The 293rd Rifle Division began service as a Red Army rifle division shortly after the German invasion. It was largely based on what would become the shtat (table of organization and equipment) of July 29, 1941. The division was initially assigned to 40th Army of Southwestern Front when that Army was formed on August 26. It served in several clashes with the German 2nd Panzer Group in the vicinity of Korop and was therefore outside the area encircled by 2nd and 1st Panzer Groups in September, spending the winter along the front near Kursk. It fought in the unsuccessful Soviet offensive on Kharkiv in May, 1942 as part of 21st Army, suffering significant casualties in the process. During June and July the remnants of the division fought along the Don River against the German summer offensive until it was pulled back into the Reserve of the Supreme High Command for rebuilding. It returned to the front in October, again as part of 21st Army, near Stalingrad, where it played a leading role in the encirclement and destruction of German 6th Army in January 1943, for which it was raised to Guards status as the 66th Guards Rifle Division as the battle was still ongoing.
A second 293rd Rifle Division was raised a few months later in Transbaikal Military District and remained in the Far East until August 1945 when it took part in the Soviet invasion of Manchuria as part of 36th Army in Transbaikal Front. In the course of this campaign it crossed the Greater Khingan Mountains was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for its role in the defeat of the Kwantung Army. It remained in the Far East until it was disbanded in 1946.
1st Formation The 293rd Rifle Division, with an authorized strength of 10,911 men, began forming on July 18, 1941 at Sumy, 47th Anniversary of the 66th Brigade composed of conscripts between ages 18 and 50 arriving from Kiev Oblast. Col. Pavel Lagutin would command the division throughout its 1st formation, being promoted to the rank of major general on December 27. In a report written after the division suffered heavy losses in September, Lagutin described its numerous shortcomings in manpower quality and equipment:The 293rd Rifle Division began formation from 18 July 1941 in Sumy from contingents, arriving from Kiev Oblast, between the ages of 18 and 50. Among these 70 percent were without any military training and a high percentage unfit for military service due to their physical condition. During the period of formation, that is, from 18 July to 19 August, more than 20,000 men passed through the division and no more than 60 percent were selected to bring the division up to its authorized strength. The division command raised the question of manning the division with more suitable personnel. After this, the leftovers of earlier mobilized age groups, citizens of Sumy Oblast born from 1905 to 1918, were called up. The division was fully manned on 18 August. Among the rank and file twenty percent were completely untrained, 70 percent had a little training from different refresher trainings, and ten percent were trained. At all levels, 70 percent of the command personnel were called up from the reserve, of which the absolute majority had gone through reserve training at different times... The armament of the division was received at the last moment. Rifles were received at the station while entraining for the front. The division received mortars, divisional guns, regimental and anti-tank artillery, and heavy machine guns two days before boarding troop trains, as a result, the division did not have the opportunity to properly familiarize its personnel with this equipment.
The division received old equipment, artillery, and heavy machine guns that received factory refurbishment, as a result of which they often broke down in battle: on the fourth day of the battle due to mechanical unreliability six regimental artillery guns and two 45 mm guns were out of order and sent to Sumy for repairs, in addition to four 122 mm howitzers, often out of order during battle. Its order of battle, with numerous changes over time, was as follows: 1032nd Rifle Regiment 1034th Rifle Regiment 1036th Rifle Regiment 817th Artillery Regiment (until July 27, 1942; reestablished October 17)Charles C. Sharp, "Red Tide", Soviet Rifle Divisions Formed From June to December, 1941, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, Vol. IX, Nafziger, 1996, p. 65 331st Antitank Battalion (from October 17, 1942) 414th Antiaircraft Battery (later 576th Antiaircraft Battalion) 262nd Machine Gun Battalion (from October 17, 1942) 350th Reconnaissance Company 586th Sapper Battalion 571st Signal Battalion (until August 13, 1942); 243rd Signal Company (after August 13) 319th Medical/Sanitation Battalion 384th Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Company 421st Auto Transport Company (later 721st) 27th Field Bakery (later 377th Auto Field Bakery) 645th Divisional Veterinary Hospital 973rd Field Postal Station 859th Field Office of the State Bank The 293rd was almost immediately assigned to Southwestern Front to complete its formation. On August 18, it was assigned to 40th Army of that Front.Walter S. Dunn, Jr., Stalin's Keys to Victory, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2006, p. 77Sharp, "Red Tide", p. 65 The division began entraining at the Sumy station on 20 August, bound for the stations of Litynovka and Krolevets. While on the way, the division headquarters received orders from the front headquarters on 21 August, tasking it with the following missions:Prepare the line along the southeastern bank of the Desna river in the sector of Pirogovka and Zhernovki for defense, covering the line of Shostka and Pirogovka from the north against a breakthrough by enemy tank groups, and be in readiness with the main forces of the division to cover the line between the mouth of the Seym and Raygorodok. On 25 August, the 293rd took positions on the line of Shostka, Pirogovka, Timonovka, and Raygorodok, a frontage of 60 kilometers, and its additional mission of covering the Korop axis extended the front by another ten. German troops came up to the Desna on 26 August and the battle for the crossing in the Prigorodka region began. That evening German infantry and tanks with artillery support crossed in force, opposed by the 1034th Rifle Regiment, which lost roughly 50 killed and 100 wounded. Two 76 mm guns from the 817th Artillery Regiment were disabled, and six heavy machine guns crushed by tanks. The 1034th counterattacked on 27 August, driving the German troops back to the crossing, but could not dislodge them from their foothold on the Soviet side of the Desna. The 1034th lost more than 60 killed and roughly 130 wounded that day, while another 76 mm gun from the 817th and several heavy machine guns were lost. After briefly holding on, the regiment retreated towards Sobich late on 28 August in the face of what the Soviets estimated as two infantry regiments supported by twenty to thirty tanks. That day, the 1036th Rifle Regiment, covering the Shostka and Bogdanovka sector, came under tank attack from the Shostka direction, as Lagutin reported:The tank attack was thrown back, and three enemy tanks destroyed, and on our side one 122 mm gun of the 817th Artillery Regiment was disabled, several horses put out of action and about twenty men killed and wounded.
