After the fighting at Quatre Bras (16 June 1815) the two opposing commanders Marshal Ney and the Duke of Wellington initially held their ground while they obtained information about what had happened at the larger Battle of Ligny. They received intelligence that the Prussian army under the command of Prince Blücher had been defeated by the French Army of the North under the command of Napoleon Bonaparte.
Upon receiving this news Wellington organised the retreat of the Anglo-allied army to a place he had identified a year before as the best place in Belgium for him to be able to employ his reverse slope tactics when fighting a major battle: the escarpment close to the village of Waterloo.
On the 17th, aided by thunderstorms and torrential rain and before the arrival of Napoleon, Wellington's army successfully extricated itself from Quatre Bras and passed through the defile of Genappe. The infantry marched ahead and were screened by a large cavalry rearguard. The French harried Wellington's army, but were unable to inflict any substantial casualties before night fell and Wellington's men were ensconced in bivouacs on the plain of Mont-Saint-Jean.
Prelude After the fighting at Quatre Bras, the two armies settled down for the night. The Anglo-allied army on the field of battle and the French just to the south. The bivouac on the battle field of Quatre Bras, during the night of 16 June, continued undisturbed until about an hour before daylight, when a cavalry patrol having accidentally got between the adverse pickets near Piermont, caused an alarm in that quarter that was quickly communicated to both armies by a rattling fire of musketry, which, rapidly augmenting, extended itself along the line of the advanced posts. Among the first who hastened to ascertain the origin and nature of the engagement was Picton, who, together with other staff officers, as they arrived in succession, on discovering that no advance had been attempted or intended on either side, soon succeeded in restoring confidence. Similar exertions were successfully made on the part of the French officers, and as day began to break upon the scene, both parties resumed their previous tranquillity. In this untoward affair, the pickets furnished by the 1st Hanoverian Brigade (Kielmansegg's), and by the 3rd Brunswick Light Battalion (Ebeling's) were sharply engaged, and a pickets of the Field Battalion Bremen (Langrehre's) suffered considerably.
Hussar brigade at Quatre Bras
It was not long before Wellington, who had slept at Genappe, arrived at Quatre Bras, where he found Major General Sir Hussey Vivian, whose Brigade of Light Cavalry, consisting of the British 10th Hussars (Quentin's), of the British 18th Hussars (Murray's), and of the 1st Hussars of the King's German Legion (KLG, Wissell's), was posted on the left of that point with two strong pickets thrown out; one, of the 18th Hussars (under Captain Croker) on the Namur road, and the other, of the 10th Hussars, under Major Frederick Howard, in front — with a picket from the latter, under Lieutenant Arnold, on the right of the Namur road.
Vivian, on being asked what account he could give of the French, communicated to Wellington the result of his observations, which were necessarily very limited, as, with the exception of the firing that had taken place, as before mentioned, along the line of pickets, the French had continued perfectly quiet, and had as yet given no indication of any offensive movement.
British hussar patrol sent down the Namur road Wellington then took a general survey of the battle field, and while sweeping the horizon with his telescope, he discovered a French vedette on some rising ground, in the direction of Fleurus, and a little to the right of the high road leading to Namur, apparently belonging to some picket thrown out from Marshal Ney's extreme right on the previous night, after the battle had ceased; or to some detached Corps placed in that quarter for the purpose of observation, and for the maintenance of the communication between Napoleon and Ney. Wellington had received no intelligence of Blücher; and, probably, judging from the advanced position of the vedette in question that whatever might have been the result of the Battle of Ligny, the Prussians could not have made any forward movement likely to endanger Ney's right, he came to the conclusion that it was quite possible that, on the other hand, Napoleon might have crossed the Namur road, and cut off his communication with Blücher, with the design of manoeuvring upon his left and rear, and causing him to be simultaneously attacked by Ney. Wellington therefore desired Vivian to send a strong patrol along the Namur road to gain intelligence respecting the Prussian Army.
A troop of the 10th Hussars, under Captain Grey, was accordingly despatched on this duty, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. Sir Alexander Gordon, one of Wellington's aides de camp. As the patrol advanced along the road, the French vedette began to circle, evidently to give notice of the approach of an enemy, and then retired. This induced the patrol to move forward with great caution, so as to guard against the possibility of being cut off.
Nevertheless, it continued, but with all due precaution, advancing along the road, until after passing a few scattered cottages, comprising a hamlet called Petit-Marbais it reached, about further on, some rising ground, about from Quatre Bras, and beyond which was another height. A vedette was observed posted upon the latter, but who had evidently not yet noticed the approach of Captain Grey's troop. Down in the intervening hollow was an isolated house, at the door of which stood a dismounted sentry, and some horses were standing in an adjoining yard.
