A far-reaching anti-corruption campaign was launched in China following the conclusion of the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012. Initiated by CCP general secretary Xi Jinping, the campaign became the most extensive and systematic anti-corruption effort in the history of CCP governance. The campaign began with the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) conducting investigations and purging numerous high-ranking CCP and government officials, as well as People's Liberation Army (PLA) generals and heads of state-owned enterprises and institutions, for violations of discipline and law. Nationwide, disciplinary inspection and supervision departments at all levels of the CCP and government have investigated and punished CCP members and senior officials for violations of discipline and law.
Upon assuming office, Xi pledged to crack down on both "tigers and flies", referring respectively to high-ranking officials and grassroots civil servants. Most of the officials investigated were dismissed from office and faced charges of bribery and abuse of power, though the severity and nature of the alleged misconduct varied considerably. Administered primarily by the CCDI its Secretary from 2012 to 2017, Wang Qishan, alongside the relevant military and judicial bodies, the campaign has targeted hundreds of senior officials, including dozens of ministerial-level official and senior PLA officers, hundreds of deputy ministerial-level officials, several executives of state-owned enterprises, and five national leaders. The campaign has also led to strengthening of the CCDI apparatus within the CCP, as well as enhanced power over local Discipline Inspection Commissions. In 2018, the National Supervisory Commission was formed as the country's highest state supervisory body following a merger between various anti-corruption government departments, strengthening the CCDI's powers and reach.
The campaign notably investigated both sitting and former national-level leaders. These included former Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) member Zhou Yongkang and former Politburo members and Central Military Commission (CMC) vice chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong. The campaign also targeted sitting Politburo members such as Chongqing CCP committee secretary Sun Zhengcai in 2017, CMC vice chairmen He Weidong and Zhang Youxia in 2025 and 2026 respectively. and former Xinjiang CCP committee secretary Ma Xingrui in 2026. As of 2023, approximately 2.3 million government officials had been prosecuted. The campaign formed a central component of a broader initiative aimed at curbing corruption within the CCP and reinforcing internal unity through a process termed self-revolution. It has since become one of the defining features of Xi's political legacy and has been cited as a key factor that allowed Xi to consolidate power.
Campaign oversight
The agency directly charged with overseeing the campaign is the CCDI, which, at the time of the campaign, was headed by Secretary Wang Qishan, a politician known for his work in the financial sector and one of the seven members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee. Wang was in charge of the day-to-day execution of the campaign. The CCDI's official mandate is to enforce party discipline, combat malfeasance, and punish party members for committing offenses. The CCDI is an internal agency of the party and therefore does not have judicial authority. In general, the CCDI investigates officials and, when necessary, forwards evidence gathered to judicial organs, such as the Supreme People's Procuratorate (in charge of investigation and prosecution), which proceeds to charge the accused with criminal wrongdoing and move the case to trial.
While the CCDI formally reports into the CCP National Congress, nominally the highest representative body of the party which gathers once every five years, and is intended to be an 'independent' agency from a constitutional standpoint, in practice ultimate oversight of the agency falls under the purview of Xi Jinping by virtue of holding the office of General Secretary (i.e., de facto leader). Xi, who also directs anti-graft efforts of the military through his holding the office of Chairman of the Central Military Commission (i.e., commander-in-chief). The majority of reporting on the campaign by media sources has highlighted Xi Jinping's direct involvement in managing the campaign, which has become a central hallmark of his term in office. However, formal disciplinary measures meted out to high-ranking officials, such as former Politburo members, must undergo ratification by the sitting Politburo. According to The Wall Street Journal, anti-corruption punishment to officials at or above the vice ministerial level need approval from Xi.
The power of anti-corruption is centralized in the CCP Politburo Standing Committee by undermining the original functions of the local Discipline Inspection Commissions. Coordination of anti-corruption efforts in the provinces and state-owned enterprises has been carried out by "central inspection teams" (), which reports to the Central Leading Group for Inspection Work, which, like the CCDI, was also led by Wang Qishan. The inspection teams are typically 'stationed' for a few months at the organization they were tasked with overseeing, and are in charge of thorough audits into the conduct of officials and organizational practices. The inspection teams send the results of the audits to the CCDI to enact formal investigative procedures such as Shuanggui (the practice of detaining individual party members for investigation).
