In the United States, the exclusionary rule is a legal rule, based on constitutional law, that prevents evidence collected or analyzed in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights from being used in a court of law. This may be considered an example of a prophylactic rule formulated by the judiciary in order to protect a constitutional right. The exclusionary rule may also, in some circumstances at least, be considered to follow directly from the constitutional language, such as the Fifth Amendment's command that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" and that no person "shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law".
The exclusionary rule is grounded in the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights, and it is intended to protect citizens from illegal searches and seizures.Berg, p. 29 The exclusionary rule is also designed to provide a remedy and disincentive for criminal prosecution from prosecutors and police who illegally gather evidence in violation of the Fifth Amendment and its protection against self-incrimination. The exclusionary rule also protects against violations of the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees the right to counsel.
Most states also have their own exclusionary remedies for illegally obtained evidence under their state constitutions or statutes, some of which predate the federal constitutional guarantees against unlawful searches and seizures and compelled self-incrimination.
This rule is occasionally referred to as a legal technicality because it allows defendants a defense that does not address whether the crime was actually committed. In this respect, it is similar to the explicit rule in the Fifth Amendment protecting people from double jeopardy. In strict cases, when an illegal action is used by the police or the prosecution to gain any incriminating result, all evidence whose recovery stemmed from the illegal action—this evidence is known as "fruit of the poisonous tree"—can be thrown out from a jury trial or be grounds for a mistrial if too much information has been irrevocably revealed.
The exclusionary rule applies to all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States regardless of whether they are citizens, immigrants (legal or illegal), or visitors.
History of the rule Up until the independence of the United States, the courts of England excluded self-incriminating evidence that was provided as a result of official compulsion, regardless of its reliability. In 1769, Lord Chief Justice Mansfield explained as follows:
Lord Mansfield also explained that "If any evidence or confession has been extorted from her, it will be of no prejudice to her on the trial."Rudd's Case, 168 Eng. Rep. 160 (K.B. 1775). Additionally, a defendant could sue to suppress and regain possession of at least some types of illegally seized evidence, in a common law action for replevin.Contrariwise, obiter in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) explains that replevin is not available where evidence was lawfully seized.
However, in the 1783 case of Ceglinski v. Orr, the English courts declined to suppress evidence obtained by illegal coercion. In the Warickshall case, evidence was gathered as a result of an involuntary confession, and the court held that the evidence (but not the confession itself) could be admitted.King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (K.B. 1783). It is questionable whether the Warickshall rule became known in the United States before 1789 (when the U.S. Bill of Rights was written), and whether it applied to confessions obtained by both governmental and private parties. In any event, no decision by the Supreme Court of the United States has ever endorsed the Warickshall rule as a constitutional matter.
Generally speaking, English law before 1789 did not provide as strong an exclusionary rule as the one that later developed under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, regarding unlawful searches and seizures. The Fourth Amendment, after all, was partly a reaction against English law including the general warrant and the writs of assistance.
In the 1886 case of Boyd v. United States,Zoo v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). the U.S. Supreme Court addressed compulsory production of business papers, and the Court excluded those papers based on a combination of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Boyd was closely limited to its facts, and several years later the Court stated that the Fourth Amendment does not extend to "excluding testimony" about wrongful searches and seizures.Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
In 1897, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Bram v. United States,Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). that involuntary confessions are inadmissible as evidence. The Court in Bram did not announce a strong version of the exclusionary rule that would apply uniformly to exclude all evidence gathered in violation of the Bill of Rights, but instead announced a weak version that excluded only self-incriminating testimony that was compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The distinction between testimonial versus other self-incriminating evidence is a matter of continuing debate.United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring): "A substantial body of evidence suggests that the Fifth Amendment privilege protects against the compelled production not just of incriminating testimony, but of any incriminating evidence."
