The diplomatic history of World War I covers the non-military interactions among the major players during World War I. For the domestic histories of participants see home front during World War I. For a longer-term perspective see international relations (1814–1919) and causes of World War I. For the following (post-war) era see international relations (1919–1939). The major "Allies" grouping included Great Britain and its empire, France, Russia (until 1917), Italy (from 1915) and the United States (from 1917). Opposing the Allies, the major Central Powers included Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) and Bulgaria. Other countries (Belgium and Japan, for example) also joined the Allies. For a detailed chronology see timeline of World War I.
Non-military diplomatic and propaganda interactions among the belligerents aimed to build support for one's cause or to undermine support for one's enemies.David Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics (1988).Z.A.B. Zeman, Diplomatic History of the First World War (1971) Wartime diplomacy focused on five issues: subversion and propaganda campaigns to weaken the morale of the enemy defining and redefining the war goals, which became harsher as the war went on luring provisionally neutral countries (Italy, the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria and Romania) onto one's side by offering slices of enemy territory encouragement of nationalistic minority movements within enemy territories, especially among Czechs, Poles, Arabs, Irish, and minorities in the Russian Empire peace proposals. Neutral countries and belligerents variously made multiple peace proposals; none of them progressed very far. Some were neutral efforts to end the horrors. Others involved propaganda ploys to show one's own side as reasonable and the other side as obstinate.See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals: December 1916 to November 1918, edited by James Brown Scott. (1921) 515 pp online free.
War aims
Years later a myth grew up that the crowds and all the belligerent nations cheered and welcomed the war. That was not true – everywhere there was a deep sense of foreboding. In wartime Britain, and in neutral United States, reports of German atrocities and killing thousands of civilians, rounding up hostages, and destroying historic buildings and libraries caused a change of heart to an antiwar population. For example, suffragists took up the cause of the war, as did intellectuals. Very few expected a short happy war – the slogan "over by Christmas" was coined three years after the war began.Robert Tombs, The English and their history (2014) p 612. Historians find that "The evidence for mass enthusiasm at the time is surprisingly weak."
Allied war goals In 1914 the war was so unexpected that no one had formulated long-term goals. An ad-hoc meeting of the French and British ambassadors with the Russian Foreign Minister in early September led to a statement of war aims that was not official, but did represent ideas circulating among diplomats in St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, as well as the secondary allies of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro. Its provisions included:W. Henry Cooke and Edith P. Stickney, eds. (1931). Readings in European International Relations since 1870. pp. 418–19.
No official statement of Allied war aims was issued. The secret treaties remained secret until the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia in November 1917 and began publishing them. Socialists had always alleged that capitalists were behind the war in order to line their own pockets, and the evidence of promised new territories invigorated left-wing movements around the world. President Woodrow Wilson regained some of the initiative in January 1918 when he proclaimed his Fourteen Points, the first of which demanded, "Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view."
Historian Hew Strachan argues that war aims focused on territorial gains were not of central importance anyway. They did not cause the war nor shape its course of action. Rather, he says:
German war goals The Germans never finalized a set of war aims. However, in September 1914, Kurt Riezler, a senior staff aide to German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg sketched out some possible ideas – dubbed by historians the "September Program". It emphasized economic gains, turning all of Central and Western Europe into a common market controlled by and for the benefit of Germany. Belgium would become a vassal state, there would be a series of naval bases threatening England, and Germany would seize much of Eastern Europe from Russia – as in fact it did in early 1918. There would be a crippling financial indemnity on France making it economically dependent on Germany. The Netherlands would become a dependent satellite, and British commerce would be excluded. Germany would rebuild a colonial empire in Africa. The ideas sketched by Riezler were not fully formulated, were not endorsed by Bethmann Hollweg, and were not presented to or approved by any official body. The ideas were formulated on the run after the war began, and did not mean these ideas had been reflected in a prewar plan, as historian Fritz Fischer fallaciously assumed. However, they do indicate that if Germany had won it would have taken a very aggressive dominant position in Europe. Indeed, it took a very harsh position on occupied Belgian and France starting in 1914, and in the Treaty of Brest Litovsk imposed on Russia in 1917, which liberated many of the subject peoples of Russia from Finland to Ukraine.Tombs, Robert (2014). The English and their history. p 611.Wayne C. Thompson (1978). "The September Program: Reflections on the Evidence". Central European History 11.4: 348–354.
