In terms of electoral success Carlism of the Second Spanish Republic remained a medium-small political grouping, by far outperformed by large parties like PSOE and CEDA though trailing behind also medium-large contenders like Izquierda Republicana. During three electoral campaigns to the Cortes combined the Carlists seized less than 50 seats, which is below 3% of all seats available. Disorganized during the 1931 elections, the Carlist candidates were a first-choice political option for some 50,000 voters; following re-organization in successive campaigns the number grew to 420,000 (1933) and 365,000 (1936), respectively 4.9% and 3.8% of active electors. In the mid-1930s as a second-choice option the Carlists were acceptable candidates for some 1.8m voters (18%). The movement enjoyed support mostly in the Northern belt of Spain; the party stronghold was Navarre, the only region where Carlism remained a dominating force; it was a minority group still to be reckoned with in Vascongadas, Old Castile and Aragón, with rather testimonial presence in some other regions. The best known Carlist Cortes personality was Tomás Domínguez de Arévalo, who held the mandate during all three Republican terms.
Background
Carlism has been known for waging wars rather than for electoral efforts,"ningún movimiento político de la España contemporánea ha mostrado, como el tradicionalismo carlista, una predisposición tan franca y tan persistente a la violencia, hasta hacerla formar parte indisociable de su praxis política, de su identidad colectiva y de su acervo cultural", Eduardo González Calleja, Aproximación a las subculturas violentas de las derechas antirrepublicanas españolas (1931-1936), [in:] Pasado y memoria 2 (2003), p. 113 and the principal Carlist tool when striving for political power has always been a rifle, not a ballot paper.sort of "official" Carlist history is a monumental series by Melchor Ferrer, Historia del tradicionalismo español, Seville 1949-1979; out of its 30 volumes, some 22 are dedicated to Carlist military efforts When competing for parliamentary mandates the party calibrated its efforts as means of political mobilization and the way to maintain momentum before the next opportunity for a violent overthrow arises. This is how the Carlist contingent in the Cortes operated in the Isabelline period and during the Restoration era; usually reduced to a tiny group, only periodically it was growing to a sizeable yet still minoritarian parliamentary force. It was most numerous in the early 1870s, when 50 Carlist MPs made up 13% of the entire chamber;Jordi Canal, El carlismo, Madrid 2000, , p. 168 in the later Alfonsine monarchy era they were reduced to 1-4% of all deputies. The Carlist strategy and position in the parliamentarian realm of the Second Spanish Republic was not very much different; the Carlists viewed the republican system as a transitory regime to be toppled one way or another.there is no scholarly monograph dedicated to Carlist electoral or - in somewhat broader terms - parliamentarian activity at all, let alone during the Second Republic years. The closest thing is a work discussing Carlism in 1931-1936, with some sections focusing on electoral/parliamentarian issues, Martin Blinkhorn, Carlism and Crisis in Spain 1931-1939, Cambridge 2008, . The Carlists first engaged in anti-Republican conspiracy in January 1932, followed by another episode of the summer of 1932. If in both cases the party decided not to proceed on violent path it was not because they preferred peaceful means; the time was considered not ripe yet, Canal 2000, p. 299 They engaged in all three electoral campaigns to the Cortes, yet their efforts were formatted as means of political mobilization rather than as a path to power.especially the campaign of 1936 was viewed by the Carlist political leader Manuel Fal Conde as a secondary issue; unlike his predecessors on the post of Jefe Delegado, he did not bother to run himself, Blinkhorn 2008, pp. 228-236
In Spain of the early days of the Republic Carlism was generally considered "already dead, though not buried yet". The phrase expressed a popular belief that in the early 1930s the movement was nothing but an archaic relic of the Spanish past. Born hundred years earlier as epigone of feudalism, pathetically obsolete already in the late 19th century, it was supposedly delivered a mortal blow by the 1919 breakup. If there were still Carlist periodicals issued and some politicians active, it was – the theory went – only because a few old partisans of the cause refused to acknowledge the new times. After they died, Carlism was expected to be laid to rest on the ash heap of history; poor results of the 1931 elections seemed to confirm this view.Canal 2000, p. 287
The years to come proved that with over 2m votes gained in each electoral campaign the movement demonstrated a revival.Canal 2000, p. 308 Scholars offer differing explanations of the phenomenon. According to one theory, sectarian republican milieu drove many voters to extremes, and Carlism as an extreme right-wing party was beneficiary of the process.there is abundant literature on politics of the Second Republic and most authors agree that its sectarian penchant contributed to the final collapse of the republican regime: "una de las explicaciones clásicas que se han dado a la proliferación de la violencia durante la Segunda República ha girado en torno a un déficit de cultura política que habría favorecido el auge de los extremismos", González Calleja, 2003, p. 107. For a classic study which tends to focus on Left-wing violence see Stanley G. Payne, The Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933-1936, New York 2006, ; similarly classic study focusing on Right-wing violence, including the Carlist one, is Paul Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and Revolution in the Second Republic, London 1994, . A monograph dedicated to Carlism of the Second Republic is formatted as "a study of political extremism in the Spain of the Second Republic", Blinkhorn 2008, p. VII According to another reading, in turbulent times Carlism has always thrived as an amalgamating force; in the 1830s it attracted absolutist defenders of the ancién regime, in the 1870s it attracted neocatólicos, in the 1930s it attracted all these anxious to prevent revolution."el carlismo se había erigido de nuevo como núcleo cohesivo de otra alamgama conterrevolucionaria, aungque de dimensiones bastante más modestas que las del siglo XIX", Jordi Canal i Morell, Banderas blancas, boinas rojas: una historia política del carlismo, 1876-1939, Madrid 2006, , p. 324 However, there were limits to Carlist appeal. As defenders of Catholic values they were outperformed by modern large Christian parties like CEDA. As advocates of the royal rule they struggled against the mainstream monarchist grouping, the Alfonsists. As campaigners for de-centralization and separate regional establishments they were no match for Basque and Catalan nationalists.Blinkhorn 2008; see especially the chapter Rivals on the right, pp. 94-118 A combination of the above features, plus issues related to electoral strategy, are deemed responsible for overall Carlist performance at the polls.
Performance at the polls: Carlism and around Overall Carlist performancefor classification of candidates and deputies see footnote #32. Votes gathered calculated accordingly using the MdV method, see footnote #58 year % of votersvoters who supported the Carlists as their first choice (calculated according to the MdV method, see footnote #58) as percentage of all active voters. In brackets voters who supported the Carlists in general, also as would-be allies of their preferred party or as option B (total number of votes gathered by the Carlists de-duplicated in case of districts with more than 1 Carlist candidate running, see footnote #54) as percentage of all active voters % of seatsnumber of seats taken by Carlist MPs as percentage of all seats available in the chamber 1931 1.2% (4.8%) 1.1% 1933 4.9% (17.7%) 5.1% 1936 3.8% (18.3%) 2.1%