The proposed constitutional changes published on 25 February 2018 envisioned the creation of a new anti-graft state agency that merges various anti-corruption government departments. The thus formed National Supervisory Commission is the highest state supervisory body in the country, and holds same constitutional status as that of the State Council, of the Supreme People's Court, and of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, outranking courts and the office of the prosecutor. Effectively functioning as the state arm of the CCDI, the commission covers all public servants, whether or not they're CCP members. Additionally under Xi, the resident discipline offices and inspectors have been embedded to cover all central agencies and state ministries.
Chronology
Background
Anti-corruption efforts have been on the agenda of successive Chinese leaders, though the effectiveness of these campaigns has varied. Since the reform and opening up began in 1978, political corruption in China has grown significantly. The types of offenses vary, though usually they involve trading bribes for political favours, such as local businesses trying to secure large government contracts or subordinates seeking promotions for higher office.
At the 18th National Congress, both outgoing General Secretary Hu Jintao and incoming party leader Xi Jinping repeatedly emphasized that corruption is a threat to the party's survival. Xi made special mention of corruption in his inaugural speech as General Secretary on 15 November 2012. In his first days in office, Xi vowed to crack down on "tigers and flies", that is, high-ranking officials and petty civil servants alike. He also warned his colleagues on the Politburo that corruption would "doom the party and state." Xi proposed to eliminate the "Four Bad Work Styles" of "formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism, and extravagance" (the latter two referring to types of corruption) from the CCP.
Around 20 days after Xi assumed office as general secretary, the Politburo issued the Eight-point Regulation, stressing reforms such as prohibiting private use of public cars, reduce and simplify official meetings, and prohibit expensive meals and showy official trips. In January 2013, the CCDI held a meeting to mobilize for the anti-corruption campaign. It was announced that the campaign would be implemented directly from Beijing by dispatching inspection teams with full power with no limits or quotas. The powers of the CCDI were also expanded, which was given enhanced power over local CDIs so that local officials could not interfere with its affairs. By July 2013, CCDI had sent out ten roving inspection teams led by retired ministerial-level officials to the provinces, state-owned enterprises, and other units. The number of inspection teams increased from 20 in 2012, 39 in 2014, 82 in 2015, to more than one hundred in 2016. In 2015, the CCDI issued a list of one hundred "most wanted" suspects for corruption crimes.
First regional inspections The first salvos of the campaign were the abrupt sacking of Sichuan CCP deputy committee secretary Li Chuncheng, which took place in December 2012, shortly after Xi took office as leader of the CCP. The first batch of central inspection teams was dispatched in the third quarter of 2013 to various Chinese provinces, including Jiangxi, Inner Mongolia, Chongqing, and Hubei. A handful of provincial-level officials were investigated for corruption and removed from office as a result of the first round of inspection work. Of these regions, the inspection team in charge of Jiangxi uncovered far-reaching official corruption in the province, bringing down about a dozen officials, including Lieutenant Governor Yao Mugen. The inspection work in Hubei province also resulted in about a dozen cases, including that of Lieutenant Governor Guo Youming. In Inner Mongolia, head of the party's regional United Front department Wang Suyi was detained.
'Encircling' Zhou Yongkang
Meanwhile, in the latter half of 2013, a separate operation began to investigate officials with connections to Zhou Yongkang, former Politburo Standing Committee member and national security chief. Three sectors in which Zhou was known to carry immense influence were targeted for investigation, including the national oil sector (where Zhou was once a chief executive), Sichuan province (where Zhou was party chief), and security organs (once under the jurisdiction of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, which Zhou headed). Senior officials, such as former China Petroleum chief executive Jiang Jiemin, senior Sichuan officials Li Chongxi and Guo Yongxiang, and former deputy minister of public security Li Dongsheng, were all dismissed in 2013. Many of Zhou's former secretaries who later received promotions, including Ji Wenlin, Tan Li, Shen Dingcheng, and Li Hualin, were also rounded up for investigation.
The fall of Jiang Jiemin – who were seen as a close confidant of Zhou Yongkang and who also held membership on the elite Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party – in September 2013 was seen as an unmistakable sign that the net was closing in on Zhou himself. On 15 December 2013, The New York Times, in a front-page article, confirmed that Zhou Yongkang was the ultimate target of the campaign, and that it would be only a matter of time before the investigation was made public. On 30 January 2014, Caixin, a Chinese website known for its investigative journalism, released a video and an accompanying article entitled "The Three 'White Gloves' of Zhou Bin", detailing allegations about the wrongdoing of Zhou Yongkang's son, without mentioning the senior Zhou directly as a means to skirt censorship rules. Zhou's targeting broke the long-standing convention of "PSC criminal immunity" () that had persisted since the end of the Cultural Revolution.
Second regional rounds and Shanxi "political earthquake"