The Actions of 30 September – 4 October 1917 were German methodical counter-attacks () during the Third Battle of Ypres, in Flanders, during the First World War. Hasty counter-attacks () by the German 4th Army during the Battle of the Menin Road Ridge on 20 September and the Battle of Polygon Wood on 26 September, had been costly failures. On 29 September, a review was held at Roulers by Erich Ludendorff, the (Quartermaster-General of the German Army, equivalent to the British Chief of the General Staff) with the commanders of (Army Group Rupprecht of Bavaria) and the 4th Army staffs.
(Methodical counter-attacks) after a British attack were to be substituted for (immediate counter-attacks) during British attacks, to benefit from greater knowledge of the situation in the front line, air reconnaissance and artillery support. The change to was expected to thwart the British tactic of short advances and rapid consolidation. From 30 September to 4 October, the 4th Army conducted several but these re-captured little ground. After a costly failure on 1 October, another intended for 3 October was put back to 4 October and failed, after coinciding with a big British attack on Broodseinde Ridge by the Second Army. Local attempts to counter-attack during the afternoon met a similar fate.
On 7 October, the 4th Army changed its defensive policy again; more emphasis was placed on reducing British barrage fire by counter-battery bombardments. Front line garrisons were to man an outpost zone dispersed in sentry posts and machine-gun nests. As soon as the British attacked, the outpost troops were to rush back to the main defensive line, which would then be protected by a standing barrage. The attackers were to be delayed by artillery-fire rather than German infantry action, while divisions (specialist counter-attack divisions) advanced through the British barrages and conducted as soon as possible. If the British had already dug in, the was to be cancelled and a conducted later.
Background
Strategic developments
The failure of the Kerensky Offensive in Russia in July had hastened the disintegration of the Russian army, made likely a Russian armistice and a huge reinforcement of the German Western Front. On the Western Front, the Battle of Hill 70 was fought by the Canadian Corps against the 6th Army, from 15 to 25 August, forestalling the transfer of fresh divisions to Flanders. On 20 August, the French attacked the German 5th Army at Verdun and in four days, re-took much of the ground lost to the Germans in 1916. The French took thirty guns, mortars and The French victory was similar in extent to the defeat of the 4th Army in the Battle of Messines in June and the Germans were unable to mount big counter-attacks because their Eingreif divisions had been transferred to Flanders. French preparations continued for an offensive on the Chemin des Dames (the Battle of La Malmaison) and the British Third Army worked on a plan for a surprise artillery–tank attack on the Flesquières Salient near Cambrai.
Tactical developments
The period of dry weather and clear skies in Flanders, in early September, greatly increased the effectiveness of British air observation and artillery-fire. German (immediate counter-attacks) had failed and when divisions arrived from the rear, they found that the British had established a defence in depth on reverse slopes, protected by standing barrages. The Royal Flying Corps (RFC) flew new specialist counter-attack reconnaissance sorties to observe German troop movements and improved its contact patrol and ground-attack methods. German artillery-fire was haphazard, due to uncertainty over the position of German infantry, just when the British could rely on massed artillery, accurately directed by observers in the air and on the ground. German counter-attacks had become assaults on reinforced field positions, due to the short British infantry advances, greater artillery firepower and tactical emphasis on defeating . Following the costly defeats at the Battle of the Menin Road Ridge on 20 September and the Battle of Polygon Wood on 26 September, the 4th Army changed its defensive organisation again by altering their counter-attack tactics.
Prelude
German preparations
On 28 September, two days after the defeat of the Battle of Polygon Wood, (Lieutenant-Colonel) Albrecht von Thaer, the chief of staff of , made a diary note that it had been an awful experience; he did not know what to do against the British. Erich Ludendorff the (Quartermaster-General of the German Army, equivalent to the British Chief of the General Staff) conferred on 29 September with (Field Marshal) Crown Prince Rupprecht the commander and (Lieutenant-General) Hermann von Kuhl the chief of staff, of (Army Group Rupprecht of Bavaria), the 4th Army commander, General Friedrich Sixt von Armin and the 4th Army chief of staff, (Major-General) Fritz von Loßberg.
