The All-Russian Executive Committee of the Union of Railwaymen (Russian: Всероссийский исполнительный комитет железнодорожного профсоюза), commonly known in English by its Cyrillic acronym, Vikzhel, was the governing body of an industrial union established in revolutionary Russia during the summer of 1917. Inclined towards syndicalism and standing as one of the most radical Russian unions of the period, Vikzhel played a decisive role in stymying the attempted Kornilov coup in August 1917.
At the time of the October Revolution Vikzhel was the largest and best organized union in Russia. Simultaneously but independent of the Bolshevik Party's seizure of state power, Vikzhel would seize control of Russia's railways in the fall of 1917. Favoring a multi-party government, Vikzhel managed to leverage its position of strength through threat of a general transportation strike to force the Bolsheviks to add other socialist political parties to the previously all-Bolshevik government — a power play culminated by the provision of three ministerial portfolios to representatives of the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party.
Vikzhel's limited success in pushing the Bolsheviks towards compromise and moderation proved to be short-lived, however, as the fledgling Soviet government soon manufactured a split of the All-Russian Union of Railwaymen and establishment of a rival governing Executive Committee known as Vikzhedor. Supplanted by the new Bolshevik-friendly organization, Vikzhel was ultimately dissolved in March 1918 by decree of the governing Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom).
History Background
During the Russian Revolution of 1905 a pioneering effort was made to organize Russian railway workers into an All-Russian Union of Railwaymen.George Jackson with Robert Devlin, Dictionary of the Russian Revolution. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1989; pp. 26-29. This forerunner of the 1917 labor organization by the same name conducted a strike in October 1905 which had escalated into a general strike in St. Petersburg and Moscow, paving the way for formation of the short-lived St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Delegates.The definitive monograph on this topic is Henry Reichman, Railwaymen and Revolution: Russia, 1905. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987.
The revolt against Tsarism soon collapsed, however, and the government of Tsar Nicholas II pushed back with a December 14 (O.S.) decree allowing railway lines to be placed under martial law.Reichman, Railwaymen and Revolution, pg. 291. The lengthy decree provided for the summary arrest of workers failing to following the orders of railway authorities, backed by jail terms of up to three months and fines of up to 500 rubles without trial. Gatherings of railway workers were prohibited, with strikers subject to immediate dismissal and possible arrest. So-called "punitive expeditions" aboard armored trains were quickly dispatched to take action against organized strikers.
Some 150 railway strikers and bystanders were killed in massacres following the imposition of martial law.Reichman, Railwaymen and Revolution, pg. 292. More than 59,000 railway workers were ultimately terminated from their jobs as a result of the repression in 1906 and 1907, although many of these ultimately regained employment elsewhere in the Russian railroad industry following defeat of the revolution.Reichman, Railwaymen and Revolution, pg. 294. The Russian railway union was thus effectively crushed.
Establishment
Following the overthrow of Tsarism in the February Revolution of 1917, workers found no governmental obstacles to their self-organization into labor unions. Railway workers were in the front ranks of this effort, rapidly unionizing themselves as the All-Russian Union of Railwaymen at a convention held in Moscow on April 6, 1917 (O.S.). The 200 delegates to this gathering decided to establish themselves as a single industry-wide industrial union rather than as an alliance of specialized craft unions organizing workers based upon their specific tasks. A decentralized structure was agreed upon, which had the benefit of fostering local initiative but at the expense of united national action. The organizational conference set July 15, 1917 (O.S.) as the date for a formal First All-Russian Congress of Railwaymen to perfect its organizational form.
Some 500 delegates assembled in Moscow on July 15 for the convocation of the First Congress, with the left wing of the Socialist Revolutionary Party in clear numerical domination. This gathering elected a governing council, an All-Russian Executive Committee, to conduct the affairs of the railway union between conventions. A total of 40 people were elected to this All-Russian Executive Committee of the Union of Railwaymen, known by its acronym Vikzhel. Of these, just two were members of the Bolshevik Party — which remained at this juncture a radical anti-war opposition party to the Provisional Government headed by Alexander Kerensky. These were part of a left wing of 15, which included as well Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Menshevik-Internationalists. The majority moderate faction included members of the Right Socialist Revolutionary, Menshevik, and Popular Socialist parties.