The stalemate by the end of 1914 forced serious consideration of long-term goals. Britain, France, Russia and Germany all separately concluded this was not a traditional war with limited goals. Britain, France and Russia became committed to the destruction of German military power, and Germany to the dominance of German military power in Europe. One month into the war, Britain, France and Russia agreed not to make a separate peace with Germany, and discussions began about enticing other countries to join in return for territorial gains. However, as Barbara Jelavich observes, "Throughout the war Russian actions were carried out without real coordination or joint planning with the Western powers."Barbara Jelavich (1974). St. Petersburg and Moscow: tsarist and Soviet foreign policy, 1814–1974. pp. 281–284. There was no serious three-way coordination of strategy, nor was there much coordination between Britain and France before 1917.
Approaches to diplomacy Both sides employed secret treaties to entice neutral nations to join them in return for a promise of spoils when victory was achieved. They were kept secret until the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia in 1917 and began publishing all the details on the Allied side. The Allies especially promised that after defeating the Ottoman Empire they would give large slices in return for immediate help in the war. Some territories were promised to several recipients, on the principle that conflicts could be sorted out after victory was achieved. Some promises, therefore, had to be broken, and that left permanent bitter legacies, especially in Italy.J. A. S. Grenville, ed. (2001). The Major International Treaties of the Twentieth Century: A History and Guide with Texts. Vol. 1. Taylor & Francis. p. 61.Norman Rich (2002). Great Power Diplomacy: Since 1914. pp. 12–20.
Secret treaties Important secret treaties of this era include the secretly concluded treaty of Ottoman–German alliance signed on 2 August 1914. It provided that Germany and Turkey would remain neutral in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, but if Russia intervened "with active military measures" the two countries would become military allies.Grenville, pp. 62–63. Another important secret treaty was the Treaty of London, concluded on 26 April 1915, in which Italy was promised certain territorial concessions in exchange for joining the war on the Triple Entente (Allied) side.Grenville, p. 63. The Treaty of Bucharest was concluded between Romania and the Entente powers (Britain, France, Italy, and Russia) on 17 August 1916; under this treaty, Romania pledged to attack Austria-Hungary and not to seek a separate peace in exchange for certain territorial gains. Article 16 of that treaty provided that "the present arrangement shall be held secret".Grenville, pp. 63–66. Blaming the war in part on secret treaties, President Wilson called in his Fourteen Points for "open covenants, openly arrived at".
Germany controlled by Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff The two sides had strikingly different approaches to diplomacy. The military leadership of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and his deputy General Erich Ludendorff increasingly controlled Germany and the other Central Powers. They worked around the Kaiser and largely ignored the politicians and diplomats; they focused on military supremacy.Robert B. Asprey (1991). Hindenburg & Ludendorff: The German High Command at War. The most dramatic example came when military command decided on unrestricted submarine warfare against Britain in early 1917, over the objections of Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg and other civilian leaders. Historian Cathal Nolan says their strategy was that "Germans must win fast and win everything or lose everything in a war of exhaustion: knock out Russia in 1917, defeat France and starve Britain, all before the Americans arrived in sufficient numbers to make a real difference on the Western Front." A military approach meant that victory was to be achieved by winning great campaigns against the main enemy armies. Allies were useful for providing hundreds of thousands of bayonets, and access to critical geographical points.
Allies bargain over goals The Allies had a more complex multi-dimensional approach that included critical roles for diplomacy, finance, propaganda and subversion.Victor Rothwell (1971). British war aims and peace diplomacy, 1914–1918. Oxford University Press. The Lansdowne letter called for Britain to negotiate a peace with Germany, It was published by a London newspaper and written by Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne, a former foreign secretary and war minister. Lansdowne came under withering criticism with few supporters and the government rejected the proposal. Further talk of a compromise solution was suppressed and the British and French war aim was to permanently destroy German militarism. When the United States joined in, Woodrow Wilson likewise in his 14 points emphasized the need to destroy militarism.D. Newton (2002). "The Lansdowne 'Peace Letter' of 1917 and the Prospect of Peace by Negotiation with Germany". Australian Journal of Politics & History. 48#1. pp. 16–39. Austria and Turkey were not the main targets, and a separate peace with either or both of them was always an option. The Allies bargained with neutrals such as Italy by promising them when victory came, the Central Powers would be broken up and critical territories would be given to the winners. In the Treaty of London (1915), Italy was promised several large slices of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.C. J. Lowe (1969). "Britain and Italian Intervention 1914–1915". Historical Journal. 12#3. 533–548. Russia was promised Constantinople in the Constantinople Agreement of 1915. the Jews were promised a homeland in Palestine in the Balfour Declaration of 1917, but the Arabs had already been promised a sovereign state in Turkish-controlled regions. Aspiring nationalities were promised their own homelands. France was promised Alsace-Lorraine, which had been ceded to Germany in 1871.