Battle of Kyiv The Front commander, Col. Gen. M. P. Kirponos, issued his Operational Directive No. 00322 at 1600 hours on August 28, several hours after the Army made initial contact with German forces, in which he described its mission, in part:Thus the Army, under command of Maj. Gen. K. P. Podlas, raised hurriedly, literally from scratch, was expected to defend a 115km-wide front with a paltry force of just over four divisions manned by roughly 50,000 men and about 40 tanks.David M. Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2012, p. 123
As his formations continued arriving in the Hlukhiv, Krolevets and Konotop region, Podlas committed them to action immediately, with orders to attack the lead elements of XXIV Motorized Corps' 10th Motorized and 3rd Panzer Divisions as they crossed the Desna. By the time they did, 3rd Panzer was well north of Novhorod-Siverskyi, and 10th Motorized had seized Korop. Ultimately, the 293rd engaged 3rd Panzer in the Shostka region. It was not a match for a full-blooded panzer division, and Podlas had no choice but to reinforce it as additional units arrived. 10th Tanks and later 5th Antitank moved to support of Lagutin's troops. Complicating Podlas' task was that while 40th Army was under Kirponos' command, it was actually wedged between Bryansk Front's 21st and 13th Armies. The obvious solution, to move 40th Army from one Front to the other, was rejected.Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, pp. 123-24
Later on August 28, Southwestern Front issued an operational summary describing 40th Army's dispositions and actions:Podlas focused his initial assaults against 3rd Panzer, and his report to the Front at 2200 hours on August 29 stated that the 293rd was fighting in the Pirogovka and Korop region. At 1500 a German force of up to a regiment of infantry with 15 tanks and tankettes (Red Army reports used this term for the Panzer I) attacked toward Altynovka. Podlas ordered forces of 10th Tanks, the 293rd, and 2nd Airborne to counterattack along this axis.Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, pp. 124-25 Roslavl-Novozybkov Offensive The forces facing the 293rd were from 10th Motorized, which was pushing southward toward the Seym River. At 2200 hours on August 30, Southwestern Front reported that the division had repelled a counterattack against its right wing and held its previous positions south and southeast of Korop. The next day it launched a converging counterattack in cooperation with 135th Division and 2nd Airborne against the lead battle group of 10th Motorized. This led to it being encircled 12km south of the town and pressed the remainder of the 10th Motorized back to its outskirts. The battle group was forced to fight its way back to Korop by nightfall on September 1 at the cost of about 200 casualties. In his memoir Panzer Leader, H. Guderian noted:Guderian turned to Army Group Center with an urgent request for reserves to restore the situation. At the end of this day the Front reported that the 293rd, now with the 28th NKVD Motorized Rifle Regiment attached, had gone over to the defense at 1800 hours with up to two regiments of German motorized infantry and a battalion of tanks facing it.Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, pp. 364-65, 395, 398-99, 418 In the fighting on 30–31 August, the 1034th Rifle Regiment, under heavy pressure from the Germans, lost up to 60 percent of its personnel, as well as more heavy weapons: another 76 mm gun from the 817th, three 45 mm guns, two 120 mm mortars, and about twelve heavy machine guns, as well as a significant quantity of other armament. Lagutin further described the fighting on 1 September: The enemy went on the offensive along the entire front on the morning of 1 September with sizable forces, no less than 100–130 tanks and up to three regiments of infantry. The regiments repulsed the enemy attacks and held the line until 14:00. The enemy directed his strike from the direction of Voronezh-Glukhov and Bogdanovka through Chervonye Lozy and from Sobich against Leski, Gluboky Kolodets and towards Zabolotye, flanking the regiment on both sides. As a result of the battle our regiments suffered significant losses: no more than 30 percent of the men of the 1034th Rifle Regiment remained, and the 7th Company of the 1036th Rifle Regiment, covering the gap between the regiments, saddling the road from Sobich to Klishke to a rectangular grove 4 kilometers south of Sobich, was fully wiped out by mortar fire and tanks, it held the enemy until the beginning of the general retreat.