As the economic crisis of 1917 expanded and the country became more radical, Vikzhel likewise shifted to the left, with Left SR A.L. Malitskii assuming the chairmanship of the organization on September 15 (O.S.). Vikzhel remained far from lockstep with the waxing Bolshevik forces, however, with the union remaining committed to the essentially syndicalist principles of decentralization and workers' control in contrast to the hard centralism touted by the Bolsheviks. Vikzhel rapidly developed amidst the chaos into which the country had descended, establishing itself as the largest and best organized union in Russia by the fall of 1917.E.H. Carr, History of Soviet Russia: The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-23: Volume 2. London: Macmillan, 1950; pg. 394.
Kornilov Affair
One of the most historically significant episodes involving Vikzhel occurred during the Kornilov affair of August 1917. The spontaneous street riots known as the July Days had fizzled and been suppressed, leading to a public discrediting of the Bolshevik Party that had belatedly supported such direct action and a turn in public opinion towards firm central government.Alexander Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power: The Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1976; pg. 94. A sense of despair filled the country, marked by daily reports of peasant lawlessness in the countryside, worker strikes in the cities, moves toward national separation in Finland and Ukraine, collapse of military discipline at the war front, chaos and violence in the streets, and a collapse of the economic system. Prime Minister Kerensky proved powerless to stave this escalating crisis, with his cabinet disunited on a single course of action and the strength of the Petrograd Soviet looming ominously over his shoulder, ready to call the masses into the streets in protest once more in the event of a repressive misstep.Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power, pp. 94-95.
A broad array of conservative forces, including business leaders and their All-Russian Union of Trade and Industry, gentry representatives organized in the Union of Landowners, and military officers of the Union of Officers and Union of Cossack Troops rapidly lost faith in the Kerensky government to find its way out of the crisis.Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power, pp. 95, 105. The monarchist tradition instilled by centuries of Tsarist rule loomed strong, and a drumbeat grew among the right for an overthrow of the stumbling young republic in favor of military leadership over the nation and its economy. A consensus emerged among these rightist elements to tap General Lavr Kornilov, commander-in-chief of the Russian army for the role of plenipotentiary leader of the Russian nation.Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power, pg. 96. Moreover, Kornilov's public status among middle class society was momentarily high, enhanced by the short-lived military successes of the army's June offensive, with which he was credited.Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power, pg. 98.
Kornilov was dismissive of the February revolution and its move towards increased civilian control of the military and the creeping of political activity into army ranks.Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power, pp. 101-102. He sought instead a purge of the officer corps and the expansion of special courts and capital punishment as a mechanism to restore military discipline and saw the continued existence of the moderate socialist Kerensky government as a fetter upon the implementation of this agenda. Kerensky reciprocated these feelings of mistrust, seeing in Kornilov an ambitious reactionary intent upon overthrow of the revolution and establishment of a military dictatorship in its stead — a sentiment shared by a substantial number of radicalized workers, fearing a new campaign of state repression akin to that which followed the collapse of the 1905 uprising.Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power, pp. 104-106.
In August Kornilov prepared the ground for a political offensive, visiting Petrograd and putting forward a plan to put the Petrograd Military District — previously controlled by Kerensky's Ministry of War — under his own personal authority.Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power, pg. 108. He also visited Moscow, upstaging the tepid reception given to the arrival of government ministers to a formal state conference with a carefully orchestrated railway ceremony featuring a military honor guard, saber-wielding Turkmen guards, and a military band.Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power, pg. 113. An uneasy political dance followed between Kerensky and Kornilov, in which each attempted to use the other to bolster his own claim as supreme leader of a future Russian government.Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power, pg. 116.
Late in August (Old Style calendar) a concrete plot for a military coup was hatched for Kornilov by the Main Committee of the Union of Officers and the Republican Center and Military League, timed to coincide with the August 27 official celebration of the 6-month anniversary of the revolution.Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power, pg. 117. The festivities would be accompanied by street disorder, the plotters assumed, making plausible a declaration of martial law to restore order, under cloak of which a change in government could be made.
Kerensky learned of the plot shortly before its execution and on August 26 sought and obtained self-dissolution of the cabinet for subsequent "restructuring" and the granting of unlimited authority by the outgoing cabinet to deal with Kornilov's "treachery" as he saw fit.Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power, pg. 125. Kerensky proved unable to by himself to divert the movement of Kornilov's troops to the capital, however, his telegraphic advice that "Petrograd is completely calm and no insurrections are expected" falling upon deaf ears.Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power, pg. 126. On August 27, troops personally loyal to Kornilov boarded trains heading for the capital city.Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power, pg. 127. Although the 6-month celebration of the revolution came and went, Kornilov's plan for a military takeover moved forward, with stock prices on the Petrograd stock exchange rocketing upwards on August 28 in anticipation of a rapid victory.