Culp's Hill,. The modern U.S. Geographic Names System refers to "Culps Hill". which is about south of the center of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, played a prominent role in the Battle of Gettysburg. It consists of two rounded peaks, separated by a narrow saddle.Gottfried, Maps of Gettysburg, p. 226. Its heavily wooded higher peak is above sea level. The lower peak is about 100 feet (30 m) shorter than its companion. The eastern slope descends to Rock Creek, about 160 feet (50 m) lower in elevation, and the western slope is to a saddle with Stevens Knoll (formerly McKnight's Hill) with a summit lower than the main Culp's Hill summit. The hill was owned in 1863 by farmer Henry CulpPfanz, Culp's Hill, pp. 111–12. and was publicized as "Culp's Hill" by October 31, 1865.
During the Battle of Gettysburg, July 1–3, 1863, Culp's Hill was a critical part of the Union Army defensive line, the principal feature of the right flank, or "barbed" portion of what is described as the "fish-hook" line. Holding the hill was by itself unimportant because its heavily wooded sides made it unsuitable for artillery placement, but its loss would have been catastrophic to the Union army. It dominated Cemetery Hill and the Baltimore Pike, the latter being critical for keeping the Union army supplied and for blocking any Confederate advance on Baltimore or Washington, D.C.Pfanz, Culp's Hill, p. 25; Pfanz, Battle of Gettysburg, p. 21.
Opposing forces
Union
Confederate
Battle
Battle of Gettysburg, First Day
Culp's Hill was occupied originally on the nightfall of July 1, 1863, by troops of the Union Army, along with neighboring Cemetery Hill, as a rallying point from the retreat following the Confederate victory that day north and west of town. Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell had discretionary orders to seize the heights south of town, and he believed that Culp's Hill was unoccupied and therefore a good target, one that would make the Union position on Cemetery Hill untenable. His third division, under Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson, had just arrived on the battlefield, and Johnson was ordered to take the hill if he had not already done so.Coddington, pp. 297–99.
Johnson did not take Culp's Hill. He sent a small party to reconnoiter, and they encountered the 7th Indiana Infantry of the I Corps, part of Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth's division, which had been in the rear guarding the corps trains and was now linked up with the Iron Brigade, digging in following their fierce battle on Seminary Ridge. Johnson's party was taken by surprise and almost taken prisoner before fleeing.Sears, p. 233.
Ewell's failure to take Culp's Hill or Cemetery Hill that evening is considered one of the great missed opportunities of the battle.Sears, pp. 233–34. Another reason for his reluctance to proceed was intelligence that Union troops were approaching from the east on the Hanover Road. This was the vanguard of the XII Corps under Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum. If those troops had arrived at the wrong time, Ewell's flank would have been turned.Coddington, pp. 314–16.
Second day
By mid-morning of July 2, 1863, the XII Corps arrived and fortified the hill. Brig. Gen. George S. Greene, who at 62 was the oldest Union general on the field, was a brigade commander in the division of Maj. Gen. John W. Geary. As a civil engineer before the war, he had a natural understanding of the value of defensive works. His division and corps commanders did not believe they would be stationed at Culp's Hill very long and did not share his enthusiasm for constructing breastworks, but they did not oppose his efforts. He set his troops to the task of felling trees and collecting rocks and earth to create very effective defensive positions.Murray, pp. 4, 13–16; Pfanz, Culp's Hill, p. 111; Sears, p. 312.
The Union defensive positions on July 2 began in the north with artillery batteries on Stevens's Knoll, followed by Wadsworth's division of the I Corps, Greene's New York brigade in positions running north to south on the upper slope, and the brigade of Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Kane connecting to Greene's line behind breastworks on the lower slope. Behind these front lines were, from left to right, the brigades of Col. Charles Candy, Col. Archibald L. McDougall, Col. Silas Colgrove, and Brig. Gen. Henry H. Lockwood, extending past Spangler's Spring and through McAllister's Woods. (The latter three brigades were from the XII Corps division of Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Ruger, who was filling in for Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams, temporarily in corps command.)Pfanz, Culp's Hill, pp. 112–14.
That morning, Confederate General Robert E. Lee ordered attacks on both ends of the Union line. Lt. Gen. James Longstreet attacked with his First Corps on the Union left (Little Round Top, Devil's Den, the Wheatfield). Ewell and the Second Corps were assigned the mission of launching a simultaneous demonstration against the Union right, a minor attack that was intended to distract and pin down the Union defenders against Longstreet. Ewell was to exploit any success his demonstration might achieve by following up with a full-scale attack at his discretion.Pfanz, Battle of Gettysburg, p. 21.
Ewell began his demonstration at 4 p.m. upon hearing the sound of Longstreet's guns to the south. For three hours, he chose to limit his demonstration to an artillery barrage from Benner's Hill, about a mile (1,600 m) to the northeast. But despite this demonstration, Ewell did not hold the attention of Army of the Potomac commander, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade. Meade was occupied with the fierce fighting on his left flank and was scrambling to send as many reinforcements as possible. He ordered Slocum to send the XII Corps in support. It is unclear whether he ordered the entire corps or instructed Slocum to leave one brigade behind, but the latter is what Slocum did, and Greene's brigade was left with the sole responsibility for defending Culp's Hill.Pfanz, Culp's Hill, pp. 194–96; Sears, pp. 282–83, 312.