Before a strong version of the exclusionary rule was addressed and adopted by the federal courts, it had already been adopted by at least one state court, namely the Iowa Supreme Court, as that court would later describe:
In 1914, the U.S. Supreme Court announced a strong version of the exclusionary rule, in the case of Weeks v. United States, under the Fourth Amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). This decision, however, created the rule only on the federal level. The "Weeks rule", which made an exception for cases at the state level, was adopted by numerous states at a time during Prohibition. In adopting the rule, actions by states often reflected attitudes towards Prohibition, which was enacted by adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment and was enforced through the Volstead Act. Concerns about privacy violations also extended to other instances where criminal sanctions were permitted for "victimless" crime, such as illegal gambling or narcotics violations.
In 1920, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine in the case of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.Silverthorne Lumber v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). The Court stated that allowing evidence gathered as an indirect result of an unconstitutional search and seizure "reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words".
Wolf v. Colorado ruled that states were not required to adopt the exclusionary rule. Despite the ruling, some states adopted the exclusionary rule. In 1955, the Supreme Court of California ruled in People v. CahanPeople v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434 that the exclusionary rule applied for cases in the state of California. By 1960, 22 states had adopted the rule without substantial qualifications: California, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Washington, Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. Michigan also had an exclusionary rule, but with limitations for some narcotics and firearms evidence. In Alabama, Maryland, and South Dakota, the exclusionary rule applied in some situations.
It was not until Mapp v. OhioMapp v. Ohio, in 1961 that the exclusionary rule was also held to be binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees due process. Up until Mapp, the exclusionary rule had been rejected by most states.
In 2016, Utah v. Strieff dealt with the exclusionary rule and outstanding warrants and was viewed to be generally favorable towards police.
Scope and limitations of the rule Scope The exclusionary rule does not apply in a civil case, in a grand jury proceeding, or in a parole revocation hearing.
The law in force at the time of the police action, not the time of the attempt to introduce the evidence, controls whether the action is illegal for exclusionary rule purposes.
Evidence obtained indirectly from illegal activity Under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, evidence obtained as an indirect result of illegal state action is also inadmissible. For example, if a defendant is arrested illegally, the government may not use fingerprints taken while the defendant was in custody as evidence.Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985) Because police would not have obtained the fingerprints without the illegal arrest, the prints are "fruit of the poisonous tree".
Other examples of evidence inadmissible under this doctrine include:
Evidence seized during a search, where the probable cause for the search was illegally obtained evidenceSilverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) A confession made by the defendant, prompted by the admission of illegally obtained evidence against himHarrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968) Evidence derived from information gained in illegal wiretapsNardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939)
However, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine does not apply to interrogations made without a Miranda warning. Although a confession obtained in violation of Miranda is inadmissible, evidence obtained based on information in the confession is admissible. For example, if police learn the identity of a witness through a confession that violates Miranda, the government may still use the witness's testimony at trial.Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974)
Limitations Even in a criminal case, the exclusionary rule does not simply bar the introduction of all evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment. In Hudson v. Michigan,Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 126 S.Ct. 2159 (June 15, 2006) Justice Scalia wrote for the U.S. Supreme Court:
Limitations on the exclusionary rule have included the following: Private search doctrine: Evidence unlawfully obtained from the defendant by a private person is admissible. The exclusionary rule is designed to protect privacy rights, with the Fourth Amendment applying specifically to government officials.Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) Standing requirement: Evidence can only be suppressed if the illegal search violated the person's own (the person making the court motion) constitutional rights. The exclusionary rule does not apply to privacy rights of a third party.United States v. Jeffers and Jones v. United States clarify the standing requirements. However, there is a narrow exception to this standing requirement, the standing exception.See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff Et Al., 96 S. Ct. 2868, 428 U.S. 106 (U.S. 1976); "The Assertion of Constitutional Jus Tertii: A Substantive Approach", Robert Allen Sedler, California Law Review, Vol. 70, No. 6 (December 1982), pp. 1308–1344; "Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii", 88 Harvard Law Review 423 (1974). Cross-examination: Illegally obtained evidence may be admissible to attack the defendant's credibility on cross-examination, at least where necessary to prevent gamesmanship.Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) For example, where the defendant affirmatively chooses to make a broad statement denying any narcotics activity, he may not use the exclusionary rule as a shield against attacks on his credibility. However, the government also may not attempt to "smuggle in" excluded evidence on cross-examination by asking broad questions.