1966, at the Workers' Party of North Korea Conference, Kim delivered a speech signaling his intention to implement armed provocations along the DMZ. The contents of the speech depicted the role of the war in Vietnam as representative of both a changing military landscape in which guerrilla warfare could succeed and as a ripe opportunity to take advantage of South Korea's divided military efforts as well as the divided attention of the U.S. in the East Pacific. The speech reflected North Korea's goals, which aimed to topple Park's administration from the inside, by raising an insurgency through spreading North Korean propaganda. In doing so, North Korea sought to level the playing ground and avoid a war of attrition, one that Kim was sure he would lose, given United States land, air, and sea support to South Korea.
November 1966–January 1968 conflicts
DMZ skirmishes and tensions (1966–1967)
The years of 1966 and 1967 were riddled with a number of low-intensity border skirmishes, which mainly involved coordinated DPRK spy activity along the DMZ (avoiding the American guarded sector) accompanied by several firefights. On November 2, 1966, North Korean forces ambushed the 23rd Infantry Regiment two days after U.S. president Lyndon B Johnson's visit to South Korea. In 1967, the number of incidents increased, but they were of lower magnitude, consisting primarily of brief coordinated ambushes which resulted in casualties from both sides, and the destruction of military property such as jeeps and patrol boats.
The DPRK agents also began sizing up the South Korean defenses in order to lay the groundwork for insurrection. Most belonged to the Reconnaissance General Bureau, an important subdivision under the KWP liaison department responsible for a majority of DMZ activity. These guerrilla agents preferred to strike in the favourable conditions of autumn: the longer nights, dry ground, and fog. Unlike the North, the South possessed no counter-guerrilla units in 1966, although by January 1967, motivated by the "November 2nd incident," General Bonesteel and his personal committee devised a new four-layer anti-infiltration strategy to hamper the DPRK under the Counter Infiltration Guerilla Concepts Requirements Plan of 1967. In terms of sea infiltration, the defense was largely left up to the ROKA, which were uncoordinated and ill-equipped with necessary radio and communications. Meanwhile, while the allies fortified their defenses as best they could, Kim launched a domestic crash program to train elite special warfare units, which would eventually amount to the completion of the all-officer 124th and 283d Army Units in 1968.
However, internal tensions were already mounting between the allies. The South Korean leadership demonstrated aggressive hopes of reunification and an escalation of the conflict. However, Bonesteel, according to the United States priority in Vietnam, remained committed only to defending South Korea against DPRK threats. Bonesteel avoided deploying heavy weaponry and artillery in order to avoid entangling South Koreans in the casualties, which Park viewed as representative of the U.S.' uncommitted nature and indecisiveness. Ultimately, Bonesteel intended to keep the status quo in which South Korea played second fiddle to Vietnam, even if it meant costing lives and suppressing the South Korean leadership, while maintaining unceasing vigilance along the border in case of any further major DPRK attack."Security Conditions in South Korea," Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency, CIA-RDP79R00904A001300040013-2, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), NARA, June 23, 1967.
Blue House raid and the USS Pueblo incident (1968) In 1966–67, Kim grew increasingly impatient as his unconventional tactics along the DMZ continued to fail in severing the U.S. and South Korea alliance. Bonesteel and Park seemed to be working closer than ever before, showing signs of developing a capable counter-insurgency plan coordinated with information gathered from failed DPRK attacks. As time began to slip, the DPRK made two bold moves on January in 1968."Weekly Summary," Central Intelligence Agency, CIA-RDP79-00927A006700070001-3, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), NARA, Nov. 15, 1968.
First, Kim ordered a band of DPRK commandos to assassinate Park at the Blue House. By doing so, he hoped to agitate the South Korean people to rise up against their government and the "American imperialists." On the evening of the 17th, they penetrated into the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division sector disguised in ROK army uniforms. For two days and nights, they moved in stealth towards Seoul, but made the mistake of trying to indoctrinate villagers on the 19th, who later notified authorities. The commandos were eventually halted by a police contingent just 800 meters from the presidential house, which prompted a nationwide manhunt. The Blue House raid also coincided with the capture of 82 crew members aboard the USS Pueblo (January 23) by disguised North Korean patrol boats.
These two attacks occurred in tandem with the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, which further burdened the U.S. military effort. Pyongyang welcomed the timing of the Tet Offensive and the sudden seizure of the Pueblo as chances to further dissuade the U.S. from maintaining its presence in South Korea.Telegram No. 123157 from U.S. Embassy Seoul to State Department, March 2, 1968, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, Box 2268, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Meanwhile, the Blue House raid vastly elevated the threat of the DPRK in the eyes of Seoul, but not the U.S., thus threatening to divide the allies. Under these conditions, In the aftermath of January 1968, the U.S.' response was of marked contrast to that of South Korea. President Johnson primarily reacted to the Tet Offensive and the Pueblo incident by ordering Bonesteel to initiate talks with the DPRK through Panmunjom in order to return American hostages.