Greene extended his line to the right to cover part of the lower slope, but his 1,400 men would be dangerously overextended if a Confederate attack came. They were only able to form a single battle line, without reserves. Only three of the five brigades of Union troops that were dispatched from the hill saw combat. The remainder of Geary's division marched down the Baltimore Pike and missed a key right hand turn. By the time they realized where they were, the crisis on the Union left flank and center had subsided.Sears, p. 312; Trudeau, pp. 398–99; Pfanz, Battle of Gettysburg, p. 21.
Around 7 pm (19:00), as dusk began to fall, and the Confederate assaults on the Union left and center were slowing, Ewell chose to begin his main infantry assault. He sent three brigades (4,700 men) from the division of Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson across Rock Creek and up the eastern slope of Culp's Hill. The brigades were, from left to right, those of Brig. Gen. George H. Steuart, Col. Jesse M. Williams (Nicholl's Brigade), and Brig. Gen. John M. Jones.Pfanz, Culp's Hill, pp. 207, 213–15. The Stonewall Brigade, under Brig. Gen. James A. Walker, had been dispatched earlier in the day to screen the Confederate left flank to the east of Rock Creek. Although Johnson ordered Walker join the dusk assault, he was unable to do so as the Stonewall Brigade sparred with Union cavalry under Brig. Gen. David M. Gregg for control of Brinkerhoff's Ridge.
As the fighting started, Greene sent for reinforcements from the I Corps and XI Corps to his left. Wadsworth was able to send three regiments, and Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard on Cemetery Hill was able to send four—altogether 750 men, who served as Greene's reserve and help to restore dwindling supplies of ammunition.Murray, pp. 25–28.
On the Confederate right flank, Jones's brigade of Virginians had the most difficult terrain to cross, the steepest part of Culp's Hill. As they scrambled through the woods and up the rocky slope, they were shocked at the strength of the Union breastworks on the crest. Their charges were beaten off with relative ease by the 60th New York, which suffered very few casualties. Confederate casualties were high, including General Jones, who was wounded and left the field. One of the New York officers wrote "without breastworks our line would have been swept away in an instant by the hailstorm of bullets and the flood of men."Sears, pp. 327–28.
In the center, Nicholls's Louisiana brigade had a similar experience to Jones's. The attackers were essentially invisible in the dark except for brief instances when they fired, but the defensive works were impressive, and the 78th and 102nd New York regiments suffered few casualties in a fight that lasted four hours.Sears, p. 328.
Steuart's regiments on the left occupied the empty breastworks on the lower hill and felt their way in the darkness toward Greene's right flank. The Union defenders waited nervously, watching as the flashes of the Confederate rifles drew near. But as they approached, Greene's men delivered a withering fire. The 3rd North Carolina "reeled and staggered like a drunken man."Pfanz, Culp's Hill, p. 217.
Two regiments on Steuart's left, the 23rd and 10th Virginia, outflanked the works of the 137th New York. Like the fabled 20th Maine of Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain on Little Round Top earlier that afternoon, Col. David Ireland of the 137th New York found himself on the extreme end of the Union army, fending off a strong flanking attack. Under heavy pressure, the New Yorkers were forced back to occupy a traversing trench that Greene had engineered facing south. They essentially held their ground and protected the flank, but they lost almost a third of their men in doing so. Because of the darkness and Greene's brigade's heroic defense, Steuart's men did not realize that they had almost unlimited access to the main line of communication for the Union army, the Baltimore Pike, only 600 yards to their front. Ireland and his men prevented a huge disaster from befalling Meade's army, although they never received the publicity that their colleagues from Maine enjoyed.Pfanz, Culp's Hill, pp. 220–22; Pfanz, Battle of Gettysburg, p. 40; Sears, p. 329.
In the confusion of fighting in the dark, the 1st North Carolina, brought up from the reserves, fired on the Confederate 1st Maryland Battalion by mistake.Sears, p. 330. (In Gettysburg National Military Park, the monument to this battalion refers to the "2nd Maryland" so that it would not be confused with the two Union regiments named 1st Maryland in Lockwood's brigade. The 1st and 2nd Maryland Regiments were also composed of the same men and officers, the "1st" Maryland having been disbanded in 1862 and subsequently reformed a few months later. The designation "2nd" was not official by the time of Gettysburg and was only used by the men as a moniker and not used in official documents.)Hawthorne, p. 93.
During the heat of the fighting, the sound of battle reached II Corps commander Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock on Cemetery Ridge, who immediately sent additional reserve forces. The 71st Pennsylvania filed in to assist the 137th New York on Greene's right.Pfanz, Culp's Hill, pp. 220–21.
By the time the rest of the XII Corps returned late that night, Confederate troops had occupied some of the Union defensive line on the southeastern slope of the hill, near Spangler's Spring. This caused considerable confusion as the Union troops stumbled in the dark to find enemy soldiers in the positions they had vacated. Gen. Williams did not want to continue this confused fight, so he ordered his men to occupy the open field in front of the woods and wait for daylight. While Steuart's brigade maintained a fragile hold on the lower heights, Johnson's other two brigades were pulled off the hill, also to wait for daylight. Geary's men returned to reinforce Greene. Both sides prepared to attack at dawn.Pfanz, Culp's Hill, p. 234.