The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) held its 39th federal congress in Madrid between 16 and 18 June 2017, to renovate its governing bodies—including the post of secretary-general, which amounted to that of party leader—and establish the party platform and policy until the next congress, after the sacking of Pedro Sánchez as party leader in October 2016 had resulted in a caretaker leadership being appointed. The primary election was held on 21 May 2017, after being confirmed in a federal committee on 1 April.
The leadership race was the first to be held after the party's electoral setbacks in both the 2015 and 2016 general elections in which the party scored its two worst electoral records since the Spanish transition to democracy. An extraordinary party congress had been held in July 2014 after Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba's resignation, in which Pedro Sánchez had been elected as new party leader. However, no ordinary congress had been held since 2012. Former President of the Congress of Deputies and former Lehendakari Patxi López publicly announced his bid as candidate on 15 January, with President of the Regional Government of Andalusia Susana Díaz and Sánchez himself following suit.
The election resulted in Pedro Sánchez being re-elected as Secretary-General in a landslide. Sánchez would ultimately lead the PSOE into government after a successful vote of no confidence which would see Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy and his People's Party ousted from power.
Background Susana Díaz's rise Susana Díaz became President of the Regional Government of Andalusia and Secretary-General of the PSOE–A succeeding José Antonio Griñán—who had resigned as a result of political fallout derived from the ERE scandal—after a rapid ascent among party ranks throughout the previous years. Known for her political ambition, her power and influence grew as she became the leader of the most powerful Spanish Socialist Workers' Party regional federation, as well as premier of the largest and most populous region in Spain. Soon, she was publicly acclaimed by party colleagues who considered she had the skills, charisma and political appeal needed for leading the PSOE, and they quickly rallied behind her as a potential contender for the role of Secretary-General after Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba's announced resignation—as a consequence of the PSOE electoral setback in the 2014 European Parliament election—ushered in a rushed leadership race. However, the challenge posed by Eduardo Madina—whose pressure forced a primary election to be held on 13 July—, Díaz's own desire to become party leader by acclamation and not through a bitter leadership contest which could see her popularity eroded, as well as opposition from within the PSOE–A—members of which asked her to remain in Andalusia—motivated Diaz's decision not to run. Nonetheless, Díaz's opposition to Madina for his maneuvers to trigger a party primary and, consequently, thwarting her planned rise, resulted in the PSOE–A backing a dark horse candidate, then-relatively unknown deputy Pedro Sánchez, ahead of the previous federal congress. Thanks to Díaz's support, Sánchez was able to win the primary election by a wide margin and become the new PSOE Secretary-General.
However, the alliance between Sánchez and Díaz was short-lived. Díaz's initial plans to become the PSOE candidate at the next general election were impeded by Sánchez's own growing political aspirations. This, coupled with personal differences derived from Sánchez's management over the party, seen as alienating the different party families, caused both leaders to grow increasingly distrustful of each other and to develop a personal rivalry. Susana Díaz took advantage of growing criticism to Sánchez's leadership, succeeding in causing many long-standing rivals within the party—such as Rubalcaba and Carme Chacón, Felipe González and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, or even Eduardo Madina and Díaz herself; as well as six out of the seven PSOE regional presidents—to abandon their feuds, attracting them to her sphere and uniting them against her former protégé.
2016 PSOE crisis
The 2015 general election had seen the PSOE obtaining its worst results in a general election since the Spanish transition to democracy, with the party reduced to just 90 seats and 5.5 million votes. Left-wing newcomer Podemos had finished within striking distance, winning 69 seats and 5.2 million votes, boosted by massive support from young voters, raising fears among some PSOE leaders that Podemos could eventually replace their party as the dominant Spanish party to the left-of-centre. Secretary-General Pedro Sánchez, who had led the party into the general election and whose leadership had been widely questioned for some time by the critical faction led by Susana Díaz, announced he would run for re-election as party leader in the party federal congress initially scheduled for early 2016. Díaz, unlike 2014, was now allegedly determined to become new party leader herself by battling Sánchez in the incoming contest, intending for the congress to be held as early as March or April 2016, whereas Sánchez sought to have it held in June. A compromise solution was reached in order to avoid a major clash between both sides, with the congress being scheduled for 21 and 22 May and a primary election to be held on 8 May.