Captain Grey directed Lieutenant Bacon to patrol towards the house, while he remained with the remainder of the troop, concealed from the French, a disposition favoured by the nature of the ground, and the trees in the hedges, on both sides of the road. When Lieutenant Bacon's party moved forward, it was discovered by the vedette, who began circling, and fired his carbine. The French pocket posted in the house instantly rushed out; several of the men had their jackets and accoutrements off; and the post could easily have been captured, had the special duty on which the British patrol was engaged admitted of an attack. The French turned out very quickly and galloped to the rear along the high road, while Bacon's party was recalled. A few French cavalry galloped up to the vedette on the heights, but evinced no disposition to advance.
British patrol finds the Prussians at Tilly It had now become sufficiently evident that, commencing from this point, that the French were in possession of the Namur road; but the principal object which Sir Alexander Gordon had in view was yet to be attained. The patrol now retired a little until it reached a cross road, which a peasant pointed out as the Prussian line of retreat. Pursuing this track, the patrol, within an hour, reached Tilly; where General Zieten, who had been placed in temporary command of the Prussian cavalry, was covering the retreat of the Prussian army.
After remaining there about a quarter of an hour, during which Sir Alexander Gordon obtained from General Zieten the most ample information respecting the movements of the Prussians, the patrol commenced its return, at a quick pace, striking into a cross road, which joined the high road at a point nearer to Quatre Bras than the one whence it had left it. The patrol reached Quatre Bras at 7:30; and Sir Alexander Gordon immediately reported to Wellington that the Prussians had retreated towards Wavre, that the French occupied the ground on which the Battle of Ligny had been fought; but that they had not crossed the high road, along which the patrol had proceeded almost into the immediate vicinity of their advanced posts.
Wellington's order for a retreat and informing Blücher of his plans
Napoleon's lack of movement was very notable, and served to satisfy Wellington that, either Napoleon's victory had not been followed up with a vigour by which the safety of his own army would have been imperilled, or, that the victory had not been of a character sufficiently decisive to have enabled Napoleon to avail himself of such an advantage.
Having ascertained that the contingency for which he was fully prepared had actually taken place, Wellington decided upon retreating along the Brussels road until he reached a position in front of the point of junction of the roads leading from Charleroi and Nivelles upon Brussels: the Mont-Saint-Jean escarpment near the village of Waterloo. On this position he might rely upon the aid of a sufficient portion of Blücher's forces from Wavre which, combined with his own, would enable the Coalition to confront Napoleon and his main army with a numerical superiority at a decisive point. Wellington was familiar with the topography of the position having identified it as a possible battle site a year previously while surveying the territory around Brussels.
Shortly after the departure of the patrol of the 10th Hussars, along the Namur road, Wellington received some despatches from England, to which he gave his attention; and now that he had satisfied himself as to the real state of things, he issued his orders for the movements of his distant units: The 2nd division of British infantry (Clinton's) to march from Nivelles to Waterloo at 10:00 The Brigades of the 4th Division (Colville's) at Nivelles were to march on Waterloo at 10:00 The Brigades of the 4th Division at Braine-le-Comte, and on the road from Braine-le-Comte to Nivelles, to collect and halt at Braine-le-Comte All the baggage on the road from Braine-le-Comte to Nivelles was to return immediately to Braine-le-Comte, and to proceed from there to Hal and Brussels. The spare musket ammunition was to be immediately parked behind Genappe. The Corps under the command of Frederick, Prince of Orange was to move from Enghien on that evening of 17 June, and take up a position in front of Hal, occupying Braine-le-Château with two battalions. Colonel Estorff was to fall back with his Brigade on Hal, and place himself under the orders of Prince Frederick.
Having issued order for those units present on the battle field and in the vicinity were to retreat, Wellington lay down on the ground near Quatre Bras, covered his head with one of the newspapers he had been reading (which had accompanied those despatches from England), and appeared to fall asleep. After remaining some time in this state, he again rose, mounted his horse, and rode a little distance down the battle field in front of Quatre Bras. He then looked about through his telescope, and expressed to those about him his astonishment at the perfect stillness of the French, remarking at the same time, "What if they should be also retiring? It is not at all impossible".
A second officer, Lieutenant , had been despatched from the Prussian to the Anglo-allied headquarters; and it was about this time that he reached Wellington. He informed Wellington of the Prussian retreat upon Wavre, and the position Blücher intended to be assumed in that quarter. It was of a nature which, taken altogether, was so far satisfactory, that Wellington immediately asked Lieutenant Massow to inform Blücher, that he intended to retreat and take up a position south of Waterloo where he proposed to stand and fight, provided Blücher would detach two corps to his assistance.
The Anglo-allied light troops retire The following is the manner in which the retreat of the Anglo-allied infantry, then in full operation, was executed.