The staff officers of the 4th Army (corps headquarters) agreed that defensive manoeuvre was to be replaced by a policy of fighting for every piece of ground. Sixt von Armin thought that even if counter-attacks failed to recapture ground, the British would keep more troops in the front line and that German infantry casualties were no worse in counter-attacks than under British barrages. On 30 September, the 4th Army issued an operation order for more field artillery bombardments between British attacks and that at least half of the heavy artillery ammunition was to be used for observed fire on captured pill-boxes, command posts and machine-gun nests, duckboard tracks and field railways. Gas bombardments were to be increased on the British front line and artillery emplacements, wind permitting. Pillboxes were to be recaptured, defensive positions improved and the British infantry were to be harassed by patrols and diversionary bombardments. The British were to be compelled by spoiling attacks to reinforce their forward positions and to counter-attack, during which they could be engaged by the German artillery.
Forward garrisons of the ground holding divisions were to be reinforced and all machine-guns, including those of the support and reserve battalions of the front line regiments, were sent into the forward zone, to make a cordon of four to eight guns every . The (storm) regiments of the divisions were moved up to the (artillery protection line) behind the forward battle zone, to counter-attack while the British were consolidating. The rest of the division was to be held back for a (methodical counter-attack) later. Between British attacks, the divisions were to make more spoiling attacks. On 27 September, south-east of Polygon Wood, three German attacks against the 39th Division in the X Corps area, were repulsed by artillery fire. On the 3rd Division front astride the Ypres–Roulers railway, the Germans made a determined attack on Bostin Farm, eventually to be forced back; there were no until 30 September.
British preparations
British tactical refinements had sought to undermine the German defence-in-depth, by attacking objectives close behind the German front line and then fighting the principal battle against divisions, as they counter-attacked. By further reorganising infantry reserves, Plumer had ensured that the depth of the attacking divisions corresponded closer to the depth of the local German counter-attack reserves and their divisions, providing more support for the advance and consolidation against German counter-attacks. Divisions had attacked on narrower fronts and advanced no more than into the German defence zone, before digging in. German counter-attackers found a reciprocal defence-in-depth, protected by a mass of artillery. The tempo of attacks achieved by the British also added to the German difficulty in replacing tired divisions through the transport bottlenecks behind the 4th Army front.
No formal artillery preparation was to be conducted before 4 October, except for the normal heavy artillery counter-battery fire and destructive fire on German strong points. To mislead the Germans as to the date and time of the infantry attack, when a hurricane bombardment was to be fired at zero hour, practice barrages began on 27 September and increased to two barrages a day from 1 October. In a summary of 1 October, British military intelligence predicted the German defensive changes made after the defeat of 26 September, forecasting a big German counter-attack to recapture the area around Zonnebeke. The British considered cancelling their attack when heavy rain fell on 2 October, turning parts of the ground into a morass but decided to go ahead. X Corps took over from the I Anzac Corps in the area north of the Menin road and the 23rd Division (Major-General J. M. Babington) relieved the 33rd Division from the Menin road, north to Cameron Covert, on the night of
German artillery began to fire on the divisional area at dusk and a German party of infantry, seen on the right flank, was dispersed by British artillery. A spur into Cameron Covert was taken over from Australian troops and patrols during the night found little sign of Germans. Advanced posts were dug and work continued on field defences, using the thick white mist that rose before dawn for concealment. The German artillery continued to bombard the area during 29 September and that day, German aircraft flew over the divisional artillery and the rear areas. In the evening, German shelling increased around Black Watch Corner on the south side of Polygon Wood. German troops were seen assembling and were engaged by artillery but still managed to attack. The British infantry waited, opened rapid fire with their small arms and repulsed the attackers. During the night, rear areas were bombed by German aircraft and the divisional artillery was severely bombarded with mustard gas. During the night of the 23rd Division reorganised, the left flank of the 69th Brigade around Cameron Covert, being in touch with the 110th Brigade on the right of the 21st Division to the north.
German plans
1 October +Weather(27 September – 4 October 1917) Date Rainmm °FSeptember 270.067dull 280.067dull 290.065fine 300.067fineOctober 10.069fine 22.776rain 31.264dull 44.660dull The ground between Polygon Wood and the Menin road contained the streams of the Polygonbeek, between Reutel and Cameron Covert and the Reutelbeek, which drained the south-eastern corner of the Gheluvelt Plateau. The beds of the streams had been smashed by artillery bombardments, their courses had become swampy and in wet weather formed a mud slough about wide, between Reutel to the north and Cameron Covert and the Polderhoek Spur to the south. A ravine between the Polygonbeek and Jetty Warren was muddy but passable in most places. The fresh 45th Reserve Division, the division of contributed Reserve Infantry Regiment 210 (RIR 210) and the 8th Division of supplied Infantry Regiment 93 (IR 93). The 4th Army provided twelve sections to attack the pillboxes and several companies were attached, to form a special force under General , commander of the 17th Division.
4 October