Government formation talks nationwide broke down after Sánchez's failed investiture attempt in early March 2016. On 28 March, the PSOE leadership race was postponed indefinitely until a new government was appointed, due to increasing odds of a fresh election being called for 26 June. The party's performance in the eventual 2016 general election, where it narrowly avoided being decisively overcome by the Unidos Podemos coalition, only temporarily halted criticism from party critics. Serious setbacks in the Basque and Galician elections held on 25 September, which had been turned by dissenters into an electoral test of Sánchez, prompted immediate calls for resignation among his opponents, unleashing a party crisis which weakened Sánchez's standing and indicated a loss of support for him within the party. Sánchez refused to step down and instead proposed to have the congress held immediately, scheduling it for 12 and 13 November and the primary election for 23 October, while daring his critics to challenge him in a back-me-or-sack-me vote. This move enraged his opponents, who subsequently forced the resignation of half of the party's executive commission on 28 September in order to trigger Sánchez's downfall. Sánchez did not acknowledge his ouster and sought to keep his promise of an autumn congress, resulting in the party being openly split into two opposing factions, as critics no longer recognized Sánchez's legitimacy to act as secretary-general. In a troubled federal committee held on 1 October, Sánchez finally resigned as party leader after losing a key ballot on his congress' proposal by 132 votes to 107. A caretaker managing committee headed by Asturias President Javier Fernández was appointed to lead the party until the party congress to elect a new leadership could be organized.
Concurrently with the ongoing PSOE crisis, the government formation process continued as the People's Party of Mariano Rajoy had secured the support of both Citizens and Canarian Coalition for Rajoy's investiture. The PSOE caretaker leadership appointed after Sánchez's sacking approved the party's abstention in such a vote, thus ensuring Rajoy's re-election as Prime Minister of Spain despite the party's previous stance not to allow a new PP government. A few hours ahead of the scheduled second ballot that would allow Rajoy's investiture, Pedro Sánchez announced his resignation as an MP—a decision advised by his close aides—arguing that he could neither abstain—and thus break his electoral pledge of opposing a PP government—or, as former PSOE leader, set a bad precedent by disobeying the decision of the highest party governing body, the federal committee. Right after government formation, in an exclusive interview for laSexta's Salvados news show, Pedro Sánchez publicly accused Susana Díaz's allies within the party and the "financial powers"—specially the PRISA Group, owner of El País media outlet—of having coerced him into avoiding a left-wing pact with Podemos and nationalist parties throughout the entire government formation process, accusing them of triggering the internal revolt within PSOE to oust him once he considered a serious attempt at forming such an alliance.
Late 2016: Díaz's consolidation, Sánchez in expectation
Taking advantage of the internal disarray resulting from Sánchez's demise, Susana Díaz, main orchestrator of the party revolt that brought him down, became widely regarded as the new PSOE leader in pectore as the Fernández-led caretaker team came to be seen as a mere puppet body under her control. As Díaz extended her influence throughout the party's structure, she sought party adhesions to its figure and visibility as the PSOE's organic and institutional reference by meeting Socialists' Party of Catalonia leader Miquel Iceta—securing the PSC neutrality for the incoming leadership contest in exchange of the promise to avoid a split between both parties—and planning a tour to the European Parliament as part of the greater national and international scope of her political agenda. She also staged a party rally in Jaén on 16 December, in which she was granted the public and unconditional support of former Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero—long turned into an admirer of the Andalusian President and an opponent to Pedro Sánchez. In the ensuing weeks, Díaz would receive public acclaim from regional Presidents Javier Lambán of Aragon—who publicly endorsed her and went as far as to assure that Díaz was "protected by the gods of Socialism"—and Guillermo Fernández Vara of Extremadura—who commented on her that "she's like a cannon communicating; she sounds like a winner"—.
Close aides to Díaz revealed that she preferred to face the primary election as the sole candidate in order to win unopposed, but the faction critical of the new leadership soon assured they would field a candidate of their own regardless of Díaz's intentions, and all sides soon acknowledged that the race would be competitive. Some called for Pedro Sánchez—who had hinted at such a possibility but had never officially confirmed it—to run again for leadership, but there were those who regarded both Díaz and Sánchez unfit for the role—arguing that their long-lasting grudge for power had deeply divided the party and that none of them would be able to fully re-unite it again—. Proponents of this alternative, 'third' way, considered former President of the Congress of Deputies Patxi López as a potential frontrunner. Support for a potential Patxi López's bid grew among Sánchez's loyalists as time passed and the former PSOE leader remained ambiguous on his intentions.